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Abstract 
Many organisations in the safety-critical domain are service-oriented, 
fundamentally centred on critical services provided by systems and operators. 
Increasingly, these services rely on software-intensive systems, e.g. medical 
health informatics and air traffic control, for improving the different aspects of 
industrial practice, e.g. enhancing efficiency through automation and safety 
through smart alarm systems. However, many services are categorised as high 
risk and as such it is vital to analyse the ways in which the software-based 
systems can contribute to unintentional harm and potentially compromise 
safety. This thesis defines an approach to modelling and analysing Service-
Oriented Architectures (SOAs) used in the safety-critical domain, with 
emphasis on identifying and classifying potential hazardous behaviour. The 
approach also provides a systematic and reusable basis for defining how the 
safety case for these SOAs can be developed in a modular manner. The 
approach is tool-supported and is evaluated through two case studies, from the 
healthcare and oil and gas domains, and industrial review. 
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Chapter 1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Service-Oriented Architectures (SOAs) 
Many organisations are primarily focussed on providing services to their 
customers. Notable service-based domains include banking, retail, healthcare 
and transport. A service can be described as a function which is well defined, is 
self-contained, and often does not have any internal dependency on the context 
or status of any other functions (1). A service has been defined as a “value 
delivered to another through a well-defined interface and available to a 
community” (2).  
One approach to designing and representing service-based systems, especially 
for software-based services, is through Service-Oriented Architectures (SOAs). 
SoAs provide “a paradigm for defining how people, organizations, and systems 
provide and use services to achieve results” (2). SOA was introduced as a design 
paradigm to minimise the gap between the business process requirements and 
the IT services implementing and supporting these requirements. SOAs are 
commonly designed with flexibility, dynamism and the capability to respond to 
changes within a system’s operational environment (3).  
SOA-based systems are typically constructed using patterns, which provide 
reusable template solutions for common problems encountered within a given 
domain. Patterns offer ‘road maps’ to build scalable applications, by breaking a 
problem down into smaller solvable problems (4). Patterns are generally 
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refined and optimised, depending on the specific context of the system being 
designed, to provide a possible solution for the problem being investigated (5).  
One of the formal definitions of SOA was provided by the Organization for the 
Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) group and the Open 
Group as follows: 
“[An SOA is] a paradigm for organizing and utilizing 
distributed capabilities that may be under the control of 
different ownership domains. It provides a uniform means to 
offer, discover, interact with and use capabilities to produce 
desired effects consistent with measurable preconditions and 
expectations.” (6) (7). 
SOAs have been lauded as a means to reduce the complexity required in the 
infrastructure of a solution platform by transforming complex business 
processes and complicated IT systems to a set of building blocks, i.e. services 
(8).  
Although there are different interpretations of SOA terminology and concepts 
for different perspectives, most agree on a set of common characteristics. These 
characteristics include loose coupling, service contracts, autonomy, reusability, 
composability and discoverability. These are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 2. 
SOA is increasingly being used in the development of enterprise systems (3). 
From the business perspective, SOA aims to facilitate the design of applications 
that are able to provide better services without increasing resource 
consumption, since the service provider can provide the same service to 
multiple clients concurrently. Consequently, more efficient systems with 
improved response times are expected (9). 
Within an SOA setting, service providers should have standardised 
communication methodologies, which allow the various business services 
provided by different vendors to communicate smoothly with each other. This 
allows businesses to interact more efficiently, potentially reducing the cost and 
time required to perform tasks as compared with traditional applications (10). 
17 
 
For some in the software engineering community, SOA is a way of thinking 
which can help to prompt the design of dependable systems that address 
flexibility, dynamicity and Quality of Service (QoS) as metrics to analyse 
business processes (4). Among the important characteristics of SOA are loose 
coupling and on-demand integration, which potentially allow organisations to 
become more proactive and dynamic. However, this brings challenges 
concerning the management and assurance of QoS, e.g. security, safety and 
performance.  
 
Figure 1: A Conceptual View of Healthcare Services (11) 
Figure 1 shows a simplified example of an SOA-based system from the 
healthcare domain (11). Two systems, Patient Management System and Payer 
System, communicate and provide basic services within a private healthcare 
setting, which are as follows: 
 Register patient; 
 Admit patient; 
 Verify Eligibility; 
 Find patient. 
The above services support key care processes within a modern health 
organisation. However, services can fail to achieve their intended behaviour 
18 
 
(e.g. providing incorrect patient information). When used in a safety-critical 
setting, service failures can directly lead to hazards and potentially harm. 
1.2. SOA and Safety 
Safety is one of the most significant dependability qualities for modern 
systems, since the consequences of hazardous failures can include harm to 
people, damage to property or threats to the environment (12). The assurance 
of safety requires specialised concepts, standards, methods and tools. Service-
based systems used in safety-critical applications have to satisfy their safety 
requirements at each level of service to support clients and other composite 
services and ensure that the safety risk posed by the system is acceptable. They 
also have to comply with any applicable safety regulations or assurance 
standards. 
Safety risks can be categorised as resulting from failures by humans involved in 
or interacting with the system, or failures due to system components and 
interactions (12). Leveson introduces absolute safety as “freedom from 
accidents or losses”. However, since this is not reasonable in the real world, 
Leveson recommends the adoption of Lawrence’s definition of a “safe” system 
as one in which the risks involved are deemed acceptable (13).  
Understanding and controlling the complex relations between system 
behaviour and the emergence of safety risks is a significant challenge. 
Addressing this challenge at the structural and behavioural level requires 
collaboration between the different technical and organisational stakeholders, 
e.g. users, analysts and system engineers. Insufficient interaction between 
domain experts and engineers remains a key difficulty in achieving effective 
risk assessment.  
An important aspect of the safety engineering process is providing assurance 
that the risk of hazardous behaviours of the system (and its components), 
which are identified in the risk assessment process, have been identified and 
managed appropriately to ensure safe system behaviour. This assurance is 
commonly communicated in the form of a safety or assurance case (14). Safety 
cases provide a reasoned and structured argument to demonstrate why the 
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available evidence, generated from testing and analysis, supports the claims 
made about system safety. In a complex environment, the overall safety case 
might be compositional (15), integrating separate safety argument modules for 
the various services, functions and sub-systems. In the context of such a 
system, although services might in reality be provided by sub-systems 
developed by different organisations, they are clearly interdependent and so 
are their corresponding safety arguments (16).  
1.3. The Challenges of SOA in Safety-Critical Systems  
SOA is increasingly being adopted in high-criticality domains (16). In sectors 
such as healthcare and aviation, many services are categorised as safety-
critical, and present various types of hazards and failures. An SOA designated 
for use in a safety-critical application must be shown to satisfy its safety 
requirements and developers and assessors must ensure that the safety risk 
posed by the system is acceptable before it can enter service. However, there is 
a lack of systematic techniques for generating safety requirements for SOA 
from the application of safety analysis. There is also a lack of systematic 
approaches for providing assurance that those requirements have been met for 
the SOA. This can hamper the adoption of SOA as an approach to building large-
scale safety-critical systems. 
The research presented in this thesis aims to address safety analysis and safety 
cases for safety-critical SOA, focusing on both the individual services and their 
associated interactions in order to identify hazardous behaviours associated 
with the system. Specifically, the following challenges are addressed in this 
research: 
 There is a shortage of research on the use of SOAs for the development 
of safety-critical systems; 
  There is a lack of systematic safety assessment processes and methods 
that address the special features of SOAs, such as composibility; 
 There is a lack of safety assurance strategies to guide the development 
of safety argumentation and evidence to justify why the use of SOAs in 
safety-critical applications is acceptably safe.  
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1.4. Research Hypothesis 
Following from the challenges described in the previous section, the hypothesis 
proposed in this thesis is as follows: 
Integrated architectural modelling and analysis of safety-critical service-
oriented systems provides a traceable, consistent and systematic means 
for assuring the safety of these systems. 
The following explains the key terms used in the thesis hypothesis: 
• Integrated: safety analysis and design decisions evolve together; 
• Traceable: forward and backward model-based traceability between 
design and safety analysis is provided; 
• Consistent: design features are reflected in the safety analysis and the 
safety assurance and vice versa; 
• Systematic: a methodical approach to performing safety assurance is 
proposed;  
• Assuring: the approach provides an explicit means for reasoning about 
the safety properties and system behaviour. 
The above terms define the basis for the criteria used for evaluation in Chapter 
6. This hypothesis is supported by the following four contributions made as 
part of this PhD research:  
 Identification and configuration of SOA modelling notations based on 
two criteria, namely coverage of the structure and behaviour of the 
services that are deemed suitable for the safety analysis and assurance 
of SOA. 
 Development of safety analysis methods for SOA which can be used to 
examine the hazardous failures of services and the failure behaviour of 
lower-level implementations.  
 Development of the concept of safety cases for the assurance of safety-
critical SOAs, supporting modularity and promoting correspondence 
between the structure of the SOA and the organisation of the safety case. 
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This is defined in a SOA Safety Argument Pattern Catalogue, which 
can be instantiated to produce safety arguments for specific SOA-based 
systems. 
 Implementation of tool-support that provides automated capabilities 
for building the SOA models, applying the safety analysis and building 
the safety case for the system.  
The target audience of the approach comprises software and systems engineers 
responsible for designing the architecture and for modelling the design. The 
safety analysis and assurance activities will more likely be the focus of the 
safety engineers. Of course this cannot be achieved without engaging the 
domain experts (e.g. clinicians in healthcare or chemical engineers in oil and 
gas). Therefore, the collaboration of domain experts and systems, software and 
safety engineers is important for performing the analysis and assurance 
activities in our proposed framework. In particular, the framework targets 
early lifecycle activities, mainly requirements engineering and architectural 
design (both in terms of structural and behavioural architecture) and their 
integration with the safety activities, e.g. hazard analysis. 
1.5. Thesis Structure   
The thesis is divided into the following chapters: 
Chapter 2 presents a survey of the published literature in relevant areas of the 
SOA paradigm. The survey first looks at the core elements of SOA. This includes 
a review of typical concept definitions, features and lifecycles of SOA and 
covers SOA design patterns and modelling. Next, the chapter reviews safety and 
certification. This includes an examination of the common elements of the 
safety engineering process, such as safety analysis, risk assessment, risk 
management, safety requirements and safety tactics. Next, the review considers 
safety assurance and safety standards, with particular attention to the concept 
of safety cases, including argument representation and modularity. Chapter 2 
concludes with a review of literature concerning dependability and safety of 
SOA and other related systems. 
Chapter 3 introduces the conceptual basis for this research by presenting our 
proposed SOA Safety Assurance Framework. The Framework defines how SOA 
22 
 
modelling, safety analysis, safety cases and tool support are performed in an 
integrated way. The chapter introduces the modelling languages that we use to 
specify the services and their underlying processes. It also introduces the 
methods we developed and adapted for identifying service hazards and 
potential failure behaviour in an SOA system design. The chapter proposes the 
use of modular safety cases and patterns to define the different argument 
structures for assuring services and their design and for constraining variation 
in SOA safety cases. Finally, the chapter presents an overview of the automated 
support developed and the tooling environment used in this research for the 
modelling, safety analysis and assurance of SOA.  
Chapter 4 explains the SOA safety analysis methods adapted and developed in 
this thesis. These methods consider potential service hazards and failure 
behaviours of services and tasks according to the ways in which these services 
and tasks are defined in the SOA context. This in turn forms the basis for the 
definition of safety requirements which can help influence or drive the design 
processes. A healthcare case study is introduced to provide an illustration of 
the application of the SOA safety analysis methods we have developed, and a 
preliminary evaluation of their effectiveness. The last section describes the 
implementation of the tool support that provides the capabilities for modelling, 
safety analysis and traceability.  
Chapter 5 develops a catalogue of safety argument patterns for justifying the 
use of SOA in safety-critical applications. The overall safety argument pattern is 
created in a modular manner to ensure a clear correspondence between the 
structure of the safety reasoning and the organisation of the SOA design. These 
argument patterns link the safety argument for the SOA with the results of the 
modelling and safety analysis presented in Chapter 4. Finally, we illustrate the 
application of the safety argument patterns to the services defined within the 
healthcare case study and provide a preliminary evaluation of their 
effectiveness. 
Chapter 6 describes our evaluation methodology in detail. It also presents a 
second case study, in which the SOA Safety Assurance Framework is applied to 
an industrial system in the oil and gas domain. A safety argument is produced, 
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based upon the SOA modelling and safety analysis described in Chapter 4 and 
the safety argument patterns presented in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 
contains a critical evaluation of the results of this PhD research. 
Chapter 7 presents the main conclusions of this research and discusses 
potential areas of future research. 
  
24 
 
Chapter 2 
 
2. Survey of SOA and Safety 
 
2.1. Introduction  
This chapter provides a survey of the published literature relating to the topic 
of this thesis. The survey is split into three main sections. The first section 
reviews current literature relating to the basic concepts of SOA, as well as to 
architectural design and the notations commonly used in developing SOA-
based systems. The second section discusses the basic concepts relating to 
system safety engineering. This includes the methods and analysis techniques 
available to system developers. Finally, we explore the concept safety cases and 
review literature relating to the development of safety arguments. 
2.2. SOA 
2.2.1. SOA Definition   
Generally, in the context of software, a service can be defined as: 
“One application or computer program performing some work for another 
application or computer program. This work may include some functionality or 
data sharing” (17). 
The definition is richer in the context of SOA, where services are defined as 
well-defined and self-contained functions. When services are combined to form 
sets, there are policies to control their usage and relationships to each other 
and whether dependability attributes are required (1). Generally, each service 
in an architecture represents a high-level business concept (18). 
The concept of SOA has been considered from several different perspectives 
(19) (3) (4). For example, SOA can be regarded as a means for developing 
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systems based on flexible concepts, which are sufficient to guarantee the 
operability of services within the system to meet business demands (3). 
However, Josuttis stated that, regardless of the dissimilarities in defining SOA 
found across the literature, the introduction of improved flexibility is an 
advantage of SOA which is highlighted in all definitions (4). Moreover, Josuttis 
pointed out that SOA is only a paradigm; when it is applied, specific decisions 
should be taken, which differ according to the situation being investigated.  
2.2.2. SOA Entities 
Typically, an SOA system comprises six entities, namely: consumer, registry, 
provider, contract, lease and proxy (20) (21). These entities interact with each 
according to a predesigned paradigm to ensure adequate provision of defined 
services. Figure 2 shows the find-bind-execute paradigm (20). Generally, the 
find-bind-execute paradigm allows the consumer of a service to request a 
third-party registry for the service which is compliant with its standard. When 
the registry has acknowledged a service, it provides the consumer with a 
contract specifying an endpoint address to the service. SOA has six entities that 
are configured jointly to support the find-bind-execute paradigm, as we explain 
in the following subsections (20). 
 
Figure 2: Find-Bind-Execute Paradigm (20) 
Service Consumer: A service consumer is any element that requires a service, 
e.g. a software element, an application or other services. The service consumer 
should have the required functionality to find the registry, bind to the service 
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provider and execute the required function(s). Communication with the 
provider and the executed function(s) must comply with the service contract.  
Service Provider: The service provider element is responsible for accepting 
and executing the consumer requests. Prior to performing any functionality 
within the system, the service provider should register its contracts with the 
service registry.  
Service Registry: The service registry is a directory that is located on the 
network, and holds all contracts from the service providers and makes them 
available for the service consumers. 
Service Contract: The service contract defines the specification of the service, 
which includes the specified formats for the consumer request and the 
provider response, the QoS level, and the pre- and post-conditions of the 
contract. 
Service Proxy: The service proxy is typically a set of APIs, located on the 
service consumer, and is responsible for finding the contract and the service 
provider on the registry, and for performing the necessary communication with 
the provider on behalf of the consumer.   
Service Lease: The service lease defines the validity period of the contract, 
starting at the time at which the registry offers the contract to the consumer. 
2.2.3. SOA Characteristics 
Most approaches to SOA design agree on a set of common characteristics. These 
characteristics are as follows. 
Loose Coupling: According to SOA, a system can be built using a composition 
of different related but independent services. This will permit the services to be 
managed individually (3). Consequently this will allow loosely-coupled 
services, which will permit the development of flexible and dynamic 
applications, which are formed by composing these services according to 
predefined requirements (4). 
Service Contract: Service providers will publish the contracts for the available 
services on the service registry. Service consumers will use these contracts to 
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bind and execute the services. SOA adheres to contract design principles, to 
ensure standardization of the service-providing mechanisms. The 
standardization will enable consistency of view for the service (3) (22). 
Autonomy: Although services are self-contained and independent and have 
full control over the execution logic that they contain, when services are 
combined to form compositions it is important that they are able to perform 
the required tasks or processes. Thus, information exchanged between 
services, using messages, should fulfil the necessary underlying requirements 
that enable these compositions to perform the designed tasks (3).     
Reusability: Business processes are typically decomposed into tasks, each of 
which will be performed inside the system by a service. It is possible that a 
single task will appear in different processes. Reusability is the concept of 
developing a flexible service that can be integrated into different compositions 
or business processes. This will allow for higher productivity of the 
development team and minimise the time required to produce the 
implementation required for these services, as the reusable service need only 
be implemented and tested once (23). 
Composability: By building services with enough capabilities to interact 
effectively with the environment, compositions can be formed by integrating 
the different services to provide a higher level service. This will allow faster 
building of SOA applications, as composed services will inherit some functions 
and attributes of the services inside the composition (24). 
Discoverability: One of the main principles of the SOA design paradigm is to 
introduce applications that can interact and respond to changes in the 
environment. One of the main characteristics of SOA applications is their ability 
to introduce within the system services that can be integrated and published in 
the registry automatically, and discovered by the service consumer (24). 
Therefore, new services, replicas of current services, and new versions of 
current services can be introduced into the system according to the service 
consumer’s demands. 
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The above characteristics make SOA a challenge for use in safety-critical 
applications. More specifically, each service can be treated as a self-contained 
element in a larger system (i.e. autonomy) and therefore it is important to 
identify the hazards that it can pose (as an individual service). At the same 
time, a service is part of larger system and therefore we need to understand the 
nature and the safety impact of interactions between the different services and 
the wider environment (i.e. contracts and loose coupling). These characteristics 
are shared with conceptual paradigms such as Systems of Systems (25). 
However, SOAs can be treated as a more specialised design framework, with its 
own design features and structures, e.g. Service-Level Agreements and 
Participants. Furthermore, unlike object-oriented technologies (26) or product 
lines (27), which tend to be used at a more detailed design and implementation 
levels, each service in an SOA-based system tend to be visible at the user-
interaction level and can be changed during the runtime phases on the SOA-
based system.   
2.2.4. SOA Lifecycle 
Traditionally, software is developed in well-defined stages, at each stage, a 
certain set of tasks should be performed to help ensure that the final software 
meets the business objectives (28). The development of software based on the 
SOA paradigm is different, as it includes both the business and the IT vision 
within the software. Thus it is reasonable to add extra levels of governance to 
control the execution of the loosely coupled services (29). According to Cox and 
Kreger, the SOA lifecycle is gradually evolving to a form in which more 
integrated processes are clearer (30).  
Figure 3 shows the SOA solution lifecycle according to Cox and Kerger (30). The 
figure shows that the lifecycle is divided into two main stages, the 
preproduction and production stages. The preproduction stage includes the 
model definition and implementation; the production stage includes mapping 
the model to the target infrastructure, monitoring the results and reacting to 
issues which arise. Seeley also cites Manes, Research Director at Burton Group 
Inc., who added that an initial stage including service identification and 
commitment is also required (29). 
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Figure 3: SOA Solution Lifecycle (30) 
Kumar (31) defined the different life cycles of the SOA application from the 
Enterprise implementation perspective, defining the service lifecycle as part of 
the enterprise SOA implementation lifecycle. Kumar asserts that the enterprise 
SOA implementation lifecycle includes three stages: initiation, development of 
the roadmap and execution plan. At each of these stages there are different 
tasks to be performed, these tasks relate to the different lifecycle stages defined 
using other perspectives. 
A management framework for the SOA lifecycle was introduced by Gejnevall 
(32) (shown in Figure 4). The framework divides the lifecycle into six broad 
areas in each of which four distinct phases are identified. The six areas are 
architecture, processes, information, solution, services and infrastructure. The 
four phases are preparation, development, and delivery and governance. The 
framework identifies the different tasks that should be performed during each 
phase, for each of the 6 lifecycle areas.  
An alternative way of representing the SOA design lifecycle is provided by 
Ramollari (33). Here five lifecycle phases are identified:  analysis and design, 
construction, testing, deployment and governance.  According to Ramollari, 
some or all of these stages will be included in any SOA development. 
30 
 
 
Figure 4: SOA Lifecycle Management Framework (32) 
Analysis and Design: 
At this stage, the business requirements will be analysed. The required 
business functionalities will be mapped to the underlying IT functions or 
services. Also at this stage, the business objectives will be addressed by the SOA 
design strategies.  Part of this stage is defining the timelines and deliverables of 
the SOA. The last activity at this stage is performing the modelling to the 
designed architecture.  
Construction 
The input for this stage is the specification of the designed architecture. The 
specification will be used to develop the implementation of the services and the 
necessary environment in which to operate these services. This includes the 
necessary protocols to allow the different services within the application to 
interact and the required interfaces to allow other applications to connect to 
the application and to perform their permitted services.    
Testing 
It is important to review the different functionalities implemented within the 
application. Testing the functionalities and services which have been developed 
is essential to ensure the provision of a reliable application that meets the 
business requirements. 
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The diversity of the hardware infrastructure, operating systems and 
applications that comprise the environment of the SOA application will 
increase the complexity of the testing process (34). Moreover, this complexity 
will increase because SOA software is flexible and can change according to the 
target environment. Thus, it is important to ensure that the testing process can 
correctly address the characteristics of the SOA software being tested and 
produce accurate results that are readable and informative. 
Deployment 
Once the suitability of the developed application has been ensured, it is logical 
to deploy the application within the targeted environment. This includes both 
operating the SOA application as a standalone application and connecting the 
application with other applications that are operating in the environment, to 
test for correct behaviour and interactions. 
Governance 
Different activities should be investigated at this stage. Most important is the 
development of a governance model which will allow control of the different 
components of the SOA software. As well as this, it is important to identify the 
business and IT transformations. 
2.2.5. SOA Design Patterns 
 Definition 2.2.5.1.
In software engineering, design patterns are often used to provide, and exploit, 
reusable solutions for common problems encountered in software design. A 
design pattern is a description or template to solve a general problem, which 
can be used in different circumstances (35). The original idea of the design 
pattern was created by an architect, Christopher Alexander, who named and 
described common architectural and landscape planning problems and 
discussed their solutions (36). Alexander asserts that: 
"Each pattern describes a problem which occurs over and over 
again in our environment, and then describes the core of the 
solution to that problem, in such a way that you can use this 
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solution a million times over, without ever doing it the same way 
twice." (37). 
Drawing inspiration from Alexander’s work, (37) developed a pattern language 
for software engineering. They suggested that communication between the 
components of the environment should be achieved in order to undertake a 
customised solution for the problem being investigated (37). Software design 
patterns therefore identify and define the basics of a design structure, which is 
common or context-specific. These design structures will be represented as 
objects, and these objects will be reused to compose new design objects. 
While Alexander indicated that the pattern should describe the core of the 
solution, design of the real solution for any problem is should be based on 
different factors, e.g. the current circumstances of the environment. This is 
particularly important for design patterns specified for the software domain. 
Further, Erl (5) in his definition of the design pattern mentioned that the 
solution provided for any problem should be proven and individually 
documented. 
 Use of Design Patterns 2.2.5.2.
 Design patterns are very important for building high-quality applications, 
since they allow the designer to reuse the different elements of the software, 
instead of re-inventing the wheel for each element. Moreover, reusability of 
elements should lead to reductions in the time required to introduce the 
software, as it will enable the developers to use tested and certified solutions 
which have been applied before. 
 Design Pattern Elements  2.2.5.3.
For any pattern there are four essential elements: name, problem, solution and 
consequences (38) (37). 
Pattern Name: Unique naming of any element in the software domain will 
make it easier to identify the pattern. It can be identified clearly in any 
discussion, without confusion (38). 
The Problem: This describes the problem and details of the circumstances of 
the environment in which it occurs (37). 
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The Solution: The different elements, which when combined introduce the 
design, are called the solution. Documentation of the solution requires well-
defined and clear descriptions for the elements, their responsibilities and all of 
the relations and collaborations required between them.  
The consequences: It is also important to document the trade-offs introduced 
in applying the pattern, which are used to evaluate the different design 
patterns, and select the most effective solution to the problem being 
investigated (37). 
 Design Pattern Categories 2.2.5.4.
Design patterns can be classified into categories based on the perspective 
adopted by the author in proposing the pattern. Metsker and Wake (39) 
defined five different categories of design patterns based on their primary 
intent: interface, responsibility, construction, operations and extensions.   
Table 1 gives examples of standard software engineering patterns in each of 
these categories. 
Intent Patterns 
Interfaces Adapter, Facade, Composite, Bridge 
Responsibility Singleton, Observer, Mediator, Proxy, Chain of Responsibility, 
Flyweight 
Construction Builder, Factory Method, Abstract Factory, Prototype, Memento 
Operations Template Method, States, Strategy, Command, Interpreter 
Extensions Decorator, Iterator, Visitor 
Table 1: Sample Categorisation of Design Patterns by Intent (39) 
Other authors categorise the design patterns according to the application areas 
to which they can be applied. Most commonly, these areas are defined as: 
creational, structural and behavioural patterns (40) (37). 
 Design Patterns and SOA 2.2.5.5.
Design patterns existed within the software design domain before the 
emergence of the SOA paradigm. For example, there are object-oriented, 
Enterprise Application Architecture and Enterprise Integration Applications 
(EIA) design patterns. Design patterns that fall within the SOA pattern 
catalogue can be classified into new design patterns, existing design patterns or 
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design patterns that are intentionally similar to patterns in other catalogues 
(5). 
SOA design patterns have been defined in the following areas: service, service 
composition, service inventory, and service-orientation enterprise 
architectures (5). In structuring a taxonomy of SOA design patterns, each of 
these four groupings can be further divided into sub-parts.  
Table 2 shows an outline taxonomy for SOA design patterns, with examples of 
the available design patterns for each group. The fourth group, service-
orientation enterprise architecture is a composition of the other three 
architectures.  
Architecture Design patterns 
Service 
Foundational service patterns Service -Identification Patterns 
Functional Decomposition, Service Encapsulation 
Service-Definition Patterns 
Agnostic Context, Non- Agnostic Context, Agnostic 
Capability 
Service implementation patterns Service Facade, Redundant Implementation, Service 
Data Replication, Partial State Deferral, Partial 
Validation, UI Mediator,  
Service security patterns Exception Shielding, Message Screening, Trusted 
Subsystem, Service Perimeter Guard, 
Service contract design patterns Decoupled Contract, Contract Centralization, 
Contract De-normalization, Concurrent Contracts, 
Validation Abstraction,  
Legacy encapsulation Legacy Wrapper, Multi-Channel Endpoint, File 
Gateway 
Service governance patterns Compatible Change, Version Identification, 
Termination Notification, Service Refactoring, 
Service Decomposition, Proxy Capability, 
Decomposed Capability, Distributed Capability 
Service composition 
Capability composition patterns Capability Composition, Capability Recomposition 
Service messaging patterns Service Messaging, Messaging Metadata, Service 
Agent, Intermediate Routing, State Messaging, 
Service Callback, Service Instance Routing, 
Asynchronous Queuing, Reliable Messaging, Event-
Driven Messaging 
Composition implementation patterns Agnostic Sub-Controller, Composition Autonomy, 
Atomic Service Transaction, Compensating Service 
Transaction 
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Service interaction security patterns Data Confidentiality, Data Origin Authentication, 
Direct Authentication, Brokered Authentication 
Transformation patterns Data Model Transformation, Data Format 
Transformation, Protocol Bridging 
Service inventory 
Foundational inventory patterns Inventory Boundary Patterns:  
Enterprise Inventory, Domain Inventory,  
Inventory Structure Patterns:  
Service Normalization, Logic Centralization, Service 
Layers,  
Inventory Standardization Patterns:  
Canonical Protocol, Canonical Schema 
Logical inventory layer patterns Utility Abstraction, Entity Abstraction, Process 
Abstraction. 
Inventory centralization patterns Process Centralization, Schema Centralization, 
Policy Centralization, Rules Centralization 
Inventory implementation patterns Dual Protocols, Canonical Resources, State 
Repository, Stateful Services, Service Grid, 
Inventory Endpoint, Cross-Domain Utility Layer,  
Inventory governance patterns Canonical Expression, Metadata Centralization, 
Canonical Versioning 
Table 2: Outline Taxonomy of SOA Design Patterns (5) 
 SOA Design Pattern Considerations 2.2.5.6.
As already emphasised, SOA is a design paradigm for computer-based 
applications, with defined goals and objectives for applications, which meet the 
corresponding goals and objectives identified from the business perspective. 
Design patterns should be selected, designed, refined and applied to allow SOA-
based applications to meet their goals and objectives. 
The different elements that comprise the SOA application should be able to 
interact with each other without requiring any intermediate transformation of 
exchanged contents. Intermediate transformations would increase the 
application’s complexity and the time required to perform any operation.  
From the business perspective, Return-On-Investment (ROI) is a major factor 
in selecting any solution or product. By developing services that are able to 
support each other, which can be composed according to the requirements and 
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designed to meet the inventory architecture, an organisation can increase the 
ROI for each of the services it provides or exploits. 
There are other factors from either a business or IT perspective that are 
important for the selection of a design pattern from the available alternatives, 
e.g. vendor diversification, business and technology alignment and IT costs. The 
ability of the IT solution to meet the business requirements will be directly 
affected by these factors, so it is very important to prioritise them and develop 
the SOA application based on that prioritisation (5). 
 Dependability and SOA Design Patterns 2.2.5.7.
This thesis is particularly concerned with three attributes of dependability are 
which need to be considered developing any SOA application for a safety-
critical domain: availability, safety, and security. Various design patterns have 
been developed to address issues related to these attributes within the 
different architectures of the SOA. Also, these dependability attributes can be 
considered to as part of the general superset of Quality of Service (QoS) 
attributes. Before we discuss dependability design patterns, we explore the 
concept of dependability, and how it related to SOA, in the next subsection. 
 Dependability 2.2.5.8.
Different factors that allow the development of more dependable computer 
systems have been identified, for example availability, reliability, and 
maintainability (41). More interest in the dependability of computer systems 
was shown during the 1980s, as a result of increasing integration of these 
systems into the business arena. The concept of dependability builds on several 
related concepts, in particular reliability and fault-tolerance. Dependability can 
be defined as “the trustworthiness of a computing system which allows reliance 
to be justifiably placed on the service it delivers” (42). 
As more IT technologies were introduced, two fundamental attributes of 
dependable systems were added to the ones which had already been 
highlighted: safety and security (43).  
There are different perspectives on the attributes that inform dependability. 
The total list of attributes comprises integrity, reliability, safety, security, 
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confidentiality, maintainability and availability. According to the point of view 
adopted in the context of a particular system or domain, some of these 
attributes may be eliminated or combined (44). 
Avizienis, et al. (45) defined threats as the intentional or accidental events that 
affect the provision of a correct service. Service failure, within a computer 
system, is defined as the deviation of the delivered service from the correct 
service due to the occurrence of an event. This may result in the external 
systems interacting with the service to enter incorrect or unknown states, 
which would be observed as anthe error. The presence of the error is due to the 
presence of a fault in the system (45). It is therefore possible to define different 
states that are based on the presence of error or failure in the service, as an 
indication that the service is not performing correctly. For example, degraded, 
slow, limited and emergency service modes can be defined to reflect the 
severity of the failure within the system. Figure 5 shows one of the mostly 
widely used dependability trees.  
To attain and maintain the different attributes of the dependability, different 
means have been developed. The means can be classified into four main 
groups: fault prevention, tolerance, removal and forecasting. Fault prevention 
and fault tolerance allow the system to provide a trusted service. More 
confidence in this service will be achieved if it can also provide fault removal 
and forecasting. Dependability attributes are targeted by tactics (46) that are 
used to achieve a certain level for each attribute.  Requirements for the 
attributes will be derived, according to the architectural decisions resulting 
from the application of the tactics. 
 
Figure 5: Dependability Tree (45) 
38 
 
Failures in dependable systems often result in losses. These losses can be 
related to customers, sales, revenue and productivity. Moreover, there will be 
an additional cost incurred in bringing the system back into normal operation 
(47).  When software is one of the system components, it is possible to have 
failures within the system caused by the presence of the software. In such 
cases, failures might be limited to the software component of the system, or 
might cause the system as a whole to fail. Thus it is important to address safety 
as part of every stage of the software lifecycle. As an example, in 2011, a 
software failure in a Pak ‘n Save supermarket in New Zealand resulted in the 
store’s doors opening automatically at a time where there were no employees 
inside, allowing the public to leave with free groceries (48).  
Security Related Design Patterns 
Security is of great concern when exposing a local service to outside users. 
External users can use services to hack the internal network or to manipulate 
the resources managed by these services. The Service perimeter guard design 
pattern addresses this issue by introducing an intermediate service at the 
network perimeter, which can be used as an interface between the internal 
service from one side and external users from the other side. In this case, the 
intermediate service will be a secure contact point for the local network; thus, 
the security threats related to this issue can be minimised (5). 
Other design patterns have been defined to address other security issues and 
threats. These patterns fall into two main groups. The first group, service 
security patterns, addresses concerns in the service architecture. This group 
includes the exception-shielding, message-screening, trusted subsystem 
and service perimeter guard patterns. The second group, service interaction 
security patterns, addresses concerns in the service-composition architecture. 
Patterns in this group include data confidentiality, data origin 
authentication, direct authentication and brokered authentication. For 
more information please refer to the discussion of SOA design patterns in Erl 
(5). 
Availability Related Design Patterns 
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Some SOA design patterns provide solutions for the availability attribute. These 
solutions can be selected according to the requirements of the service. For 
example, in the group of service-implementation patterns, there is a 
redundant implementation pattern which addresses the case of a heavily-
used service. In this case, the service can be considered as a potential source of 
failure in the system, especially if it is being used in composition with other 
services. Any fault the service faces will be implicated in all compositions that it 
is part of. Based on this, the redundant implementation pattern provides the 
use of redundant implementation or failover support as a solution to this 
problem. 
For more information about other SOA design patterns providing solutions for 
the availability attribute please, refer to the discussion of SOA design patterns 
catalogue introduced in Erl (5). 
Safety Related Design Patterns 
In order to ensure that a system’s safety requirements are satisfied 
appropriately, it is important to ensure that the runtime behaviour of all 
components within the system complies with their specifications at the design 
and development stages. To help satisfy this, monitoring design patterns are 
introduced. Monitoring design patterns help in building tools that are able to 
monitor the components within the system and to measure to what extent the 
specifications used at system development are respected at runtime (49).  
Although safety is a key concern in ensuring the appropriate operation of the 
different software applications within a safety-critical system, there has not 
been a great deal of work on safety design patterns for SOA (50). Different 
techniques have been developed to provide a certain level of system safety, 
which are not specific to SOA. For example, partitioning allows the isolation of 
different independent components of the software, to ensure that severe faults 
that may occur in any component are contained. Generally, safety tactics are 
designed and organized based on the fault-handling mechanism. There are 
three handling mechanisms, failure avoidance, detection and containment (50).  
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For example, the Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) pattern provides a 
solution to avoid a single point of failure for a processing unit, by implementing 
three processing units based on the same input, along with a voter that decides 
which unit’s results will be transferred to the output (51). The voter will detect 
failures occurring in any of the processing units and the final result will be 
defined according to the results from the three processing units. 
Different variations of the TMR pattern have been implemented to ensure the 
avoidance of failure, for example, by implementing three independent inputs 
for each processing unit and three voters, each of which takes input from the 
three processing units. Logically, this will improve the system’s integrity in the 
face of failure, as it reduces the likelihood of system failure due to a single 
failure or a failure of any of its components. 
Jackson (52) argued that current practices in developing software indirectly 
address dependability attributes in general and safety in particular. This 
appears to be true, since design patterns that provide specific solutions for 
safety are very rare. Thus, as Jackson suggested, new tools or practices should 
be developed to address safety-related issues directly. Kang and Jackson 
discuss an approach to dependability analysis based on trust bases, which 
offers a promising way to address dependability assurance more directly (53). 
 Service Level Agreements 2.2.5.9.
A Service Level Agreement (SLA) is a document that can be used to define the 
relationship between two parties: the provider (or producer) and the recipient 
(or consumer) (54). This is an important item of documentation for both 
parties. Its purpose is as follows: 
 Identify and define the customer’s needs;  
 Provide a framework for understanding;  
 Simplify complex issues; 
 Reduce areas of conflict; 
 Encourage dialog in the event of disputes;  
 Eliminate unrealistic expectations. 
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An SLA is a core part of a service contract, in which the specification and 
quality of service are formally defined. An important role of an SLA is to 
capture the non-functional aspects of the service so as to monitor the 
performance of the service to ensure that it is used according to the contract 
between different parties. According to (55), SLAs are used for the preservation 
of service capacity. Increasingly, SLAs are used as a way to ensure delivery of 
services in IT-based SOAs. During SLA discussions, all parties must agree on the 
interface and the service provided by the provider. If the provider is providing 
a service that was not originally assured or agreed upon, then we have a SLA 
disagreement fault (56). One way of representing SLA is using a tabular format 
as shown in Table 3 (57). 
 
Table 3: SLA Sample (57) 
2.2.6. SOA Modelling 
After decisions regarding the architectural design have been reached and 
agreed on, it is necessary to provide an unambiguous record of the decisions. 
This is often carried out in the form of modelling (58). Modelling can be defined 
as a description of some phenomenon of interest (59). In the case of SOA, the 
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phenomenon is the service to be provided. Kolovos asserted that models can be 
classified into unstructured and structured: 
“Unstructured models are descriptions that do not adhere to well-
defined syntactic or semantic rules. Examples of this type of model are 
board drawings, informal sketches, natural language specifications etc. 
Due to their lack of conformance to well-defined rules, unstructured 
models are only useful for communication between humans. By 
contrast, a structured model is an artefact that conforms to a set of 
syntactic and semantic well-formedness constraints which is called its 
modelling language or metamodel. Due to their rigorously defined 
nature, except for human communication purposes, structured models 
are also useful for mechanised processing”. (59). 
The models used to describe a system are based on system characteristics such 
size, complexity and heterogeneity (58). 
 The system architecture model is the composition of the different 
architectures that represent the system’s constituent elements and structures. 
Viewpoints are system architecture models that are constructed according to 
the perspective of the stakeholder. Viewpoints can be constructed using 
Architectural Description Languages (ADLs) (60). 
Software modelling can help developers better understand the system and 
allows for effective and efficient organisation. Based on this understanding, 
different design alternatives can be explored and considered based on their 
importance.  
Different ADLs are introduced to enable designers to build different 
versions/aspects of the model and to help the development team to define 
optimized code. Each modelling language represents a different point of view 
on the system. Examples of these languages include the Unified Modelling 
Language (UML) (61), the Systems Modelling Language (SysML) (62), the 
Specification and Description Language (SDL), and the Business Process 
Modelling Notation (BPMN) (63).  
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Different modelling languages are introduced to ensure proper modelling of 
SOA solutions. Service-Oriented Modelling and Architecture (SOMA), Service-
Oriented Modelling Framework (SOMF) and Service-oriented Architecture 
Modelling Language (SoaML) are examples of these languages.  
SOMA was introduced by IBM as the first modelling language for SOA (64). 
SOMA aids in the analysis and design of SOAs through the identification, 
specification and realization of the services that are required to build the 
system. SOMA also provides the ability to compose services from preliminary 
services. 
SOMF was introduced to provide modelling of SOAs; it is based on conceptions 
and a universal language (65). Strategic business decisions can be used along 
with IT tactics to design and provide solutions to enterprise problems. 
According to the developer of SOMF, it can be used to provide modelling for 
any application and include any business processes or technological services. 
UML was introduced as a general modelling language, thus no capabilities were 
introduced for SOA modelling. The OMG introduced SoaML, as a UML profile 
and metadata that adds the required capabilities to allow precise modelling of 
SOA based on UML.  
In the next sections, we discuss two of the most commonly used modelling 
languages and comment on their applicability to SOA. 
2.2.6.1. BPMN 
The BPMN standard (currently at version 2.0) was developed by the Business 
Process Management Initiative (BPMI) (66). In May 2004, version 1.0 of the 
specification of BPMN was released to the public and in February, 2006, BPMN 
1.0 was adopted as an OMG standard. BPMN is a graphical modelling notation 
for business processes in an organisation. White (66) discussed the context and 
use of BPMN, considering the four main elements of BPMN: flow objects, 
connecting objects, swim lanes, and artefacts. Figure 6 illustrates the graphical 
elements of BPMN. Flow objects are displayed as a set of elements that include 
different types of events, activities, and gateways. An event means “something 
that occurs” as distinct from an activity which is defined as “something that is 
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done” (67). Gateways can be used to control the communication between the 
flows of paths via splits and joints.  
Connectors can be used to model the flow between objects. The connector 
consists of sequence flows, message flows and associations objects. Sequence 
flows can be used for ordering the activities that are performed in a process; 
message flows can be used for sending and receiving messages across 
businesses; and association can be used for linking information with flow 
objects. Swim lanes can help in classifying and managing activities. There are 
two types of swim lanes: pools and lanes. Artefacts can be used to add more 
information to the model. Artefacts comprise data objects, text annotations, 
and groups. The data object can be used to manage the input and output data 
for activities, the text annotations can be used to describe the process, while 
groups can be used for grouping certain activities (67). 
 
Figure 6: Basic BPMN Elements  (66) 
2.2.6.2. SoaML 
The OMG introduced SoaML as a UML profile which has the capability to model 
SOA (68). The SoaML profile is structured around five SoaML diagrams, namely, 
the Service Participant diagram, the Service Contract diagram, the 
ServicesArchitecture diagram, the Service Interface diagram and the Service 
Categorisation diagram. Each of these diagrams provides a different view to 
define and understand services (68). For example, the ServicesArchitecture 
diagram shown in Figure 7 allows for the definition of Participants and 
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Services, showing the collaboration between different organisations, and the 
roles each Participant plays within each ServiceContract (collaborationUse). 
The Service Interface diagram shows the different types of Interface which the 
SoaML standard offers. Figure 8 shows a simple interface, which describes a 
one-way service which does not require protocol, e.g. a service can be used 
without knowing anything about the entity which calls it. 
 
Figure 7: ServicesArchitecture Diagram in SoaML 
 
Figure 8: Interfaces Diagram in SoaML: UML Simple Unidirectional Interface 
As Figure 9 indicates, a service interface can also be defined for bi-directional 
services. Here, the service includes communication between the consumer and 
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the provider of the service which may be required to complete the services. 
Further information about UML simple Interface unidirectional, UML interface 
bidirectional, and ServiceInterface, which is defined by understanding and 
using UML simple interfaces, is provided in (69). 
 
Figure 9: shows a service interface and a bi-directional service interface 
2.3. Safety and Certification 
This section introduces the concepts of safety, safety-related issues, and the 
certification processes. Section 2.3.1 provides a review of safety in safety-
critical systems. A review of aspects relating to the certification of such systems 
will be presented in Section 2.3.2 
2.3.1. System Safety 
Roland, et al. (70) defined system safety as applying special technical and 
managerial methodologies to guarantee systematic and forward-looking 
control of hazards during the lifecycle of the system being investigated. Roland 
et al. suggested that safety analysis and hazard control activities should be 
performed during the conceptual phase of the system, with further safety 
actions defined for the lifecycle stages. 
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The concept of safety within the system is related to the physical context of the 
system. A system can be considered unsafe if its effects are harmful for humans. 
Logically, software components can cause harm to humans indirectly. Hazards 
or accidents within the system occur because of three main sources: humans 
who interact with the system, the system itself or the environment in which the 
system operates. For example, an accident between two cars on a road could be 
caused by human error (e.g. excessive speed), a failure in one of the cars (e.g. 
sudden failure of the lights at night) or causes within the environment (e.g. 
heavy fog). 
In order to manage the definition and implementation of safety requirements 
for a system, it is important to understand which of the safety activities should 
be integrated within each stage of the lifecycle. Figure 10 shows a “V” system 
development lifecycle, along with the safety activities related to each stage 
(71). The figure shows the different stages of the development lifecycle: 
requirements analysis and specification, architectural design, detailed design, 
implementation, integration, testing and verification, and delivery and 
commissioning. At each stage, the associated safety activities are integrated in 
the development process. For example, hazard identification and risk 
assessment, which is a continuous activity, is commonly performed as part of 
requirements analysis and common cause/common mode and zonal analyses 
are associated with the detailed design and implementation stages.  
 
Figure 10:  A “V” System Development Lifecycle (72) 
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2.3.1.1. Safety Processes 
For safety-critical systems, it is important to perform an analysis of the 
hazards, identify them, evaluate their effects and provide the necessary 
measures to manage the hazards. Pumfrey defined a hazard as a “physical 
situation, often following some initiating event that can lead to an accident” 
(72). The hazard analysis determines the extent to which each hazard can lead 
to an unsafe system status.  
Safety analysis helps to define the necessary requirements that ensure the 
system being developed is acceptably safe. Safety analysis should be carried out 
as part of a safety management process, which will result in examining the 
system safety level and whether the system can be deployed or not. 
The safety process should be designed to address relevant factors within the 
system and its environment, for example, the size of the company, the structure 
of the system, the industry the system is operating in and the applications the 
system is used for (12). Each stage should result in a detailed documentation of 
the system safety process results.  
2.3.1.2. Safety Analysis  
A preliminary hazard list should be provided for safety-critical systems. Based 
on the hazard analysis, a list of high-level safety requirements, specifying how 
the hazards should be managed and controlled in design and operation of the 
system, is typically generated. These requirements are then transformed into 
detailed safety criteria. The system safety team should decompose these 
detailed safety criteria into readable detailed requirements which can be used 
by the design team to develop the system (73). Safety analysis should be 
performed throughout the system lifecycle to identify the hazards and risks 
posed by the system, assess each of these hazards or risks, and provide and 
recommend solutions for managing the risks. 
The safety analysis should be based on the milestones defined for the safety 
processes and should comply with the milestones of the system development 
process. The reporting of the analysis should address any challenges faced in 
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performing the analysis, such as lack of information or insufficient 
recommendations. 
Safety analysis techniques can be classified into two main categories, deductive 
and inductive. Deductive analysis helps in answering the question, “How can 
something occur?” Conversely, inductive analysis helps in understanding the 
consequences of an event, which has either occurred or has been postulated. 
Thus it helps in answering the question, “What if this happens?” (74). Some 
techniques can be used either inductively or deductively, depending on the 
context. Markov Analysis (MA) and Fault Propagation and Transformation 
Calculus (FPTC) are examples of these types of technique (27). 
Generally, failures in the system can be classified into either random or 
systematic failures. Typically random failures occur in the system due to faults 
in the hardware components. Such faults can be caused by different issues, 
such as the age of a component. Systematic failures, on the other hand, are the 
repeatable under the same system and environmental conditions, as a result of 
a human error that could occur at any stage of the system lifecycle. However, a 
fault due to an error of this kind will not occur unless the system is in an 
appropriate state (75). 
Due to their nature, random faults are often measured quantitatively, while 
system failures are measured qualitatively.  
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is one of the main inductive safety 
analysis techniques. Pumfrey (72) discussed the categorisation of the FMEA 
analysis technique and techniques that have been developed using it as a basis. 
Simply, starting from a certain event (which has either occurred or is 
postulated) FMEA performs an analysis for the different consequences that 
might be faced.  
FMEA provides a basis for understanding how the requirements defined in the 
preliminary stages of the development are implemented in the system, and of 
whether the system actually meets these requirements. 
To perform FMEA, a set of information needs to be collected. This information 
can be identified and categorised according to the issue being addressed. 
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Information collection should be organised to ensure that the information 
needed to satisfy the analysis requirements is assembled. Different forms have 
been designed for data collection, such as the example shown in Table 3 (76). 
Stamatis states that the information within the form can be categorised into 
three parts. The first part is introductory and is essential to the analysis 
process; however, none of the information in this part is mandatory. The 
analysis is completely dependent on the information in part 2, thus all of the 
items in this section are mandatory. More items can be added to the form or the 
items in the form can be reorganized according to the analysis requirements, 
but none of the items in the form can be removed. The third part contains the 
signatures of the team performing the analysis. Although it is not mandatory, it 
reflects the team’s responsibility. Stamatis numbers the parts according to the 
analysis requirements performed. These numbers can be altered as required. 
 
Table 4: FMEA Form (76) 
2.3.1.3. Key Safety Activities 
There are key issues that need to be investigated when analysing the safety of a 
system. Firstly, it is important to understand possible hazards which might lead 
to the presence of risks within the system. These risks should be assessed and 
any necessary steps taken to manage them. In the following three subsections, 
hazard analysis, risk assessment and risk management will be discussed. 
Hazard Analysis 
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Pumfrey asserts that hazard identification, which implies locating the potential 
hazards within the system in order to specify suitable management and control 
measures, is the first step in the safety process.  
Different systems pose different hazards. Some of these hazards can be 
considered as generic, or common for all systems, whether computer-based or 
not. Examples include environmental hazards, like floods, fog, storms and 
earthquakes. However, possible failure of altitude measuring sensors is a 
hazard specific to aircraft for example. However, whether the hazard is generic 
or specific, the context of the system dictates the way in which it is handled. For 
example, fog is a hazard for both aircraft and cars; however, in each system the 
solutions will be designed differently. 
The process of hazard analysis includes several steps that are designed to 
address the goals of the analysis (12). Hazard analysis can be performed on 
planned or existing systems. However, for most systems, complete elimination 
of hazards is not feasible and therefore hazard control measures are used for 
those hazards which cannot be eliminated.  
Different techniques have been developed to perform hazard analysis. These 
techniques use either quantitative or qualitative methods to evaluate the 
hazard, based on hazard characteristics like hazard level (the degree to which 
the hazard will affect the system) and likelihood. 
Functional Failure Analysis (FFA), Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) 
and Fault Hazard Analysis (FHA) are among the best known hazard analysis 
techniques (12) (72). There are also other techniques, and variations of these 
techniques which are designed to identify and analyse hazards. However, 
Pumfrey argued that these techniques are not widely accepted in industry and 
are limited to use within the research community, so we do not consider them 
in detail here.  
Functional Failure Analysis  
Functional Failure Analysis (FFA) is an inductive technique which is intended 
to derive the hazards from a functional description of the system (sometimes 
referred to as Functional Hazard Analysis) (77). For each function of a system, 
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FFA examines all possible failure modes of the function that may contribute to 
unsafe behaviour and provides suitable recommendations for mitigation in the 
design (72). The FFA technique consists of four steps as described by Pumfrey: 
  Identifying a function; 
 Identifying the failure modes of the function, based on three potential 
deviations: function not provided, functional provided when not 
required and incorrect function; 
 Assessing the effects of each failure mode at various abstract levels;  
 Suggesting requirements and recommendations to improve the design.  
Table 4 shows an example of hazard analysis of a vehicle speed sensor using 
FFA. The results of FFA are commonly presented in a tabular format. 
 
Table 5:  Example of Hazard Analysis of a Vehicle Speed Sensor Using FFA (72) 
HAZard and OPerability Studies (HAZOP)  
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) is a predictive safety analysis 
technique that was developed in the mid-1960s, to assist, assess and refine the 
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design of new process plants (78). HAZOP was originally developed at ICI, for 
use in the chemical industry (79). The main focus of this method is on the flow 
of chemical material and liquids between different components of a chemical 
plant, Table 6 shows the steps of the HAZOP process. The process provides a 
set of guide words to help the analyst to consider a variety of possible 
deviations for each flow. Although the original HAZOP guide words were 
designed for use in analysis of processes within chemical processing plants, 
they are sufficiently generic to be applicable to other safety-related systems, 
with some interpretation. 
Step Description 
1 Select a flow in a pipeline. 
2 Identify important physical attributes of the flow, such as pressure, temperature, flow 
rate, chemical composition etc. 
3 Consider the deviations prompted by applying each guide word to each property for 
this line section. 
4 Determine the possible causes of each of these deviations. 
5 Investigate the expected outcome (effect on the plant) of each deviation, taking into 
consideration operating conditions and other causal factors where necessary, and 
examining the contribution of protection mechanisms and other mitigation already 
included in the design. 
6 Decide which deviations are safety problems (i.e. those with both plausible causes and 
hazardous effects). 
7 For deviations which are not safety problems, record a justification (i.e. explain why 
the design is acceptable as proposed.). 
8 Consider changes to the plant that will remove, or reduce the probability or severity 
of, hazardous deviations. 
9 Determine whether the cost of the proposed changes is justified. 
10 Agree actions and responsibilities. 
11 Repeat steps 1 to 10 for all other lines in the plant. 
12 Follow up to ensure necessary actions have been taken. 
Table 6:  Steps of HAZOP (72) 
The standard guide words for process plant analysis (with example 
interpretations) are shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7:  HAZOP Guide Words (72) 
HAZOP differs from the other safety techniques we have reviewed in that it is a 
team-based activity. A HAZOP team typically comprises around six people who 
are selected for different roles and interests, generally including the following:  
 The plant design engineers; 
 Commissioning or installation engineers;  
 Operators and maintenance engineers; 
 One or more independent experts; 
 HAZOP leader; 
 Recorder or secretary. 
In its original form, HAZOP does not work well for systems where the flow 
involves information. This fact has led to the development of Software Hazard 
Analysis and Resolution in Design (SHARD) for the analysis of computer-based 
applications (72). 
Software Hazard Analysis and Resolution in Design (SHARD) 
Pumfrey (72) proposed a technique called Software Hazard Analysis and 
Resolution in Design (SHARD), which is a refinement of HAZOP intended to 
address the requirements of safety analysis in computer systems (hardware 
and software).  
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Table 8 shows the steps of the SHARD process. The process provides a set of 
guide words to help the analyst to consider a variety of possible deviations for 
each information flow. 
Step Description 
1 Identify and consistently label the flows in the diagram. For each flow, identify its 
source (where the flow originates) and sink (destination). Assemble any additional 
material from data dictionaries, timing diagrams etc. required to completely describe 
the operation of the flow. 
2 Review the design to ensure that the intended operation is clear. 
3 Construct a table of guide words, interpreting the six major failure classifications for 
the combinations of communications protocol and data type used in the design. 
4 Work through the flows in a systematic order, using the combination of protocol and 
data type to select a set of guide words from the table constructed in step 3, and 
considering the deviations from intended behaviour suggested by each guide word. 
5 Determine and record the potential causes of the suggested deviations. Note that 
identifying the causes of a deviation will require study of the active component 
(process) or data store that is the source of the flow 
6 Determine and record the expected effects of the suggested deviations. Except at the 
top (context) level of a design, the extent of identification of effects should be limited 
to the active component (process) or data store which is the flow sink. Effects that 
propagate beyond the immediate destination of the flow will be considered as part of 
the analysis of further data paths that originate from this component. 
7 Reduce the set of suggested deviations to a set of meaningful failure modes by 
discarding those for which the potential causes are acceptably improbable, and those 
for which no hazardous effects have been identified. Note that whenever a deviation is 
discarded, a justification must be recorded 
8 For each meaningful failure mode identified, suggest alternative management 
strategies. These may take the form of design modifications to remove its causes or 
limit its effects, or a set of requirements that must be satisfied by lower-level design 
elaboration to achieve acceptable system-level safety properties. 
9 Select of one of these strategies to pursue, and record a justification for the selection. 
In the worst case, if no acceptable management strategy can be suggested, the only 
acceptable course of action may be a redesign. 
Table 8: SHARD Process 
SHARD can be used for the analysis of information flows in a normal operation 
and can also study the possibility of unintentional behaviour. The guide words 
defined for SHARD (72) are as follows: 
Omission: 
There is no delivery of the service; no communication (service not provided). 
Commission: 
A service is provided when it is not required, the communication is unforeseen 
(more services provided). 
Early: 
The service (communication) is provided earlier than required 
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Late: 
The service (communication) is provided later than required 
Value: 
The service or data has the wrong value. Errors of this kind can be divided into 
two classes: detectable (the problem can be detected and protected or 
mitigated against) or undetectable (the problem cannot be found). 
SHARD does not need a team to carry out each step of the analysis. The results 
can be captured in a tabular format. The columns should include “Guide word, 
Deviation, Possible causes, Detection and protection, Effects, and Justification 
or design recommendations”. Table 9 shows a sample of SHARD outputs for a 
computer-assisted braking system (72). 
Risk Assessment 
Once the hazards have been identified and recorded, the potential risks within 
the system can be identified and analysed. Upon identifying the risks, it is 
important to perform risk assessment and management. Risk assessment 
includes different tasks. The first is a detailed interpretation of the identified 
risks, such that risks can be classified into acceptable and unacceptable risks. 
Second, reduction measures for the unacceptable risks should be proposed. 
Typically, these measures should be selected to control the hazards involved.  
During the risk assessment process, the system design will be revised, to 
ensure that risks are reduced. For risks where it is not possible to eliminate the 
hazards by changing the design, the measures will be proposed ensure that 
these risks will be minimized to an acceptable level. Risk assessment 
techniques can be quantitative or qualitative, depending on the requirements 
of the assessment. 
For example, the presence of fog will increase the risk of car accidents. Fog 
limits visibility, making it difficult for drivers to the road or other vehicles 
clearly. For a car at a speed of 40 miles per hour with visibility of 100 metres, 
the risk of having an accident due to fog is limited, or can be classified as 
acceptable. But for the same car with a visibility of 10 metres, the risk of having 
an accident is high or unacceptable. 
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Table 9: Sample SHARD Output for a Computer Assisted Braking System (72) 
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Risk Management 
The process of defining the hazards, analysing them, and performing 
assessment on the risks caused by the hazards will result in a better 
understanding of hazards, risks and potential losses arising from their 
occurrence.  Procedures for avoiding or minimising losses can then be 
proposed. 
Understanding of the risks inherent in a system will allow these risks to be 
managed. The process of risk management is aimed at mitigating identified 
risks and achieving the desired goals of the system (80). According to Hillson, 
the success of risk management can be measured by the effectiveness of the 
selected solutions in achieving the final goals.  
Although effective risk management will increase the chances of avoiding the 
risks within the systems, resulting in the best achievement of the objectives, 
even in the presence of risk management, the system will have residual risks. 
Hillson et al. argued that risk management processes, tools and techniques 
should evolve over time to be able to address changes in the system and its 
environment. They also defined three major period of evolution in the attitudes 
to risk enshrined in standards, before 1997, from 1997 to 2000 and after 2000 
(80).  
 Before 1997: the concentration was on the negative side of the risk; 
risk is equivalent to threat in this period. 
 From 1997-2000: the definition of risk starts to add the positives or 
opportunities along with the negatives. 
 After 2000: all standards appearing after 2000 includes both threats 
and opportunities as part of risk management. 
Risk management includes the identification, communication and resolution of 
possible risks within the system (81). It can be divided into two main steps. 
The first is performing risk identification and assessment. The second is risk 
control. Risk assessment has been discussed above, so only risk control will be 
discussed here. Risk control is the process of planning risk resolution 
techniques, providing solutions for potential risks within the system and finally 
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monitoring the applied solutions to ensure their effectiveness in resolving the 
risks. Figure 11 shows the risk management cycle as proposed by Kasse 
Initiatives (81).  
 
Figure 11: Risk Management Cycle (81) 
The processes, tools and techniques used when performing risk management 
should be selected to suit the system and the risks being addressed. This will 
ensure that resources are wisely consumed by the risk management process 
and the risk management solutions will be practical and efficient. 
Risk management can be implemented within the system using four different 
approaches (82). These are: 
 Inactive risk management: the system is assumed to work normally 
and nothing will be done regarding the risk. 
 Reactive risk management: no risk assessment is carried out in 
advance; risk management will be performed based on the presence of 
accidents. 
 Interactive risk management: risks will be considered when they have 
a high potential to occur, in other words, risks will be considered based 
on the phase the system is currently in, as risks depend on the current 
system status. 
 Proactive risk management: risk identification, assessment and 
solving will be performed completely in advance of the system 
development. Thus, solutions for potential risk will be implemented as 
part of the system design. 
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As the approaches change from the inactive to the proactive, the time and cost 
overheads of risk management will increase. However, the possibility of 
suffering loss due to risk will be minimized by the proactive approach. 
2.3.1.4. Safety Requirements 
One of the outputs from the risk assessment and management activities is a set 
of recommended solutions for the expected risks in the system. These solutions 
will be used to define and develop the safety requirements of the system. 
It is important to ensure that the system is acceptably safe, by guaranteeing 
that the system meets its safety requirements. Within each industry different 
standards have been developed to help assure the safety of the products. For 
example in aviation systems, Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA) 
uses the risk assessment and management to ensure that the system being 
developed is acceptably safe (72). PSSA is applied at the design phase of the 
system to guarantee a system that meets the safety requirements and 
maintains refined safety requirements that are appropriate to the final design 
of the system (83).  
As discussed in the system development lifecycle, hazard identification and 
analysis and risk assessment activities are performed during the first stage of 
system development, which is requirements analysis. These activities will 
define the safety requirements of the system. Risk management is the process 
of integrating the safety solutions as part of each system development stage. 
For example, the safety requirements relating to environmental hazards, like 
lightning for an aircraft, will be defined during the system requirements 
analysis. The design and operational solutions provided for these hazards will 
be integrated in the aircraft system during the different stages of development, 
for example to avoid crashing due to lightning, the aircraft body should include 
metal which makes it operate as a conductor, this solution will be integrated as 
part of the design and implementation stages.   
2.3.1.5. Safety Design Tactics 
The achievement of high quality and performance (e.g. design decisions) in 
systems depends on many factors. So, we need a strategy to assist in recording 
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and examining the system design decisions. Tactics are strategies which help to 
capture these design decisions. According to Bass et al. “A tactic is a design 
decision that influences the control of a quality attribute response.” (46). 
Safety is an important quality attribute for many computer systems. Different 
architectural patterns can be used to build each component within the 
computer system. Safety tactics are the foundational building blocks that define 
which design patterns among those available can be selected to achieve the 
attributes’ requirements. Wu (58) asserted that safety tactics can be used to 
select the architectural design patterns that allow the safety requirements to be 
met. Wu discussed the use of redundancy, voting and diversity tactics with the 
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) pattern to avoid a single point of failure 
and to increase the availability of the system, which guarantees a higher level 
safe system. Figure 10 shows a taxonomy of safety tactics according to Kelly’s 
and Wu’s classification.
 
Figure 12: Safety Tactics (50) 
Safety is related to reducing the consequences of undesired accidents. It is best 
to avoid failures and, in cases where failures occur, they should be detected and 
managed. Safety Tactics can be classified into three groups: failure avoidance, 
detection and containment tactics (84). 
Failure avoidance is the best mechanism to handle failures: if a failure is 
avoided, it cannot occur. Simplicity tactics are designed to help in designing 
systems that can avoid failure. Logically, however, there is no failure-free 
software. It is therefore important to ensure that tactics are provided to detect 
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and manage any failures which do occur, in order to avoid any further 
consequences. Timestamp and sanity checking are examples of these tactics. 
It is important to ensure that, where possible, the consequences of failures are 
managed within the system to avoid any further drawbacks within the system. 
The redundancy and recovery tactics help to achieve this.  
One of the architectural techniques that explicitly exploits the concept of design 
tactics is the Architecture Tradeoff Analysis Method (ATAM) (46). ATAM is a 
structured method for understanding the tradeoffs inherent in the design of 
architectures for software-intensive systems. This technique was developed as 
a principled way to evaluate the fitness-for-purposed of software architectures, 
with respect to many competing quality attributes such as security, 
modifiability, availability and performance, (85). The technique can help to 
provide reasoning about architectural decisions which affect quality attribute 
interactions.  Safety can be only one of the competing attributes covered by 
ATAM and therefore the outcome of the safety analysis should form a core 
input to ATAM when the method is used for the analysis of safety-critical 
systems (considering safety but also other important systems and business 
quality attributes) (58).  
2.3.2. Safety Certification 
System certification is a very important step and is usually required before the 
deployment of safety-critical systems, especially if the system can lead to 
accidents and human injury or death, where “it must be certified as adequately 
safe according to applicable standards” (86). Ivan defined certification as a 
process that is conducted by an independent party to assess whether a product, 
method or service complies with a pre-defined set of requirements (87).  The 
result of the certification process is a written statement, in the form of a 
certificate.  
2.3.2.1. Standards 
For most safety-critical domains, different institutions provide standards to 
guide system development and operation. For example, in the aerospace 
industry the European Space Agency (ESA) and the National Aeronautics and 
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Space Administration (NASA) define standards relating to their respective 
areas. Generally, these institutions are located in different geographical 
locations (88). The provided standards address safety issues within the system 
as a whole or sometimes only the safety issues relating to a specific aspect or 
component of the system (for example, software). 
In the nuclear industry, IEC 60880 was introduced by the International Electro-
technical Commission subcommittee 54A (IEC SC 54A) to address safety issues 
related to the introduction of software in current nuclear systems. Prior to that, 
IEC 60880 addressed only hardware safety in nuclear plants (88). In the UK 
Ministry of Defence (MoD), different standards have been developed at the 
software and system levels. The DEF STAN 00-55 standard was developed for 
software safety and DEF STAN 00-56 was developed for system safety (88).  
Kelly (14), Habli (27) and Penny et al. (89) highlight an increased interest in 
the goal-based approach over prescriptive approaches, based on the reports 
and recommendations provided from different accidents (e.g. the Cullen report 
for the Piper Alpha accident). 
Generally, there are many standards introduced for the purpose of certifying 
software safety (90). As discussed below, these standards can be classified 
either as prescriptive /process-based or goal-based standards.  
Prescriptive/process-based  
Prescriptive or process-based safety standards define a set of requirements 
and prescribe the specific means for compliance and the necessary evidence 
(91). The prescriptive methodology is based on the accumulated experience 
development and operation of a system in a certain environment. 
Consequently, when the system is to be located in a new environment or in a 
novel situation, it will not be adequate to apply the prescriptive methodology 
(91) (89). Hereña asserts that this drawback will limit the extent to which the 
standard will be useful.  
Technological advances will affect the operations performed within the system. 
Over time, this leads to new safety requirements, which may not be addressed 
within the system. Thus, the prescriptive methodology is somewhat limited 
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when considering time as a factor in the system lifecycle (91) (89). The 
addition of features and functions to maintain the ongoing safety of the system 
will contribute to an increase in the cost of the installation and maintenance of 
the system (91). 
A very important issue to consider is legal responsibility. The provider of the 
system should integrate the necessary safety requirements within the system, 
and the regulator should ensure that these requirements are accurately 
integrated. In the case where these requirements did not prevent the 
occurrence of a certain accident, there is likely to be some dispute as to who is 
responsible (91). 
Goal-based Standards 
Goal-based methodologies do not prescribe a process for the development of 
safety-critical systems, but require developers and operators to provide 
assurance that the system is safe.  In many domains, this assurance is provided 
in the form of safety arguments that are accompanied by evidence to indicate 
that the system safety meets the requirements (92). By providing for different 
arguments and their corresponding evidence, the goal-based approach 
provides more freedom in developing technical solutions that can 
accommodate different standards (89). 
Kelly, et al. (93) addressed the challenges facing the goal-based approach. 
Basically, the question that should be answered is “how to comply?”. In the 
goal-based approach, developers produce a set of arguments and pieces of 
evidence which address the safety issues within the system. One challenge is 
how acceptable risks should be defined for the system and what is taken to be 
the accepted level of risk. Another challenge, which is managerial rather than 
technical, is program management and the costs of developing new systems.  
As safety is integrated in the system using arguments and evidence. It is 
important to establish which arguments and evidence are necessary to satisfy a 
particular safety requirement (89). Penny et al. argued that the arguments and 
evidence required are related to the significance of the individual system 
functions.   
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2.3.3. Safety Cases 
In order for the regulators to be able to certify any system, documentation for 
the system safety should be presented to demonstrate how the system has met 
its safety certification requirements.  In general, the system developers should 
define a set of safety goals that the system should meet.  For each of these goals 
(sometimes called claims) an argument and evidence should be presented to 
support the goal (94). The collection of these arguments and their 
corresponding evidence is called the safety case of the system (14).  
Ideally, the development of the safety case should start as part of the 
requirements analysis and it should be updated during the different stages of 
system development. Any later changes in the system should result in a 
revision of the safety case to assess the impact of those changes on the safety 
case (89) (14). 
A safety case can be defined as: 
“A structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a 
compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for a given 
application in a given operating environment.” (95) 
So the goals, arguments and evidence should address the target environment in 
which the system is designed to operate. 
Each system should have a set of goals or objectives that define its safety 
requirements within the environment in which it will operate. These goals will 
be identified based on different factors, mostly derived from the hazard 
analysis and risk assessment process, as discussed above. As a result, it is 
logical that these goals can be modified (new goals added or removed) if the 
system is relocated to a different environment. 
Claims about the achievement of safety objectives should be supported by 
arguments and evidence. Figure 13 shows the role of a safety argument in 
linking requirements and objectives with specific items of supporting evidence. 
It explicitly links and justifies how the evidence substantiates the safety 
requirements and objectives. 
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Figure 13: The Role of Safety Argument (14) 
One of the aims of the safety case is to evaluate the extent to which the system 
meets its safety requirements. It should be developed by the system provider 
and audited by the regulator. Thus, it is important that both parties have a 
common understanding of the safety case’s contents, i.e. the safety goals, 
arguments and evidence. Given the size and complexity of modern integrated 
systems, it is expected that safety cases will contain huge amounts of data 
generated by analysis of the system. In order to ensure adequate presentation 
of the safety case contents, and to effectively address the system safety 
requirements, the safety case should be developed using systematic and 
organised procedures. There is a strong challenge to provide a readable safety 
case that can be easily interpreted by the regulator (14) (96). Cockram et al. 
argued that with the huge amount of documentation provided in the safety 
case, it might be possible to lose concentration on which arguments are 
provided with which evidence, which makes it hard for the regulator to assess 
the credibility of the safety case. 
2.3.3.1. Safety Case Argument Representation 
Safety case arguments can be presented either textually, graphically or in a 
tabular format. Each of these has its own positives and negatives.  
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) 
The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) is the most widely graphical language in 
industry for representing safety arguments. GSN was developed at the 
University of York for defining safety arguments in a graphical format (97). 
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This notation is expressive and structured to develop safety arguments in a 
methodical way through capturing the primary argumentation elements.  
 
Figure 14: Principal Elements of GSN (14) 
Figure 14 shows the basic elements of GSN such as goals, contexts, solutions, 
justifications and assumptions and their relationships. An argument is created 
by linking these elements using ‘supported by’ and ‘in context of’ relationships 
to form a ‘goal structure (14)’. The goal structure (i.e. claims) can be 
decomposed into sub-claims and the sub-claims can be further decomposed 
until these can be satisfied by direct solutions (i.e. items of evidence). 
The reasoning behind the decomposition is made clear in the GSN strategy 
elements.  Context elements are used to provide an explicit statement of the 
context in which the claim is made. Justifications provide reasons why a 
specific strategy is selected, or a particular claim or solution is used. A claim 
(GSN ‘goal’) can be supported by quantitative or qualitative evidence, 
depending on the nature of the claim. Common types of evidence (solutions) 
include the results of the hazard identification or risk analysis. Figure 15 shows 
an example goal structure in GSN, taken from (98).  
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Figure 15: An Example Goal Structure 
2.3.3.2. Modular Safety Cases 
The modular safety case approach  (99) was developed in order to allow the 
development of a baseline safety case which can be used to reflect additions to 
or modifications of the system. The approach was developed as a means of 
managing safety cases for modern, large-scale integrated systems. 
Furthermore, the modular safety case aims to limit the size of changes in the 
safety case that are due to the changes in the system structure. In the 
conventional safety case approach, an independent safety case will be 
developed for each configuration of the system, which will dramatically 
increase the time and cost requirements of the certification process. In the 
modular safety case approach, it is possible to have different variants of the 
safety case. Each variant is related to one of the system configurations (99). 
In the modular safety case approach, a safety case can be partitioned into 
modules both vertically and horizontally. The partitioning will be based on the 
top-down progression of the objectives-argument-evidence (100). In vertical 
partitioning, certain argument claims can be used as objectives for another 
safety argument, while in horizontal partitioning one argument can provide the 
assumed context for another. 
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As different modules are inter-related with each other, it is important to define 
the dependencies between these modules. Explicit interfaces can be defined 
between safety case modules. The safety case module interface can be 
represented as follows (99): 
1. Objectives addressed by the module; 
2. Evidence presented within the module; 
3. Context defined within the module; 
4. Arguments requiring support from other modules 
Inter-module dependencies; 
5. Reliance on objectives addressed elsewhere; 
6. Reliance on evidence presented elsewhere; 
7. Reliance on context defined elsewhere. 
When developing a modular safety case, the argument contained within a 
single argument may fail to support all the module claims. Thus, some 
argument modules can be used provide arguments and evidence to support 
claims that are recorded in other argument modules. However, within any 
composition, objectives and arguments from different modules should 
complement each other. Furthermore, the evidence in different modules should 
not be contradictory, and the context of each module should be consistent with 
the context of the other modules in the composition. 
In compositions, the rely-guarantee approach is used to capture the modules’ 
behaviour within the composition.  In the safety case module interface defined 
above, item 1 will provide the guarantee and items 4-7 will provide the rely 
conditions.  Items 2 and 3 must hold as the composition is being developed. 
Graphical extensions for GSN have been provided to handle the modularity of 
the safety case  (99). The first extension to GSN is the representation of the 
modules, which is a package notation imported from UML.  In the module 
notation goals supported by other modules are represented as Away Goals 
(101). Further extensions have been developed to allow the link between an 
argument in a certain module and context and evidence that exist in another 
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module. To support these links the Away Context and Away Solution are 
introduced. 
In GSN, a safety case module interface is defined as follows (99): 
1. Goals addressed by the module; 
2. Solutions presented within the module; 
3. Context defined within the module; 
4. Goals requiring support from other modules. 
Inter-module dependencies are captured by: 
5. Away Goal references; 
6. Away Solution references; 
7. Away Context references. 
The process of composing different modules to form a safe composition should 
be carefully performed, to ensure that the resulting argument consists of well-
defined modules that are correctly connected and interdependent. Three main 
steps for the composition of safety-case modules are identified by Kelly (99).. 
These are: Goal matching, Consistency checks and Handling cross-references. 
At each step, different related issues will be investigated to ensure proper 
composition of the modules. 
While performing the composition of the different modules, documentation for 
the relations between the different modules should be developed as a safety-
case contract  (99). This will help in understanding the relationships between 
the different modules, and to assess whether the composition still holds if the 
context changes, or if one of the modules is modified or substituted.  The 
contract must record all the away goal and solution references that had been 
exploited by the composition (99). 
The safety case architecture will be similar to the system architecture. The 
main principles for this are: high cohesion/low coupling, supporting the 
division of work and contractual boundaries, supporting future expansion, and 
isolating change (100). Research into the development of Integrated Modular 
Avionics (IMA)-based systems adapted safety case architectures based on the 
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modularity of the safety case, which corresponds to the modularity in the 
system itself  (99). Adopting this architecture, the safety case can be divided 
into modules, and the cross-references between the modules can be 
represented as well. 
In modular safety cases, and based on the principle of isolating change, 
arguments that are likely to change will be separated in standalone modules. In 
the case of change, only those modules affected by the change require 
reassessment; it is assumed that the other modules in the safety case are 
unaffected. Although it might be possible for the interface of the module to 
change (which requires changes to the contract to be made), the paths that 
require revision in the safety case can be identified easily. The changes should 
be limited to the specific module in which the change occurred and the 
interfaces connected to other modules within the safety case. 
The final architecture of the system and its corresponding safety case should be 
evaluated to ensure that they meet the architectural quality attributes, such as 
scalability, performance and modifiability. Different evaluation techniques have 
been proposed, either for the system as a whole or for the software element of 
the system. An example is the Software Architectural Analysis Method (SAAM)  
(102).  
 
Figure 16: Activities in SAAM Analysis  (102) 
SAAM proposed a systematic evaluation process for the system architecture 
that is modular, as shown in Figure 16 (102). Each step in the method performs 
the necessary evaluation for a certain module or set of modules within the 
architecture, trying to identify the required changes to the architecture and the 
effort required to enact these changes.  Generally, changes will be at one of 
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three levels: local to a certain module within the architecture, for a set of 
modules within the architecture, or for the architecture as a whole. 
GSN: In our work we use GSN to develop SOA safety cases using the modular 
and pattern extensions of the notation. We applied GSN for defining argument 
modules and patterns which capture the different argument structures for 
assuring services and their design and constrain variation in SOA safety cases.  
Modular safety cases have been adapted for different applications. For example, 
they have been used to provide assurance for Integrated Modular Avionics  
(IMA) (103), for operating systems (104), for Objected-Oriented systems (26), 
for COTS (105) (106), for Kernels (107) and for product lines (27).  
2.3.3.3. Modular and Incremental Certification  
The introduction of the modular safety cases technique inspired proposals to 
concerning the adaptation of the certification process. By limiting the effects of 
change within the safety case, and safety assurance work, modularity 
theoretically allows for the limited certification of certain system elements: the 
effort required to certify changes from a previously-certified baseline in a given 
composition should be smaller than re-certifying the entire system. By 
adopting the same modular and incremental approaches, the certification 
process simulates the modularity of the safety case (108). Thus, in theory, the 
re-certification of a system due to any change or addition to the system should 
only require the assessment and evaluation of the changes, which will limit the 
re-certification effort to the size of the changes, rather than to complete 
recertification of a complex system. 
Rushby (109) proposed an approach based on the concept of assume-
guarantee reasoning. By investigating the presence of failures, the approach 
will extend from verification into certification. However, the approach requires 
the use of partitioning, whereby a single module can be reused within the 
system, or can be deployed in another system. This approach is based on the 
modular certification process proposed for IMA  (103), where certification of 
the system can be performed based on a modular safety case, which facilitates 
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the certification of the changes in the system, by focussing on certification of 
those modules involved in the change and their interfaces. 
In traditional certification, the cost of the re-certification is related to the 
system’s size and complexity, as recertification typically requires the 
development of a new safety case, in total, in response to the system changes. 
With the introduction of modular safety case and certification approaches, it 
became possible to relate the cost of the re-certification to the size and 
complexity of the changes, which will dramatically decrease the total cost of re-
certification, especially in the case of small changes to large systems (110). 
The project conducted by IAWG investigated the construction of modular safety 
cases and proposed a methodology for incremental certification in the UK 
defence avionics domain. In the case of any changes to the system or its 
proposed operating environment or use, evaluation of these changes will define 
where changes are also required in modular safety case relating to the system.  
In most certification regimes, any changes to the system safety case require a 
re-certification process to be performed. In the case of modular safety cases, 
the re-certification will be only performed on the parts of the safety case that 
have actually changed, or which address aspects of the system design which 
have changed. The process is called an incremental certification process. Fenn 
et al. (108) assert that the incremental certification process is still immature. 
The IAWG modular certification process defines a series of systematic steps to 
assess where change is required in the safety case and what concerns must be 
addressed. These steps start by identifying the change scenarios, then 
performing optimisation for the safety case architecture, followed by 
identifying the Dependency-Guarantee Relationships (DGR), and finally 
building the safety-case arguments. These steps are discussed in detail in Fenn 
et al. (108). 
Although the modular and incremental certification processes are expected to 
have benefits over traditional certification processes, these approaches cannot 
be considered suitable in all cases. As part of the IAWG project, five key criteria 
were identified to ensure that applying modular and incremental certification 
approaches are likely to be beneficial in a given case. The five keys are: distilled 
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set of change scenarios, re-use, and modularity, use of COTS and vendor co-
operation, and size and complexity of the system (108). 
2.3.4. SOA and Safety 
For an SOA system that is considered to be safety-critical, or has any safety-
related impact on humans in particular or on the environment in general, a 
certification process is often conducted to ensure that the system is safe to 
operate in its designated context.  
In Section 2.2, we discussed SOA designs. The discussion included the SOA 
lifecycle, tactics, design patterns and system modelling. In Section 2.3, we 
discussed the different issues related to the safety of the system. This includes 
defining the safety requirements, developing the system safety case and the 
certification process. 
The aim of this section is to discuss published work related to SOA safety. In the 
following, a review will be carried out on existing work on SOA applications for 
safety-critical systems and safety assessment.  
Existing work on SOA has lacked sufficient consideration of potential safety 
applications. Only one paper could be found in the literature (16) on the use of 
modular safety certification for SOA. However, there is published work which 
touches on some safety aspects of SOA. 
Donini et al work focused on testing safety-critical SOA-based systems through 
the adoption of a classical SOA to build an environment for safety-critical 
control systems (111). They provided indications on the integration of SOA 
system architecture components with existing centralised testing 
environments by addressing concrete test objectives. Specifically, they 
provided a test framework where automated functional testing is presented in 
an external simulated environment based on SOAs. They also conducted 
functional system testing via simulated environments which can be an 
approach to minimising test sets. The test sets defined were representative of 
an actual operational usage profile for a railway interlocking control system.  
Rychlý has created an approach to representing the behaviour of services 
within SOA and their implementation through algebra π-calculus (112). This is 
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represented by using the case study of Donini et al (111) based on a railway 
interlocking control system which is driven by an SOA design (113). Detailed 
description of the SOA and all its services is introduced in (112).  
The researchers in (114) proposed a framework for using SOA in non-critical 
parts of safety-critical embedded systems. This allowed the use of Smart Sensor 
Interfaces (SSI) and Smart Sensor Protocol (SSP). SSI can facilitate the 
integration of the payload on a UAV represented by sensors. SSP can be used to 
exchange information to decide the requirements for mission accomplishment 
(114). Based on an SOA design, the paper demonstrates that the real-time 
performance is compulsory and has to be guaranteed under different 
circumstances.  
In (115), the authors proposed a Knowledge-Based Framework for 
Dynamically Changing Applications. The framework uses the dynamic 
definition of web services, based on a specific system configuration, the 
availability of the web service component and the database with predefined 
context information. The framework allows the monitoring of the information 
to generate services with different levels of security, reliability as well as 
performance, in a dynamic way. Nevertheless, the implications of SOA systems 
for safety certification are not well explored.  
The above pieces of work are different from our work. Although they consider 
safety-critical systems, they do not cover any aspects of safety analysis and 
safety cases.  
The researchers in (116) have developed a methodology for risk management 
within SOA to address risks, threats and vulnerabilities, through using the 
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE), 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Factor Analysis of 
Information Risk (FAIR). These techniques can be used to provide assurance to 
changes within safety requirements (116). Similar to our work, they produce 
safety requirements at different stages of development. They present a 
development model based on five SOA layers where each layer is composed of 
phases. These phases have activities, which can be subdivided into tasks, which 
are the subject of the safety analysis. Their work is similar to our work as far as 
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safety analysis is concerned. However, it does not cover any aspects of safety 
cases or any interfaces between design and modelling, and safety analysis.  
Brown et al have addressed the issue of assuring SOA designs using modular 
safety cases. Similar to our work, they used GSN to create these safety cases 
(16). They have raised some challenges to safety when using an SOA style. 
These are related to: 
 System/service requirements 
 System safety certification 
 Safety certification throughout the system development lifecycle.  
They introduce the problems and propose a high-level methodology for 
creating a safety case within the military aviation domain.  Brown’s argument is 
meant to support the flexibility of compositional features in SOA, while 
simplifying the safety certification and accreditation of SOA-style systems (16). 
However, their work was limited in scope, focusing on an example application 
rather than creating an integrated framework for modelling, analysing and 
assuring the safety of SOA in safety-critical applications.  
2.4. Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we reviewed the definitions, features and lifecycles of SOAs. We 
discussed the SOA system architecture and gave an overview of the core 
elements of SOA covering the SOA design patterns and notations used for SOA 
modelling. We introduced the concept of system safety, and introduced safety-
related issues and certification processes and discussed the most common 
elements of concern in system safety engineering, such as the overall system 
safety process, safety analysis, risk assessment, risk management, safety 
requirements and safety tactics. In addition, we explained techniques which are 
commonly applied to address these elements. Then we moved on to discuss 
safety certification and safety standards. We considered the concept of safety 
cases in some detail addressing approaches to safety-case development, 
challenges for the safety-case approach, and argument representation 
techniques. Finally, we reviewed the concept of modular safety cases and its 
application for modular and incremental certification.  
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Chapter 3 
 
3. SOA Safety Assurance 
Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The literature review in Chapter 2 covered key issues related to the 
development and assessment of SOA. In particular, it considered the safety and 
dependability properties of SOA and related architectures, such as cloud 
computing and SoS, used in critical industries. Based on the review of current 
literature concerning SOAs and safety-critical systems, the following 
observations can be drawn: 
 There is a shortage of research on the use of SOAs for the development 
of safety-critical systems. 
  There is a lack of systematic safety assessment processes and methods 
that address the special features of SOAs such as composibility. 
 There is a lack of safety assurance strategies in the form of safety 
argumentation and evidence to justify why the use of SOAs in safety-
critical applications is acceptably safe.  
In this chapter, we introduce and define a conceptual framework for SOA safety 
assurance. This framework is discussed in the context of architectural 
modelling, safety analysis, safety certification and tool support, and methods to 
support the framework are proposed. These methods are explained in more 
detail in Chapter 4 (SOA Safety Analysis) and Chapter 5 (SOA Safety Cases). 
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3.2 Conceptual Framework 
The main aim of the SOA safety assurance framework presented in this chapter 
is to provide a systematic means to understand and analyse how SOA can 
contribute to safety and hazards and how safety justifications can be provided 
by means of structured and explicit safety cases. The framework is summarised 
in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 17: SOA Safety Assurance Framework 
Figure 17 shows the four aspects that have been considered and developed in 
order to address key concerns about SOA safety: modelling, safety analysis, 
safety cases and automated support and tooling:  
 Modelling is used to represent the structure and behaviour of the 
service-based system, developed against a variety of design styles. This 
covers the design of the services, contracts and interactions and the 
specific tasks and flow of information used for realising the SOA design.  
 Safety analysis results are used for understanding the failure behaviour 
of the SOA and specifying safety requirements and design tactics to 
control the risk of any hazardous failures. The framework adapts and 
develops two safety analysis techniques for understanding service 
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hazards and examining how the system failure behaviour can contribute 
to the occurrence of these hazards. In early safety analysis, engineers 
designing services used in safety-critical applications need to define 
safety requirements that address the risk of any hazardous behaviour 
posed by these services and ensure that the design of the SOA explicitly 
meets these requirements. 
 Justification of the safety of the service-based system is communicated 
through the development of an explicit safety case. A safety case is a 
structure that comprises an argument and evidence that present the 
reasoning for why that system is safe for a given application in a given 
environment (99). In our framework, the safety case is based on the 
results generated from the SOA models and safety analyses.  
 The tool-support environment provides automated capabilities for 
building the SOA models, applying the safety analysis and developing 
the safety case for the system. The tool environment, developed during 
this PhD research, also provides means for ensuring traceability 
between the modelling, safety analysis and safety case artefacts.  
In short, the SOA safety assurance framework proposed in this thesis provides 
a methodical basis for integrated design and analysis of service-based systems, 
with explicit consideration of hazardous behaviour and safety justification.  
3.3 SOA Modelling  
This section introduces the modelling languages that are used in our 
framework for specifying the services and the dynamic processes for SOA-
based systems. These modelling languages are employed in order to provide a 
holistic view of the design elements of the SOA within the system, considering 
structure and behaviour which are important for the safety analysis, and to 
generate models which can be understood by stakeholders with different levels 
of technical background.  
In terms of the structure of the SOA, the types of concern covered by our 
modelling include: 
 Services 
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 Interfaces 
 Contracts 
 Operations 
 Actors 
The modelling language we use for specifying the above structures is SoaML 
(117), which was reviewed in Section 1.7. SoaML models are based on a 
modular description of the SOA in which related Contracts, Interfaces and 
Operations are encapsulated in, and provided by, self-contained Services. SoaML 
allows for the specification and analysis of the requirements for each Service, 
including the safety requirements, which is an important feature of the 
language for dealing with safety-critical services. Further, SoaML can provide 
an explicit description of Services in terms of actors, or Participants, which 
realise and implement these Services.  
The proposed framework models SOA behaviour, including behaviour that can 
lead to hazardous events, using BPMN to describe the processes and the 
information flows in the SOA design. BPMN captures the dynamic Tasks and 
Flows implemented in the SOA design. BPMN allows the modeller to 
communicate and represent internal procedures, based on processes, in a 
graphical and structured notation. In our framework, BPMN is used to 
understand and analyse the detailed failure behaviour in a service-based 
system and how this can contribute to service hazards. However, the 
conceptual framework can be seen as a notation-independent solution. Any 
notation which has sufficient power to model the structural definition of 
services and their behavioural implementation could be used as part of the 
framework. There are many alternative languages which could reasonably be 
used: each modelling language will have subtly different approaches, but the 
concepts required by our framework are sufficiently generic that the choice of 
language does not affect the application of the framework. In this thesis, SoaML 
and BPMN are used as the two main modelling languages in order to illustrate 
more concretely the concepts and the methods that are developed as part of 
the framework, and to show how traceability can be achieved between the 
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structure and behaviour of the SOA design (as an input for the safety analysis 
and safety case methods). 
3.3.1 Modelling SOA Services in SoaML  
As stated above, SoaML is intended to model the structure of the services that 
comprise an SOA-based system in terms of Participants (Consumers and 
Providers), Services Architecture, Service Contracts, Service Interfaces and 
internal Operations. It is focused on the integration of Participants into the 
Services Architecture model using Service Contracts, which capture the Service-
Level Agreements (SLAs). In our framework, this level of detail is important for 
understanding how services can be hazardous and how Contracts, Interfaces 
and Participants can contribute to service hazards. 
In addition, SoaML can help identify and specify policies for providing and 
using the services and classification schemes. We use this to support the 
definition of  severity classification schemes when applying SOA safety analysis 
and their effects on the safe operation of the system. 
The SoaML specification describes the services provided by the architecture, 
including different areas that can be useful for safety analysis. Participants are 
used to model the service Providers and Consumers within the system. This can 
help in understanding how service Providers and Consumers can potentially 
deviate from the intended behaviour and contribute to unsafe failures. The 
interactions between Participants are through service Contracts. Service 
Contracts are used to explain the interaction among service entities. Like 
Participant failures, communication failures can also contribute to unsafe 
failure behaviour, via deviations from the intended Contracts. 
Service Interfaces are used to define the Operations that are offered by 
Providers and are available for Consumers in an SOA. The technical Interfaces 
include signatures of Operations that include the names of the Operations, the 
parameter types and the return types of the Operations. Since Interfaces are 
used to specify the input and output values for the processes, failures such as 
the loss of data or the provision of incorrect descriptions of data via these 
Operations could lead to unsafe behaviour of the system. These failures could 
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also delay the Operations within the system and might contribute to service 
hazards.   
Services Architectures are the diagrams used to describe the main components 
and communications within the system and how Participants work together 
using Services. Contracts are used to display the relationships between 
Participants and Services.  These relationships can help to identify the effects of 
failures within the Services and Participants, clarifying the level of severity and 
deriving the safety requirements that are specific to the Services. 
In summary, SoaML provides a structured basis for modelling the high-level 
services and their interactions, including interfaces. This is necessary to 
perform hazard analysis on service-based systems.  
3.3.2 Modelling SOA Processes in BPMN 
The framework uses BPMN as the modelling notation for specifying dynamic 
processes in the SOA design. The BPMN model specifies the behaviour of the 
processes underlying the services and identifies Tasks, such as Script Tasks and 
User Tasks, as well as Sub-Processes, Gateways, Sequence Flows, Pools and Lanes. 
It also describes how messages are exchanged and coordinated between 
Participants. The diagram describes the execution of processes within an SOA 
system and provides a key input for understanding both the intended and 
failure behaviour of the system. This is a key prerequisite for performing 
detailed safety analysis of the low-level behaviour of services and their 
interactions. 
A key concern in SOA safety is understanding how interaction failures can lead 
to hazards. BPMN models focus on the orchestration of tasks that implement 
high-level services in business processes. This includes specification of the 
choreography and collaboration between interacting processes. Defining and 
understanding these interacting processes is key for analysing the failure 
behaviour of the services.  
Another area of concern for understanding the safety of system behaviour is 
the flow of information and control within the SOA. Service-based systems tend 
to be information-intensive: key decisions are based on the information 
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processed by the system and provided by different services and participants. 
Analysing the failure modes associated with information flows is necessary for 
analysis of the safety of the SOA system, and BPMN provides a structured 
means for capturing the flow of information and understanding the 
consequences of any potential deviations.   
The BPMN process defined in our framework can help engineers to focus their 
analysis of the low-level service behaviour under different situations and 
timing conditions. Each process captures the tasks that should be done by the 
identified service Participants and the coordination between them. The timing 
of messages between processes has to be scheduled, in order to clarify the 
overall duration for each process, or the worst-case timing behaviour. This 
enables the analyst to see how timing failures can contribute to service failures. 
Some of these failures might be hazardous. 
In summary, BPMN provides a detailed representation of the execution 
mechanisms underlying the high-level services and is used as a basis for the 
detailed failure analysis of the service-based system behaviour.  
3.3.3 Traceability between SoaML and BPMN Models 
In our framework, the SoaML models, used for defining the services, and the 
BPMN model, used for specifying low-level behaviour, are linked explicitly at 
the model level. 
 
Figure 18: Link between SoaML and BPMN Models 
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 As illustrated in Figure 2, Services in SoaML interact through defined 
Contracts. These Contracts have explicit Interfaces that offer a number of 
Operations. We link each of these Operations to a Task in BPMN, thus enabling 
traceability between the different models at different abstraction levels. 
Further, we represent every Participant in SoaML as a Swimlane in the BPMN 
model. A link between two BPMN Tasks should capture the information flow in 
terms of inputs, outputs, data, sequence and timing. The explicit traceability 
between the various SoaML and BPMN models is necessary for assuring 
consistency in the SOA safety analysis and safety cases.  The interaction 
between the SoaML and BPMN models is explored in detail in the next section. 
3.4 SOA Safety Analysis 
This section introduces the two safety analysis techniques we propose for use 
in hazard and failure analysis for SOA-based systems. In the design phase, 
safety analysis is used to derive the necessary safety requirements that define 
the basis for ensuring that the SOA system developed is acceptably safe. Safety 
analysis is carried out as part of a safety management process, which forces 
explicit consideration of the system safety level and the system deployment. 
The analysis allows for identification of the system-level hazards associated 
with the services and their interactions and of the potential failure modes that 
can contribute to these hazards.  
The consideration of hazards and failures is a fundamental issue for service-
based applications used in the safety-critical domain. It is important to 
implement the analysis of the hazards, identify them, evaluate their effects, 
identify the severity of the hazards and then provide the necessary measures to 
manage the service hazards. The service hazard analysis technique proposed in 
this thesis helps to identify the top-level conditions that may lead to unsafe 
system events.   
The safety process should be designed to address factors within the system and 
its environment which potentially affect the design and operation of the 
service, e.g. the size of the company, the structure of the system, the industry 
the system is operating in and the applications the system is used for (Leveson, 
1995). A safety process will have different activities, depending on the SOA 
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system that is being investigated, with specific reporting requirements for each 
activity. Each activity will result in a detailed documentation of results. 
Applying safety analysis to an SOA system should determine the safety 
requirements for the services and processes and provide evidence for the 
processes of assuring that the system is acceptably safe. In addition, safety 
analysis will affect the ability of the system to be deployed.  
The framework uses and adapts two existing safety analysis techniques, 
namely Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) (118) and Software Hazard 
Analysis and Resolution in Design (SHARD) (72) and tailors them to the 
analysis of individual services and SOA processes. The aim of these techniques 
is to provide a systematic basis for identifying and analysing hazardous 
behaviour associated with the SOA system (e.g. hazards due to lack of 
information, or due to incorrect, information). The system safety team can thus 
decompose high-level safety criteria into readable and detailed subsets, which 
can be used by the design team to develop the SOA system (73). Safety analysis 
should also be performed to assess the risk associated with each of these 
service hazards and to identify measures for managing the risk. 
The rest of this section considers the safety analysis of both services and their 
underlying behavioural processes, considering service hazards and the failure 
modes that can contribute to these hazards. 
3.4.1. Safety Analysis of Services  
The framework proposes to perform safety analysis for services modelled in 
SoaML, through adapting FHA as a means for identifying and classifying service 
hazards. A service hazard is a condition associated with the service, or its 
interactions, that can lead to an accident. This thesis defines an adapted FHA 
technique for identifying and analysing service hazards, which we have called 
Service Hazard Analysis (SHA). SHA addresses individual services, considering 
their associated hazards, the effects of these hazards at different levels and the 
severity classification of these effects. Based on these factors, SHA provides 
suitable actions or recommendations for creating safety requirements for the 
service. 
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In terms of the “V” safety lifecycle model discussed in Chapter 2, we adopt this 
technique to consider early lifecycle hazard and risk assessment. At this stage 
of the conceptual design, the analyst has to consider broad hypothetical failure 
types, since the system has not yet been implemented and detailed hazard 
analysis is therefore not possible. These failure types are generic and consider 
issues such as the complete absence of the service, unintended service 
provision or incorrect service operation. Each of these failure types will have to 
be interpreted and classified in the specific context in which the system is used.  
In summary, in our framework, SHA provides a list of service hazards, their 
safety classification and a set of requirements needed for managing those 
hazards through subsequent design, development and deployment activities. 
SHA is described in detail in Chapter 4. 
3.4.2. Safety Analysis of SOA Processes  
In order to identify and assess the design failure modes that can contribute to 
service hazards, we have adapted the SHARD technique to provide a means for 
understanding detailed service failures. We call this technique Service Failure 
Analysis (SFA). 
SHARD, which provides the basis for SFA, is one of several software and 
hardware safety analysis techniques which address information and control 
flow and intended behaviour and how failures within information flows in 
particular can be lead to hazards (72). SHARD is a variant of the hazard and 
operability study (HAZOP) technique (119). In our framework, SHARD has 
been adapted to analyse the flow of information between the Tasks 
represented within the SOA processes (captured in the BPMN models). The 
analysis identifies a series of failure modes, and is driven by the application of a 
set of guidewords to each information flow. The guidewords are omission, 
commission, early, late and value. These guidewords are used to define the 
types of failure modes that may occur during the execution of the SOA process. 
Each of these failure modes is then associated with specific service faults linked 
to existing SOA fault taxonomies (i.e. potential causes). It then identifies the 
effects of the flow failures. The output of this analysis is a set of derived safety 
requirements.  
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More specifically, SFA starts by defining the deviations that could potentially be 
exhibited in behavioural SOA processes. These deviations are identified by 
applying and interpreting the abovementioned guidewords against information 
flows defined between the Tasks modelled in BPMN. To make the analysis 
specific to SOA failures, the causes of each potential deviation is linked to a 
specific type of fault as defined in the SOA fault taxonomy used in this thesis 
(Chapter 4). Next, the impact of each flow deviation is assessed in terms of the 
contributions that it could make to the service hazards (i.e. as identified in 
SHA). Finally, SFA produces detailed safety requirements and design measures 
for potentially meeting these requirements i.e. in the form of specific SOA 
design tactics. These tactics are based on existing safety tactics in the software 
architecture literature or SOA-specific dependability tactics (e.g. which are 
centred on the use of service redundancy, diversity, graceful degradation, 
monitoring and containment) (120). 
3.4.3. Use of SOA Fault Taxonomies in SFA 
A typical SOA has five major steps in its execution, namely: service publishing, 
service discovery, service composition, service binding and service execution. 
Each of these steps may be exposed to faults when running an SOA-based 
system. If faults are not detected, they may lead to failures at the service and 
system level (some of which are hazardous). The SOA literature covers ranges 
of faults identified and categorised by the community (i.e. SOA-specific faults 
rather than general system faults). One of the most thorough fault taxonomies 
for SOA was defined by Bruning, Weissleder and Malek (121). This taxonomy is 
well structured and categorises faults based on the SOA lifecycle phase. Fault 
types in the fault taxonomy are used in our framework as prompts or hints for 
safety analysts when performing SFA rather than as an exhaustive list of all 
possible SOA faults. 
3.5 SOA Safety Cases 
Safety certification often requires a safety case to be constructed in parallel to 
the development of a safety-critical system (14). In this section, we discuss the 
approach we developed to constructing SOA safety cases using the modular 
and pattern extensions of GSN (99). We use the Goal Structuring Notation 
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(GSN) (97) to define modules and patterns which capture the different 
argument structures for assuring services and their design and constrain 
variation in SOA safety cases. The modular safety case and catalogue of 
argument patterns we have developed for SOA are introduced in the next two 
sections and described in detail in Chapter 5. 
3.5.1. Modular Safety Case Development for SOA 
The SOA safety case architect plays an important role to put together 
information regarding the safety conditions and safety requirements, based on 
the SOA safety analysis described in Section 3.4 above, in order to capture the 
safety reasoning and provide assurance about the safe behaviour of the SOA-
based system. In order to improve traceability, it is desirable for a safety case 
to have a clear correspondence with the design of the system. Essentially, an 
SOA is a modular architecture, where each service represents a separate high-
level module with defined interactions. In this thesis, we adopt the notion of 
modular safety cases and examine how modularity in the assurance case can 
correspond to the modularity in the design of the SOA. 
More specifically, the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) is used to represent a 
series of safety argument modules (93). A GSN argument module is a self-
contained structure which represents the argument relating to a specific aspect 
of the safety of the system and the evidence which supports the argument. A 
modular safety case comprises several linked argument modules, each 
concerned with a discrete element of the system, which combine to provide 
assurance for the system as a whole. Modularity in the definition of services in 
SOAs lends itself to the concept of modular safety cases. Services and 
participants are self-contained system elements that interact through 
predefined interfaces (e.g. provided through SLAs). Service owners or 
producers often rely on other services when guaranteeing and providing their 
own services (122). Similarly, claims in certain argument modules can only be 
said to be substantiated (the guarantee clause) if claims or evidence are 
available in other argument modules to offer sufficient support (the rely 
clause). 
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Figure 19: SOA and Modular Safety Case Correspondence. 
 
Figure 19 gives an overview of the key modules in the design and safety case of 
an SOA, as considered in this thesis. We enforce a traceable relationship 
between the high-level SOA design, as captured in SoaML 
(ServicesArchitectures), and the overall SOA safety case, as defined in modular 
GSN. For each service in the SOA, we create a service argument that addresses 
the hazards posed by the service (based on the results of SHA), i.e. the 
argument provides a justification for how the service hazards have been 
managed. Similarly, for each participant, we create a safety argument that 
justifies the contributions that the participant makes to service hazards (based 
on the results of SFA). Furthermore, participants interact through defined SLAs 
in order to provide and consume services. These interactions between 
participants can contribute to safety and therefore their assurance is addressed 
in explicit safety argument contracts.  
3.5.2. Pattern Catalogue for SOA Modular Safety Cases 
As outlined in Section 3.4, the safety analysis of SOA follows a structured, 
though implicit, line of reasoning: an SOA-based system is acceptably safe 
because all credible service hazards have been identified and managed. This is 
supported by the evidence from the analysis of services and their interactions 
provided by SHA. Furthermore, this line of reasoning is supported at a lower 
level through the analysis of the technical failures that contribute to the service 
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hazards.  This is supported by the results of the analysis of tasks and flows 
provided by SFA. 
In this thesis, we propose a set of argument patterns to capture this line of 
reasoning (123). The main objectives are to ensure consistency across modular 
arguments and to allow the safety analyst to reuse the argument patterns as a 
basis for the safety assurance of different SOA-based systems. The argument 
patterns catalogue we propose for SOA safety cases (99) is presented in 
Chapter 5. 
The SOA safety argument patterns catalogue provides framework argument 
structures to address aspects of the safety of using an SOA system within a 
specific safety application. Although the argument patterns in the catalogue are 
separately defined, they are directly related to each other to inform the 
development of an overall modular argument structure. Therefore, the SOA 
argument patterns catalogue includes rules for pattern composition and 
traceability to the architectural design (i.e. SoaML and BPMN models) and 
analysis (i.e. SHA and SFA). 
 
Figure 20: SOA Argument Patterns Catalogue 
The SOA safety argument pattern catalogue developed in this thesis consists of 
three individual arguments and one argument contract (Figure 4). These 
patterns are established according to an overall hazard-directed argument 
(Top Argument), which is supported by a number of Service Arguments, SLA 
Argument Contracts and Participant Arguments. These patterns are composed 
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together to form a complete justification regarding the safety of the overall SOA 
system design. The pattern we have defined enable us to present the argument 
regarding the safety of the SOA system from the perspectives of both the 
Services and the Participants. The SOA safety argument pattern catalogue is 
explained in detail in Chapter 5. 
3.6 Automated Support and Tooling  
This section presents an overview of the automated support that was 
developed for the safety analysis and assurance of SOA and the tolling 
environment used to implement it. This covers the three main elements of our 
SOA safety assurance framework: modelling, safety analysis and safety cases. 
Figure 5 shows an overview of the integrated tools that have been used to 
support our SOA safety assurance framework. The main capabilities of the 
tooling environment are as follows: 
1. Create SoaML and BPMN models 
2. Create and integrate SLAs into the SoaML models 
3. Integrate BPMN and SoaML models 
4. Execute BPMN models 
5. Embed SHA results into the SoaML models 
6. Embed SFA results into the BPMN models 
7. Create GSN-based arguments and patterns 
In order to represent SOA, we implemented most of the models in Eclipse 
(124). Eclipse is an open source Integrated Development Environment (IDE) 
platform that provides support for creating, deploying and managing software, 
and which can be extended in terms of frameworks, runtimes or tools. For 
service modelling, the SoaML plugin is the tool used to model SoaML inside 
Eclipse. It was extended from Papyrus (125), which is an Eclipse plugin for 
creating UML models such as SysML, UML and UML profile. For BPMN 
modelling, Activiti Business Process Management (BPM) was selected. Activiti 
BPM is an open source and lightweight workflow platform for BPMN that 
supports BPMN 2.0 specification for modelling and execution. (126).  
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Figure 21: Overview of SOA Safety Assurance Tools 
To create a business process, Activiti BPM provides solutions based on an 
Eclipse plugin and a web-based modeller called Activiti Modeller. The Activiti 
Engine can be used to make the business process executable. Moreover, Activiti 
has an Activiti Explorer which is a web application for testing or simulating 
instances of business processes. These executable features are useful for the 
analysis of the dynamic processes underlying the SOA architecture.  
In order to support the SOA Safety Assurance Framework presented in this 
thesis, we implemented an integration basis between SoaML and BPMN models 
in order to improve the traceability between the design of the services (mainly 
structure) and their underlying processes (mainly behavioural). We also 
extended the Activiti modelling environment with capabilities to support the 
documentation of the SLAs for services and the results of SHA and SFA by 
providing automated means for displaying the safety analysis for both services 
and flows between tasks.  
3.7 Summary  
In this chapter, we introduce a conceptual framework for SOA safety assurance 
and the tooling we have developed to support it. The framework defines how 
SOA system modelling, safety analysis and safety certification captured in such 
a way that they can be integrated with each other. The chapter introduces the 
modelling languages and approaches that the framework uses for specification 
of the services and dynamic processes in SOA-based systems. It introduces 
methods for identifying service hazards and potential failure behaviour in an 
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SOA system design.  It also proposes the use of GSN modules and patterns to 
define the different argument structures for assuring services and their design 
and constrain variation in SOA safety cases. The last section presents an 
overview of the automated support that was developed and the tooling 
environment that was used for the safety analysis and assurance of SOA.  
Subsequent chapters of this thesis examine the elements of the framework in 
more detail. In the next chapter, we consider the two SOA safety analysis 
techniques that this thesis has adapted: SHA and SFA. 
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Chapter 4 
 
4. SOA Safety Analysis 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we propose a process for the safety analysis of SOA that is 
integrated within the engineering of service-based systems. The safety analysis 
techniques presented here capture and examine hazards and failure 
behaviours relating to services and tasks, respecting the ways in which these 
services and tasks are defined in the SOA context. The techniques are 
illustrated using a real-world case study from the healthcare domain. 
The SOA safety analysis is an essential stage in the definition of the SOA safety 
requirements. Similarly, producing these requirements successfully can 
provide useful input to an integrated and verifiable approach to assuring the 
safety of the SOA system. 
This chapter presents two safety analysis techniques for examining an SOA 
design and generating the necessary safety requirements: Service Hazard 
Analysis (SHA) and Service Failure Analysis (SFA). The safety requirements 
generated from this analysis provide the basis for integrating safety 
considerations into the design of the system. For example, issues raised during 
the analysis can be used to inform the choice of of architectural tactics used in 
design. The analysis also emphasises the interactions between services and 
tasks in order to identify failures in the behaviour of the interactions which 
could contribute to service hazards within the service-based system, and thus 
potentially to accidents. The results of these safety analyses should help 
prevent the occurrence of failures and hazards by defining and enforcing a set 
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of Service Safety Requirements (SSRs) at the service level and Derived Service 
Safety Requirements (DSSRs) at the more detailed design level (e.g. tasks and 
flows implementing services). 
As described in Chapter 3, this thesis proposes a framework for modelling the 
design and analysing the safety of SOA systems and for providing assurance 
that the system is acceptably safe. In this chapter, we consider the 
identification of potential safety deviations that are of interest in an SOA-based 
system and suggest suitable mitigation design measures for addressing these 
deviations.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 introduces a case study, which 
is used to illustrate and evaluate the SOA analysis methods we propose. Section 
4.3 provides a detailed explanation of SHA, with reference to its application in 
the case study. Section 4.4 discusses SFA and how it has been applied in the 
case study. Section 4.5 describes the implementation of these SOA safety 
analysis techniques in the tool-suite developed in this research. 
4.2 SOA Healthcare Case Study 
An SOA provides a “paradigm for defining how people, organizations, and 
systems provide and use services to achieve results” (2). For healthcare services, 
the SOA paradigm can assist in the assessment of patient safety, in which 
accidents predominantly occur as a result of a combination of human, 
technological and organisational failures (127).  SOA-based systems can lead to 
people being harmed or property being damaged. For example, patients might 
be harmed due to loss of their health records.  
The first case study undertaken for this thesis was the analysis of part of an 
ambulance system. The case study includes a general overview of the 
ambulance and Electronic Health Record (EHR) services in the healthcare 
domain. The system focuses on one medical pathway that considers the 
processes and services that are used to transport pregnant women. These 
processes and services were adapted from the UK National Health Service 
(NHS) Map of Medicine (128). The ambulance system is based on the 
description provided in (129) (130). In this study, we have performed 
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additional modelling beyond that presented in in this Chapter (please see 
Appendix A). Also, we have not covered other medical processes which are out 
of the scope, e.g. childbirth services.  
The objective of this case study is to provide rapid feedback on the techniques 
we have developed, and to also illustrate the application of the safety analysis 
methods and safety case approach. The case study is concerned with three 
categories of service: ambulance, electronic health records and childbirth 
services. These have been used to provide 10 detailed services within the 
system, which are as follows:  
 Request Ambulance 
 Dispatch Ambulance 
 Update Status 
 Request Record 
 Provide Patient Record 
 Update Health Record 
 Retrieve Health Record 
 Pick up Patient 
 Examine Patient  
 Drop off Patient.  
The following subsections provide an overview of the three main categories of 
service used in this case study. 
4.2.1 Ambulance Services 
Ambulance services can be used to help people with serious and life-
threatening medical conditions. They can provide a range of urgent healthcare 
and transport services, including acute care of patients who require help 
without a previous medical appointment. The crews within the Ambulance 
service include a range of medical staff, e.g., emergency care assistants and 
paramedics (131). Ambulance services often use a range of vehicles to respond 
to an emergency in the quickest possible time (132).    
In our case study, we assume that initial medical emergency calls are dealt with 
by ambulance service operators (133).  The call centre records the call and 
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captures the following information: name of patient, contact telephone number, 
address of patient, destination address and brief details of the patient’s 
condition. This information is then transmitted to the ambulance region 
nearest to the patient for an ambulance to be dispatched. The regional 
ambulance centre receives the request and sends a vehicle and a crew to the 
patient, having selected the most appropriate service level: Immediate (i.e. life-
threatening) and Urgent (i.e. serious but not life-threatening) (134). Next, the 
system specifies the location of the patient on a map and monitors the vehicle’s 
progress towards the destination via online messages transmitted by each 
vehicle every 13 seconds (with the potential for the use of radio 
communication as a backup measure). The ambulance crew confirms that the 
vehicle is on its way. At the same time, the ambulance crew requests that the 
patient record be retrieved through the EHR service.  
4.2.2 EHR Services 
EHR services play a very important role in modern healthcare. Their main 
function is to capture, store and supply patients’ records, including personal 
and medical information (e.g. data related to treatments and 
medication).  There are a number of definitions for EHR. The US Institute of 
Standards and Technology defines an EHR a “longitudinal collection of patient-
centric health care information available across providers, care settings, and 
time. It is a central component of an integrated health information system” (135). 
One of the benefits of EHR is to enable healthcare providers to share, store and 
update patient information in order to capture care history (136).  
In our case study, the risks associated with EHR are mainly related to retrieving 
and updating patient information. This service can help users access the system 
and retrieve patient's EHR and update their records. The risks relate to 
conditions such as lack of information, incorrect information or late arrival of 
information.  
4.2.3 Childbirth Services 
Our case study is concerned with the transportation of pregnant women by the 
Ambulance Service. Every pregnancy is different and there is a wide variation 
in the length of labour (137). For first-time mothers, labour often takes 
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between 10 and 20 hours. For some, however, it lasts much longer, while for 
others it may be over much sooner. Labour generally progresses more quickly 
for women who already have children. 
In our case study, there are risks associated with the transport of pregnant 
women in urgent cases. The principal risks are concerned with timing. In the 
first place, the fact that the emergency services have been contacted suggests 
that the delivery time is very close and there is a medical emergency. The 
ambulance station schedules a vehicle to go and collect the patient and take her 
to the hospital. The crew retrieves the patient information from EHR service. 
They examine the patient, check the maternal and foetal condition and 
transport the patient to the labour ward. 
4.3 Service Hazard Analysis (SHA) 
In this section, we introduce and describe SHA as the main safety analysis 
method for examining services in SOA and generating the necessary safety 
requirements. We also show how SHA has been applied to our healthcare case 
study. 
4.3.1 Method 
Safety analysis processes are centred on identifying, analysing and managing 
hazards. For SOA, identifying the hazards associated with the services is 
essential for defining the service safety requirements, which should influence 
and potentially drive the architectural design. In this section, the identification 
and classification of hazardous service failures is carried out by applying SHA  
to a high-level representation of the SOA in SoaML. Table 10 shows a tabular 
representation of the output of the analysis. The goal of SHA is to identify and 
clarify each failure mode associated with a service based on the defined 
deviations.  
For each failure mode, SHA also identifies the potential effects of failure and 
determines the severity of these effects. The last two columns in Table 10 
provide the final output of the SHA which is the starting point to generate and 
provide recommendations for the Service Safety Requirements (SSRs) to 
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mitigate the potential failures, and to allocate them to services, tasks and 
participants.  
Service  Failure Mode 
a) not 
provided 
b) provided 
when not 
required 
c) provided 
incorrectly 
Effect Severity SSR Mitigation 
Service 
name  
The specific 
failure modes 
associated with 
the service based 
on the defined 
deviations 
The specific 
effects 
associated 
with the 
failure mode  
The 
severity of 
each 
service 
failure 
mode 
effect 
 
Definition of 
service safety 
requirements 
 
Suitable 
recommendati
ons for service 
safety 
requirements  
Table 10: SHA Table Template 
SHA consists of six steps:    
(1) Identify a service; 
(2) Identify the service failure modes; 
(3) Determine the safety effects of each service failure mode; 
(4) Determine the safety severity and classification of each service failure 
mode; 
(5) Provide service safety requirements; 
(6) Identify potential mitigation measures for meeting the service safety 
requirements. 
Step 1 - Identify a service. High-level services are captured in SoaML 
ServicesArchitecture models. The SoaML ServicesArchitecture model describes 
both Participants and Services and their interactions. A SoaML 
ServicesArchitecture model describes how Participants collaborate by 
providing and consuming Services to achieve goals. These collaborations can be 
captured in service Contracts. In this context, a service Contract is defined by 
means of an SLA, which describes a mutual agreement between two or more 
parties (138). These agreements are captured in the form of SoaML 
ServiceInterfaces between Participants.  
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Step 2 - Identify the service failure modes. For each service (identified from 
the SoaML ServicesArchitecture), the analyst considers the effects of three 
broad hypothetical failure modes: 
 Service not provided when required; 
 Service provided when not required; 
 Incorrect service. 
The service can be considered as a potential source of hazards in the SOA 
system and for every failure mode it is necessary to consider more than one 
interpretation (72). For instance, the first failure mode ‘service not provided’ is 
easily interpreted for responsive services (such as for requesting ambulances 
or allocating drivers to ambulances). From the perspective of on-going or 
regular services (such as monitoring the condition of patients or tracking 
ambulance locations), the ‘service not provided when required’ failure mode 
requires a more specific interpretation, e.g. failing to monitor the condition of 
patients every 3 minutes or failing to update ambulance locations every 5 
seconds.  
The failure mode ‘service provided when not required’ deals with 
uncommanded requests, e.g. requesting an ambulance when not required. 
From the perspective of on-going or regular services (e.g. maintaining available 
call centres), this failure mode might not be applicable or might be hard to 
interpret.  
The third failure mode (incorrect service) covers a diverse set of behaviour. 
Possible explanations include wrong timing (i.e. too late or too early), 
incompleteness, asymmetry or undesirable side effects. 
Eventually, these failure modes should be defined with enough detail in order 
to enable the generation of the service safety requirements and potential 
mitigation measures (e.g. by providing enough contextual information to make 
a specific interpretation). 
Step 3 - Determine the safety effects of each service failure mode. The 
adverse consequences of the failure modes should be determined, taking 
different context-relevant factors into consideration. In terms of determining 
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the effects of service failures, a useful feature of the SoaML 
ServicesArchitecture models is that they include a representation of service 
interaction and the Participants that use these services, which makes it easier 
for the analyst to trace the effects of a particular failure mode. The analyst has 
to consider the effects of the failure modes on the system and on its 
environment. The analyst should consult people with operational experience to 
assist in classifying the failure mode effects.  
In the case of the system level SHA, the effects of failure modes may be 
observed within the system level, or the analyst may have to consider 
combined effects of systems with their environment in order to determine the 
effect of the system failure mode. 
Step 4 - Determine the safety severity and classification of each service 
failure mode. We determine the severity and classification of the identified 
failure modes by analysing accident and incident data, reviewing regulatory 
guidance material, using previous design experience, and consulting with 
system developers and operators.  
The process of analysing and classifying the failure modes should be careful 
documented, and supporting materials (analyses, studies, tests, etc.) used 
should be preserved to ensure traceability for future reference. The safety 
classification should be defined (e.g. ‘Catastrophic’, ‘Severe-Major/Hazardous’, 
‘Major’, ‘Minor’ and ‘No Safety Effect’), typically based on Hazard/Risk Matrices 
(HRM) defined in the system’s domain standards and regulations (139).       
Step 5 -Provide Service Safety Requirements (SSRs). Based on the identified 
failure modes and their classification, recommendations should be generated. 
Preferably, these recommendations should take the form of SSRs, where the 
rigor/integrity with which the requirements need be met should be 
proportionate to the severity of the failures (i.e. higher degrees of severity 
require more stringent integrity requirements and more rigorous processes) 
(140).  
Step 6 - Identify potential mitigation measures for meeting the SSRs. In 
order to help influence the design process, mitigation measures should be 
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identified that have the potential for meeting the SSRs identified in the 
previous step. For example, in order to ensure that hazardous behaviour is 
detected and controlled, the system might be designed to include active 
monitoring and cross-checking of the state of a service. Mitigations should 
build on best practice in safety and dependability design, e.g. existing work on 
tactics for fault tolerant services (120). 
4.3.2 Healthcare Case study: SHA 
In this section, we show how we applied the SHA method to the healthcare case 
study that we introduced briefly in Section 4.2. The aim of the case study is to 
illustrate the use of the method, understand how the SSRs can be developed in 
a systematic and traceable manner and provide a preliminary evaluation.    
4.3.2.1 System Overview      
This description of the system and all of the other information presented about 
the system and its design, including all design diagrams, are based on (128). 
The system architecture model in Figure 1 shows the structural architecture of 
the system. It basically covers the services used (i.e. produced and consumed) 
from the point at which a phone call is made to request an ambulance (for a 
pregnant woman) to the point at which the patient is admitted to a hospital 
(labour ward).  Another set of models was created to capture subsequent 
stages in the patient’s treatment e.g. foetal monitoring, first and second stages 
of labour, caesarean section and postnatal care. These models and documented 
in Appendix A for the sake of completeness, but are not analysed further in this 
thesis.  
In Figure 1, we provide a design of the system which focuses on the 
interactions between services and Participants. Specifically, the scenario 
focuses on the Ambulance System architecture, and identifies five Participants 
connected by ten SoaML Collaboration Uses, i.e. services. These Collaboration 
Uses are defined in terms of service contracts, which are: Request Ambulance, 
Dispatch Ambulance, Update Status, Request Record, Provide Patient Record, 
Update Health Record, Retrieve Health Record, Pick up Patient, Examine 
Patient and Drop off Patient. In this section, we show how SHA has been 
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applied to two of the services: Dispatch Ambulance and Retrieve Health Record. 
The analysis of additional services is documented in Appendices B and C. 
 
Figure 22: SoaML Service Architectures Model for SOA Healthcare  
The Ambulance System architecture extract presented in Figure 23 shows how 
the Dispatch Ambulance Collaboration Use is defined to provide the service. 
Two Participants, Call_centre and Ambulance crew, have been specified, 
connected by the Dispatch Ambulance service contract. These two Participants 
represent the roles that are connected to this service. 
 
Figure 23: SoaML ServicesArchitecture Model (Dispatch Ambulance) 
The description of the Dispatch Ambulance service is provided by means of a 
Service Level Agreement (SLA). The SLA is defined using the template, shown 
in Table 11, which has been adapted from (141).  
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Attribute Description Source 
Name The name of the SLA artefact, defined during 
SoaML service modelling 
SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture  
Provider  A person, department or organization that 
provides the service 
SoaML Participants 
Architecture  
Consumer  A person, department or organisation that uses 
the service 
SoaML Participants 
Architecture  
Start time The start time of the SLA validity period SoaML 
ServicesArchitecture  
Due time   The end time of the SLA validity period SoaML 
ServicesArchitecture  
Duration The length of time that the service should last for  SoaML 
ServicesArchitecture   
 (Pre-
condition) 
The condition that must be fulfilled before the 
service can start 
SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture 
 (Post-
condition) 
 The condition that must be fulfilled after the 
service is completed 
SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture 
Contribution 
to Safety  
Required to complete an incident report SHA 
Table 11: SLA Template 
Table 12 presents the SLA for the Dispatch Ambulance service. For instance, 
the Participants, Call_centre and Ambulance crew, represent the consumer and 
provider for the service. 
Attribute Description Source 
Name Dispatches Ambulance  SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture for the 
ambulance system 
Provider   The Ambulance crew department that 
provides the service 
SoaML Participants 
Architecture for the 
ambulance system 
Consumer  The Call_centre that uses the service SoaML Participants 
Architecture for the 
ambulance system 
Start time Requesting an ambulance by the Call_centre 
(e.g. 11:00:00 AM) 
SoaML 
ServicesArchitecture for 
the ambulance system 
Due time Dispatching of the ambulance (e.g. 11:00:30 
AM) 
SoaML 
ServicesArchitecture for 
the ambulance system  
Duration 30 seconds SoaML 
ServicesArchitecture for 
the ambulance system  
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 (Pre-
condition) 
 
Call_centre has received the ambulance 
request information including the patient’s 
name, contact telephone number, address of 
the patient, destination address and brief 
details of the patient’s condition. 
SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture for the 
ambulance system 
 (Post-
condition) 
The nearest available ambulance has been 
dispatched and the Call_centre has received 
an expected arrival time 
SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture for the 
ambulance system 
Contribution 
to Safety 
Overall severity is major (see SHA Table 4) SHA 
Table 12: Dispatch Ambulance SLA 
Table 13 shows an extract from the SHA analysis for the Dispatch Ambulance 
service. The analysis establishes the potential safety criticality of the Dispatch 
Ambulance service, based on the severity of the worst credible effects of the 
identified failure modes. The ‘SSR’ column details the stringent safety 
requirements which are allocated to the service as a result of the analysis, and 
the ‘Mitigation’ column indicates design and operational measures which are 
proposed to satisfy these requirements. 
Service  Failure 
Mode 
Effect Severity SSR Mitigation 
Dispatch 
Ambulance  
 
Context: 
the patient 
has given 
birth before 
the 
ambulance 
arrives, and 
is actively 
bleeding 
following 
the birth 
 
Ambulance 
not 
dispatched 
Death Major  
 
The failure mode 
‘ambulance not 
dispatched’ shall 
be prevented or 
mitigated 
Active 
monitoring and 
cross checking 
between 
requested and 
dispatched 
ambulances 
Ambulance 
dispatched 
when not 
required 
N/A  
No direct safety 
effects but 
waste for 
critical services 
N/A 
 
None. None. 
Ambulance 
dispatched 
later than 
intended 
Severe 
morbidity 
(hypovolaemia, 
renal failure, 
cardiac arrest, 
disseminated 
intravascular 
coagulopathy…) 
Major The failure mode 
‘ambulance 
dispatched later 
than intended’ 
shall be 
prevented or 
mitigated  
Active 
monitoring of 
timing targets 
and strategies 
for recovery 
from timing-
related failures  
Ambulance 
dispatched 
to the 
wrong 
address 
Severe 
morbidity 
(hypovolaemia, 
renal failure, 
cardiac arrest, 
disseminated 
intravascular 
Major The failure mode 
‘ambulance 
dispatched to the 
wrong address’ 
shall be 
prevented or 
mitigated 
Early address 
cross-checking 
and confirmation 
between 
requested and 
dispatched 
ambulances 
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coagulopathy…) 
Table 13:  Dispatch Ambulance SHA 
The first failure mode, ‘ambulance not dispatched’, is straightforward as this 
service is responsive in nature, i.e. a demand for an ambulance vehicle 
provided by an ambulance crew. The worst credible effect here as estimated by 
the medical expert, consulted in the process of this case study, is death and the 
severity is major as defined in the Health and Social Care Information Centre 
standard used for Health IT safety assurance in the NHS (142).  
The defined SSR specifies the need to eliminate or mitigate this failure mode 
given its potential severity. The mitigation here, i.e. active monitoring and 
crosschecking, is considered appropriate, considering the identified potential 
effects of the failure (i.e. patient death) and the classification (Major).  
Another failure mode that may occur is, ‘ambulance dispatched when not 
required’. In this case there are no safety effects within the scope of the case 
study scenario (potentially the fact that an ambulance is unnecessarily 
occupied on this call means that it is unavailable for an emergency elsewhere).  
A third potential hazardous failure mode is ‘ambulance dispatched later than 
intended’, which could arise from a timing-related failure and will result in 
delays to the patient’s medical treatment. The potential effects, as identified by 
our clinical expert, are severe morbidities such as hypovolaemia, renal failure, 
cardiac arrest and disseminated intravascular coagulopathy. The severity is 
classified as major and the mitigation is active monitoring of timing targets and 
strategies for recovery from timing-related failures. 
 The fourth failure mode is ‘ambulance dispatched to the wrong address’, which 
may lead to delays in treatment. The effects identified and the severity 
classification are similar to those in the previous step but the mitigation is early 
address cross-checking and confirmation between requested and dispatched 
ambulances. 
Table 14 and Table 15 show the SLA and the SHA results for the ‘Retrieve 
Health Record’ service. For this service, the two Participants are the EHR and 
Ambulance crew and the duration of the service is 20 seconds. 
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Attribute Description Source 
Name Retrieve Health Record SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture for the 
ambulance system 
Provider   The EHR provides the service  SoaML Participants 
Architecture for the 
ambulance system 
Consumer  The ambulance crew uses the service  SoaML Participants 
Architecture for the 
ambulance system 
Start time The point at which a request for information 
is sent by the ambulance crew (e.g. 11:00:00 
PM) 
SoaML ServicesArchitecture 
for the ambulance system 
Due time   The point at which the requested 
information is received by the ambulance 
crew (e.g. 11:00:20 PM) 
SoaML ServicesArchitecture 
for the ambulance system  
Duration 20 seconds SoaML ServicesArchitecture 
for the ambulance system  
 (Pre-
condition) 
 
The system contains the correct patient 
details 
SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture for the 
ambulance system 
 (Post-
condition) 
Correct health records for the patient have 
been received by the ambulance crew  
SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture for the 
ambulance system 
Contribution 
to safety  
Overall severity is considerable (see SHA 
table 6) 
SHA 
Table 14: SLA for the Retrieve Health Record Service  
Although the potential severity of failures of the Retrieve Health Record service 
is considerable, the worst credible consequence is not patient death, as it is 
assumed that the ambulance crew can recover from the failure modes 
associated with the Retrieve Health Record service. Also, in order to mitigate 
the inability to retrieve health records through the electronic system, the 
service relies on other communication means, e.g. radio communication. 
Services 
 
Failure 
mode 
Effect Severity 
  
SSRs 
 
Mitigation 
Retrieve 
Health 
Record  
EHR not 
retrieved  
Delay in 
treatment and 
increased 
complication  
 
Considerable The failure 
mode ‘EHR 
not 
retrieved’ 
shall be 
prevented or 
mitigated.  
Use of 
redundancy   
through fitting 
an additional 
flow to 
provide 
patient 
information 
from another 
source 
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EHR 
retrieved 
when not 
required 
N/A  
No direct effect 
on safety but 
waste for 
critical services 
N/A None None 
EHR 
retrieved     
later than 
intended 
Delay in 
treatment and 
increased 
complication  
Considerable The failure 
mode ‘EHR 
retrieved     
later than 
intended’ 
shall be 
prevented or 
mitigated.  
Active 
monitoring of 
timing targets 
and strategies 
for recovery 
from timing-
related 
failures 
Incorrect 
record 
retrieved 
Incorrect 
treatments and 
medicines 
provided 
Considerable The failure 
mode 
‘inaccurate 
records 
retrieved’ 
shall be 
prevented or 
mitigated.  
Active 
monitoring 
and cross-
checking of 
the 
information 
retrieved 
Table 15: Retrieve Health Record SHA 
4.4 Service Failure Analysis (SFA) 
In this section, we introduce and describe SFA as the safety analysis method for 
examining the flow of the Tasks that implement the SOA behavioural process 
and for generating the safety requirements relating to task flows. More 
specifically, the objective of SFA is to examine the detailed flow between the 
service tasks and identify how failures, specifically interaction failures, can 
contribute to service hazards. We also show how SFA is applied to our 
healthcare case study. SFA extends SHARD (Section 2.3.1.3.) with three main 
aspects:  
- It provides a traceable relationship between the causes of the failures 
and existing SOA fault taxonomies. This is discussed in Section 4.4.2. 
-  It provides an explicit means for defining derived service safety 
requirements as explained in Section 4.4.1. (Step 5). 
- Finally, it offers a way for capturing tactics and design decisions for 
potentially meeting these derived safety requirements in the context of 
the SOA design. This is discussed is more detail in Section 4.4.1. (Step 6). 
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4.4.1 Method 
SFA is centred on defining the deviations that can be exhibited in service tasks 
and understanding the causes and safety effects of those deviations. Based on 
these causes and the severity of the effects, SFA generates a set of safety 
requirements and recommends design patterns for mitigating the task 
deviations and therefore influences the detailed architectural design of the 
system. In SFA, BPMN models are used for representing the low-level design of 
the SOA. In particular, these models show the interactions of the system 
behaviour in the form of information flow between service tasks.  
Based on the BPMN models, SFA uses a set of guidewords to consider potential 
deviations from the intended behaviour, i.e. failure modes, in the flows between 
tasks. The guidewords help ensure coverage of the potential failure modes in 
the context of the detailed design of the behavioural aspects of the SOA. When 
examining the causes of the deviations, SFA uses the SOA fault taxonomy 
developed by (143). This fault taxonomy is well structured and categorises 
service faults based on the SOA lifecycle phase in which they are generated, e.g. 
specific faults related to service execution and composition. 
SFA results are represented in a tabular format as shown in Table 16. The 
columns should include ID (Flow), Guide word, Deviations, Possible Causes, 
Effects, Derived Service Safety Requirements (DSSRs) and Mitigations.  
ID 
Flow 
Guide 
Word 
Deviation 
Failure 
Mode 
Possible 
Causes 
Effects DSSRs Mitigation 
The 
flow 
link 
These 
describe the 
potential 
deviations 
from the 
intended 
behaviour in 
the flows 
between 
tasks  
The 
specific 
flow 
failure 
modes 
associated 
with the 
task, based 
on the 
fault 
taxonomy 
The 
potential 
causes of 
each flow 
failure 
mode of 
the 
specific 
tasks 
associated 
with the 
flow 
The 
specific 
effects 
associated 
with the 
task, based 
on the 
fault 
taxonomy 
Definition 
of DSSRs 
Recommendations 
for design patterns 
and tactics for 
meeting the DSSRs 
Table 16: SFA Table Template 
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SFA consists of six steps:  
(1) Identify a flow between two tasks;  
(2) Identify flow failure modes; 
(3) Determine the potential causes of each flow failure mode;  
(4) Determine the potential effects of each flow failure mode;  
(5) Define DSSRs; and  
(6) Identify potential mitigation measures for meeting the DSSRs. 
Step 1 -Identify a flow between two tasks. We use a behavioural model of the 
SOA as represented in BPMN (68) to identify the flows. BPMN provides the 
capability to communicate and represent internal procedures, based on 
Processes, in a graphical and structured notation. Typically, these Processes 
represent workflows of connected Tasks (i.e. atomic Activities), grouped into 
Swimlanes (i.e. a container for organising Activities). Further, each Participant 
in the model is represented as a Swimlane in BPMN.  This step in SFA involves 
the selection of a link between two BPMN Tasks that captures a flow in terms of 
inputs, outputs, data, sequence and timing. 
Step 2 -Identify flow failure modes. This step uses a number of guidewords, 
based on the SHARD guidewords, to determine the ways in which the selected 
flow can deviate from its intended usage. The failures derived from the use of 
each of these guide words need to be presented in the context of the detailed 
SOA design. The generic guidewords are taken from (72), but require some re-
interpretation for use in the context of SOA:  
 Omission: no delivery through the flow between the tasks (no 
communication); 
 Commission: delivery through the flow between the tasks when not 
required (unintended communication); 
 Early: delivery through the flow between the tasks earlier than intended 
(early communication); 
 Late: delivery through the flow between the tasks later than intended 
(late communication); 
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 Value: wrong delivery of information through the flow between the 
tasks.  
Step 3 - Determine the potential causes of each flow failure mode. Failures 
in flows can be caused by a variety of technical, human and organisational 
events or conditions, or by combinations of such events or conditions. For 
technical causes in particular, we use the SOA fault taxonomy developed by 
(56). This fault taxonomy is well structured and categorises faults based on the 
SOA lifecycle phase in which they can emerge: (1) publishing, (2) discovery, (3) 
composition, (4) binding and (5) execution. The advantage of using these fault 
types is that they are SOA-specific. However, these fault types should be used as 
prompts or hints for safety analysts rather than as an exhaustive list of all 
possible SOA faults. 
Step 4 - Determine the potential effects of each flow failure mode. The 
potential effects associated with the failure types should be recorded and 
examined in terms of the contribution that they can make to the service 
hazards, identified in the SHA, or to a new hazard (i.e. hazards missed during 
SHA). 
Step 5 - Provide DSSRs. Based on the identified failure modes and their 
causes, recommendations should be generated. Preferably, these 
recommendations should be in the form of DSSRs, where the rigor/integrity 
with which the requirements need be met should be proportionate to the 
failures (i.e. higher degrees of severity require more stringent integrity 
requirements and more rigorous processes) (140). Where a failure mode 
contributes to one or more hazards, one or more safety requirements should be 
defined to address the failure mode. 
Step 6 - Identify potential mitigation measures for meeting the DSSRs. 
Design recommendations should be made for addressing the failure modes 
which have been identified during the analysis. These recommendations could 
be based on existing safety tactics in the software architecture literature (e.g. 
(50) and (58)). Importantly, in our approach, we select design approaches 
including detection of, containment of and recovery from identified classes of 
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failure. More specifically, for SFA, we adopt the following categories of design 
tactics (120): 
1. Redundancy - Invokes one or more copy of the same mechanism; 
2. Diversity - Invokes one or more copy of a particular mechanism that 
performs the same function; 
3. Monitoring - Checks the system continuously to identify failures and sends 
alerts; 
4. Diagnosis - Identifies the source of failure; 
5. Masking - Hides the effects of a failure; 
6. Containment - confines a failure to stop its propagation; 
7. Recovery - Erases failure and restores normal operation. 
4.4.2 SOA Fault Taxonomy used in SFA 
In this section, we introduce the SOA fault taxonomy that we use to support the 
choice of mitigation measures in SFA. This SOA fault taxonomy is based on the 
types of fault defined in (144) and (145). As shown in Figure 24, these faults are 
categorised based on the lifecycle phase in which they can occur: Publishing, 
Discovery, Composition, Binding, and Execution. These faults provide the 
analyst with a generic list of potential causes and should be treated as guidance 
rather than as a complete list of all possible causes. 
4.4.2.1 Publishing Faults   
During the publishing phase, faults can occur due to issues related to service 
task description or deployment. 
Faults relating to the service task description occur when problems arise when 
defining the characteristics of the service. Either the service is not completely 
described, or the defined service task. These types of faults may lead to 
problems either during the discovery phase or during the execution phase. 
Faults might also occur when the description of the file is wrong. Format faults 
can occur when the format of a file is incorrect. For example, an XML file might 
not be well formed due to missing tags.  
Faults can also occur when the deployment of a service is incorrect (service 
task deployment faults). For example, a service task deployment fault might 
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occur when the service is deployed without the required resources being 
available. 
 
Figure 24: Taxonomy of SOA-Specific Faults (146) 
4.4.2.2 Discovery Faults   
In the discovery phase, three possible types of fault may occur, namely:  
 Service not found;  
 Wrong service found; and  
 Time out. 
The first of these is the most likely to occur, i.e. the required service task does 
not exist. This can be due to incorrect search criteria being used, or to the task 
not being listed in the lookup service. The second fault type, wrong service 
found, is difficult to detect in this phase but is more likely to be detected in the 
execution phase.  
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The time out fault is a common fault in the discovery, composition, binding, and 
execution phases. Time out is typically caused by the server crashing as a result 
of hardware, software or communication errors.  
4.4.2.3 Composition Faults   
During the composition phase, faults can occur because of invalid composition 
due to missing parts or timed out attempts. Figure 25 provides an example of 
compatible service task failure in which a ‘no valid composition’ fault occurs 
due either to incompatible components or to missing components.  
More importantly for services, composition faults can result from an inability to 
meet contract conditions: pre-conditions, post-conditions and invariants. In our 
work, these conditions are explicitly defined in SLAs (initially defined at the 
service level in the SoaML models and considered in the SHA).  
  
Figure 25: ‘No Valid Composition’ Failure Mode 
4.4.2.4 Binding Faults 
In this phase, the service task consumer and provider negotiate conditions 
needed to execute the task. Types of faults which can arise during the binding 
phase include: 
 Binding denied; 
 Bound to the wrong service task; and  
 Time out. 
The ‘binding denied’ fault can occur when the authorisation for use has not 
been granted by the authorisation component. The ‘bound to wrong service’ 
task is tightly linked to service description faults that occur during the 
publishing phase.  
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4.4.2.5 Execution Faults 
Execution faults occur when the outcome of a service task does not match the 
result expected by the participant. Relevant failure types here include:  
 Incorrect result;    
 Service task crashed; and  
 Time out.   
During execution, the service is run and an incorrect result might occur if the 
wrong service task has been selected. The ‘incorrect result’ fault might arise 
either due to a software fault (service faulty) or to an incorrect input.  Incorrect 
inputs may be caused by conversion faults or by the input range being 
exceeded.  
In the SFA method, the SOA fault taxonomy discussed above (Section 4.4.2) is 
principally used for identifying the causes of the flow failure modes identified 
in Step 2 of the SFA. These causes are linked to a specific type of faults 
identified in the SOA fault taxonomy. The flow failure modes are assessed in 
terms of the contributions that they make to the service hazard failures (i.e. as 
identified in SHA).  
4.4.3 Healthcare Case study: SFA 
In this section, we show how we applied the SFA method to the healthcare case 
study that we introduced in Section 4.2. The objective of the case study is to 
illustrate the use of the method and to provide a preliminary evaluation.  
4.4.3.1 Representing Tasks and Information Flows in the SOA Design 
The modelling presented in this section builds on the results of the SoaML 
modelling in Section 4.3.2.1. We have already specified the Service Contracts 
for the healthcare case study, using SoaML, and have refined these into Service 
Interfaces in the system architecture design in Figure 27. The Service Interfaces 
offer a number of Operations that specify the interactions between the 
Participants of the architecture. In our approach, and in order to integrate the 
SoaML models and BPMN models of the SOA design as shown in Figure 26, we 
link SoaML Operations with BPMN Tasks, enabling traceability between the 
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different models at different abstraction levels (i.e. structural services and 
behavioural service tasks and interactions).  
 
Figure 26: Link between SoaML and BPMN Models 
 
Figure 27: SoaML Service Interfaces Model with Operations 
For example, the Retrieve Health Record service can be divided into a number 
of operations within the SoaML interface model and has been linked to the 
BPMN Tasks, which are as follows:  
 Provide user name and password; 
 Authorise and authenticate; 
 Provide patient name; and 
 Provide patient health record.   
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Figure 28: Tasks in BPMN Model 
Figure 28 presents a more detailed BPMN model of the SOA design, with more 
emphasis on the SOA behavioural processes. BPMN Tasks in these processes 
are mapped into the Operations in the Interfaces provided by each SoaML 
Service, while BPMN Swimlanes are mapped onto the SoaML Participants. SFA 
was applied to every flow between Tasks in the BPMN model. An example is 
shown in Table 17, which shows the results of the analysis of the penultimate 
flow in the BPMN model, from ‘Provide patient name’ to ‘Provide patient health 
record’ (in the context of admission to the labour ward).  The example shows 
how a lack of patient information from the EHR, and more seriously the 
provision of incorrect information, can potentially lead to adverse patient 
complications.  
ID 
(Flow) 
 
Guide 
Word 
Deviation Possible 
Causes 
Effects DSSRs Mitigation 
Flow 
between 
‘Provide 
patient 
name’ 
and 
‘Provide 
patient 
health 
record’ 
Omission No record 
available 
Authentication 
failure or 
request timed 
out (server 
crashed) 
 
Incomplete 
history and 
background  
 
Anaphylaxis- 
unknown 
allergy 
status 
 
The failure 
mode ‘no 
record 
available’ 
shall be 
prevented 
or 
mitigated. 
Use of redundancy 
in data sources for 
health records 
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Commission Patient 
record 
provided 
when not 
requested  
False 
messages 
Description 
incorrect or 
mismatch 
Execution 
fault 
(Incorrect 
result) 
No direct 
safety effects 
 The failure 
mode 
‘patient 
record 
provided 
when not 
requested’ 
shall be 
prevented 
or 
mitigated. 
Monitoring of 
uncommanded 
requests 
Early N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Late Record 
arrived 
later than 
intended 
Failure in 
scheduling 
Time out 
related to 
clock time 
with ripple 
effects on all 
processes  
Overloading 
due to 
dealing with 
backlog 
requests 
The failure 
mode 
‘record 
arrived 
later than 
intended’ 
shall be 
prevented 
or 
mitigated. 
Monitoring of time 
delays and 
recovery by giving 
more priority for 
delayed requests 
Value   Incorrect 
record 
retrieved 
Incorrect 
input or 
conversion 
fault   
Corruption 
message 
execution fault 
incorrect 
result or 
service crash 
Anaphylaxis- 
unknown 
allergy 
status 
 
The failure 
mode 
‘incorrect 
record 
retrieved’ 
shall be 
prevented 
or 
mitigated. 
Data entry cross-
checking, online 
monitoring and 
fault containment 
Table 17: SFA for the Flow between ‘Provide Patient Name’ to ‘Provide Patient Health 
Record’ 
The first identified failure mode (omission) is ‘no record available when 
requested’. Possible causes, as generated from the SOA fault taxonomy, are 
authentication failures and request time out (i.e. due to a server crash). The 
effects might be incomplete history and background, which could result in the 
patient’s suffering anaphylaxis due to unknown allergy status. The mitigation 
for this failure mode is the provision of redundancy in data sources for health 
records. Another failure mode that may occur is revealed through the 
application of the guideword ‘commission’: a record could be sent even though 
it had not been requested. Possible causes for this are false messages, incorrect 
data description, mismatch or incorrect result. Here there are no direct safety 
effects and the mitigation suggested is monitoring the arrival and reporting of 
uncommanded requests.  
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Application of the guideword ‘late’ reveals a possible failure mode in which the 
patient’s record is received later than intended. Possible causes include failures 
in the scheduling system or the clock time on all processes (i.e. timed out 
processes). The effect that the system is likely to become overloaded with a 
backlog of delayed requests. The mitigation suggested is monitoring of time 
delays and recovery of the system by giving delayed requests a higher priority. 
The guideword ‘value’ reveals a potential failure mode ‘incorrect record 
retrieved’ which can result in the patient’s suffering anaphylaxis due to the 
medical staff having no data of a relevant allergy. The mitigation measures 
suggested for this failure mode are cross-checking of data entries, online 
monitoring and fault containment. 
ID (Flow) Guide 
Word 
Deviation Possible 
Causes 
Effects DSSRs Mitigation 
Flow 
between 
‘Dispatch 
ambulance 
and 
‘Receive 
request’  
Omission No request for 
ambulance 
received 
Deployment 
fault (Request 
resource 
missing) 
Service/server 
incompatible 
Task crashed  
Ambulance 
not 
dispatched 
The failure 
mode ‘no 
request 
for 
ambulance 
received’ 
shall be 
prevented 
or 
mitigated. 
Use of 
redundancy 
in data 
sources by Fit 
addition flow 
to the request 
Commission Uncommanded 
request for 
ambulance 
received 
False request, 
incorrect 
request 
Execution fault 
(Incorrect 
result) 
 
No safety 
effect 
 N/A N/A 
Early N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Late Request 
arrived later 
than intended 
Failure in 
scheduling/ 
synchronisation 
Time out 
related to clock 
time with 
effects on other 
tasks  
Ambulance 
dispatched 
later than 
intended 
The failure 
mode 
‘request 
arrived 
later than 
intended’ 
shall be 
prevented 
or 
mitigated. 
Monitoring 
for timing 
failure and 
developing 
recovery 
strategies  
 
Value   Incorrect 
request 
 
Incorrect input 
or conversion 
fault   
execution fault, 
Delay in 
the 
treatment  
The failure 
mode 
‘incorrect 
request’ 
shall be 
Diversity via 
programming 
solutions to 
detect and 
reject 
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incorrect result 
or servicer 
crash 
prevented 
or 
mitigated. 
improper 
values and 
fault 
containment 
Table 18: SFA for Flow between ‘Dispatch Ambulance’ to ‘Receive Request’ 
Table 18 shows another example of the use of SFA for examining the flow 
between the ‘Dispatch Ambulance and ‘Receive Request’ tasks. An important 
issue to note here is that two of the effects highlighted by the analysis, 
‘ambulance not dispatched’ and ‘ambulance dispatched later than intended’, 
are the direct causes of the service hazards identified in the SHA analysis in 
Table 13. This shows the continuity of the safety analysis between SHA, at the 
service level, and SFA, at the detailed design level. 
4.5 Tool Support  
This section describes the implementation of the tool support for the SOA 
modelling and safety analysis which has been described in this chapter, and 
presents the metamodels on which it is based. The tool support environment 
provides the following the capabilities: 
 Create SoaML and BPMN models; 
 Create and integrate SLAs into the SoaML models; 
 Integrate BPMN and SoaML models; 
 Embed SHA results into the SoaML models; 
 Embed SFA results into the BPMN models. 
These capabilities are intended to support the design and safety analysis of the 
SOA system at the high (i.e. services) and low (tasks) levels of the design. The 
following subsections illustrate the implementation and use of these 
capabilities. 
4.5.1 SoaML to BPMN Link 
In this thesis, we implemented most of the models in Eclipse (124) using the 
SoaML and Activiti BPM plug-ins (125) and (126). We have extended the 
SoaML plug-in to perform the traceability with the BPMN models. Figure 29 
shows the implementation of the SoaML-BPMN link within the SoaML 
ServicesArchitecture model through the selection of an appropriate file for the 
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BPMN Model. Then, the specific notation element and the ID are chosen, in 
order to determine the precise Tasks within the BPMN model that are linked to 
the SoaML model.  
 
Figure 29: Link from SoaML ServicesArchitecture Model to BPMN Model 
 
Figure 30: Link from SoaML Interfaces Model to BPMN Model 
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Once the traceability between the SoaML and BPMN models is established, each 
of the Operations within the SoaML Interfaces model can be linked to a specific 
Task in the BPMN model as shown in Figure 30. 
4.5.2 BPMN to SoaML Link  
Traceability between the SoaML and BPMN models can also be established. 
Figure 31 shows the traceability between lower-level design models (BPMN) 
and high-level service models (SoaML ServicesArchitecture model). The link is 
established first within the BPMN model by selecting a SoaML File. Then, the 
specific model (e.g. ServicesArchitecture model), the Stereotype for the model 
(e.g. Participant or CollaborationUse or ServicesArchitecture) and the Name of 
the chosen element are linked to the precise service in the SoaML models. The 
example in Figure 10 shows the link between the ‘Dispatch Ambulance’ Task in 
the BPMN model and the ‘Dispatch Ambulance’ service in the SoaML 
ServicesArchitecture model. 
 
Figure 31: Link from BPMN to SoaML ServicesArchitecture Model 
As before, once the traceability between the SoaML and BPMN models is 
established, Tasks described in the BPMN model can be linked with Operations 
captured in the SoaML Interface model.  
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Figure 32: Link from BPMN model to SoaML Interface Model  
For example, in Figure 32, the ‘Dispatch Ambulance’ Task is linked with the 
‘Dispatch Ambulance’ operation in the SoaML Interface model. 
4.5.3 SLA Implementation 
In this section, SLA is represented as part of the SoaML service contract. The 
example presented in Figure 33 shows the creation of an SLA description and 
the recording of the pre- and post-conditions for the service and the required 
information for SLA.  
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 Figure 33: Representing XML schema for SLA 
4.5.4 SHA Implementation 
This section describes the tool support for SHA as integrated into the SoaML 
models. Figure 34 shows the SHA user interface for populating the service 
safety data. When the user clicks on a service, the SHA results relating to that 
service are displayed and can also be edited. More specifically, in the example, 
the tool displays the data corresponding to the Dispatch Ambulance service 
failure mode ‘ambulance dispatched later than intended’, its effects 
(hypovolaemia, renal failure, cardiac arrest, disseminated intravascular 
coagulopathy…), the severity of the effects (major), proposed mitigations 
(active monitoring of timing targets and strategies for recovery from timing-
related failures) and SSRs (e.g. “ambulance dispatched later than intended shall 
be prevented or mitigated”). 
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Figure 34: SHA implementation 
4.5.5 SFA Implementation 
This section describes the tool support for SFA as integrated into the BPMN 
models. Figure 35 shows the SFA user interface for populating the service 
safety data. When the user clicks on a flow link, the SFA results relating to the 
selected flow are displayed and can also be edited. More specifically, in the 
example, the tool shows the data corresponding to the flow between ‘Dispatch 
ambulance’ and ‘Receive request’ for the guideword ‘Omission’. The deviation 
identified is ‘no request for ambulance received’, the possible causes are 
‘Deployment fault (Request resource missing), Task/server incompatible and 
Task crashed’, the effect is ‘Ambulance not dispatched’, the DSSR is “the failure 
mode ‘no request for ambulance received’ shall be prevented or mitigated” and 
the proposed mitigation is “use of redundancy in data sources by fitting an 
additional flow”. 
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Figure 35: SFA implementation 
4.5.6 Model-Based Support 
This section describes the models and metamodels used to support the tool 
implementation. Figure 36 shows the extension of part of the SoaML 
metamodel by adding BPMN hyperLinks to link the SoaML models with the 
BPMN models, SoaML table to capture the SHA data, and SLA to capture SLA 
pre- and post-conditions. 
 
Figure 36: Extended SoaML ServicesArchitecture Metamodel 
Figure 37 another extension of the SoaML metamdel to create and support the 
link between SoaML participants and BPMN tasks (BPMN hyperlinks). 
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Figure 37: Extended SoaML ServiceInterfaces Metamodel 
Figure 38 shows the extended BPMN metamodel, with the addition of the 
Hyperlinks (to link to the SoaML metamodel) and Bpmntable (to capture the 
SFA results). 
 
Figure 38: Extended BPMN Metamodel 
4.6 Summary  
In this chapter, we have presented an SOA safety analysis process that is 
integrated with the modelling of the SOA design. The safety analysis captures 
and examines the hazards and failure behaviours relating to services and tasks 
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according to the way in which these services and tasks are defined in the SOA 
context. This in turn forms the basis for defining the safety requirements and 
for recommendations for satisfaction of the requirements, which should 
influence and drive the design process. Producing these requirements can lead 
to an integrated and verifiable approach to assuring the safety of the SOA 
system.  We have also introduced a detailed case study from the healthcare 
domain. The case study provides an illustration of the SOA safety analysis 
techniques used (SHA and SFA) and how they are applied and allows for 
evaluation of the techniques defined. Finally, we discussed the implementation 
of the tool support that provides capabilities for SOA modelling, safety analysis 
and traceability management. The information generated from the SOA safety 
analysis process forms the basis for assuring the system by means of safety 
cases as described in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
 
5. SOA Safety Cases  
 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, we discussed the background to safety, various safety-related 
issues and certification processes. Safety certification was described as an 
important step in assuring the safety of a system, and the safety case was 
introduced as a means of recording the arguments and evidence necessary for 
assurance and – in some domains – for certification. The role of the safety case 
is to present a clear and defensible argument that the system is acceptably safe 
to operate within a specific application and to indicate the evidence on which 
the argument depends. Modular GSN (99) has been developed as a notation to 
represent safety arguments for modular systems. In this chapter, modular GSN 
will be the basis for our structuring and representation of SOA safety cases. 
Chapter 3 introduced an overview of the SOA safety assurance framework that 
we have developed to assess how an SOA system can meet its safety 
requirements and can be assured by providing an explicit safety case. Chapter 4 
described the detailed safety analysis methods that we adapted for SOA, 
namely SHA and SFA.  
In this chapter, we develop an approach to the justification of safety-critical 
service-based systems, using modular GSN to represent the compositional 
structure of the safety case. This chapter explores the relationship between the 
service architecture and the safety case architecture. We identify the 
similarities and differences between both architectures. For example, the 
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structure of the SOA system should ideally correspond to the safety case 
structure to help ensure that they meet architectural attributes such as 
maintainability (i.e. by incorporating maintainability in the SOA system design, 
we should be able to achieve corresponding maintainability in the safety case, 
reducing the impact of system change on assurance). In particular, contracts 
which are defined to enforce the relationships between the safety argument 
modules will be based on the SLA between the actual services. 
In this chapter, the information used to structure and the evidence used to 
support the safety case will be based on the results of the modelling SoaML for 
services and BPMN for tasks and flows as well as on the safety analysis 
outcomes generated from SHA and SFA.  
Finally, the general structure of the safety arguments for SOA will be captured 
in the form of GSN patterns. These patterns will be organised in modules that 
correspond to the overall SOA structure, e.g. services, SLAs and participants, 
and explicitly linked to the results of the SOA modelling and safety analysis. The 
argument patterns are presented at a generic level, and can be instantiated to 
form argument structures relating to the assurance of specific SOA systems.  
This chapter is organised as follows. In section 5.2, we introduce modular 
safety case development for SOA as a means for improving design and 
assurance traceability. Section 5.3 presents the elements of our SOA safety 
argument approach. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 describe the relationship between the 
SOA safety argument approach and the results of the SOA modelling and safety 
analysis described in the preceding chapters, and give practical guidance on 
how to create SOA safety arguments based on a pattern catalogue. Finally, 
Section 5.8 presents the instantiation of the approach based on our healthcare 
case study. 
5.2 Modular Safety Case Development for SOA 
In many safety-critical industries, it is regarded as best practice to construct a 
safety case in parallel with the system development, and to use the safety 
requirements to drive the design and development processes in such a way as 
to generate claims and evidence for the safety case. Because of the nature of 
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SOA systems, which may contain several interacting services, developed and 
operated by different service providers, establishing and justifying an 
acceptable level of confidence in the overall safety of SOA-based systems will 
often require integration of different safety arguments and evidence generated 
by different service owners or providers. One approach to representing this 
compositionality of the overall safety case for service-based systems is through 
modular GSN (97). Modular GSN supports the definition of the high-level safety 
case as a composition of different, yet mostly interrelated, argument modules, 
each of which addresses some aspect of the overall system. In order to improve 
flexibility and maintainability and support reconfigurability, some argument 
modules are connected using contracts (15). A contract is a special kind of GSN 
argument module which “contains a definition of the relationships between two 
modules, defining how a claim in one supports the argument in the other” (97), 
hence promoting loose coupling between argument modules and minimising 
the impact of change. 
In order to improve traceability in the design and assurance processes, it is 
desirable for a safety case to have a clear correspondence with the design of the 
system. Essentially, an SOA is mainly a modular architecture, where each 
service represents a separate high-level module with defined intentions, 
interactions, inputs and outputs.  
This modularity in the definition of services lends itself to the concept of 
modular safety cases, where there are explicit reply-guarantee relationships 
between the different safety argument modules (147).  
A GSN argument module provides justifications relating to a specific aspect of 
the safety case (93). SOA-systems are modular in nature, i.e. individual services 
can be treated as individual modules (99). In our approach, each of the services 
in the overall system architecture will have a corresponding safety argument 
module and the overall safety case will address the composition of these safety 
argument modules. The same will apply for detailed design elements such as 
participants. Contracts between the safety argument modules will be based on 
the SLAs (Brown, Fenn, & Menon, 2010) that are defined between the actual 
services.  
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Services and participants are self-contained system elements that interact 
through predefined interfaces (e.g. those provided through SLAs). Service 
owners or producers often rely on other services when guaranteeing and 
providing their own services (122). Similarly, claims in certain argument 
modules can only be said to be substantiated (the guarantee clause) if claims or 
evidence are available in other argument modules that offer sufficient support 
(the rely clause). 
5.3 Modular SOA Safety Argumentation Approach 
This section briefly introduces the elements of our SOA safety argumentation 
approach, how it is applied and how it relates to the results of the SOA 
modelling and safety analysis described in Chapter 4.  
5.3.1 Overall Structure 
This section considers the overall organisation of the modular safety cases that 
we developed for SOA-based systems and discusses how the safety case 
argument relates to the structure of the SOA and the safety analysis. The 
purpose of the arguments is to justify the safety of the SOA design. This is done 
by arguing that the system safety requirements, which arise from the safety 
analysis, have been addressed through the selected design mitigations and 
provide for a sufficient level of safety. 
Our SOA safety analysis follows a structured, though implicit, line of reasoning: 
an SOA-based system is acceptably safe because all credible service hazards 
have been identified and mitigated. This is supported by the safety analysis of 
services and their interactions provided by SHA which identifies relevant 
service hazards to be addressed in the argument. Furthermore, this line of 
reasoning is supported at a lower level through the analysis of the technical 
failures that could potentially contribute to the service hazards. This is 
supported by the safety analysis of tasks and flows provided by SFA. 
We capture this reasoning through an argument pattern (123) to ensure 
consistency across the modular argument and allow the safety analyst to reuse 
the argument pattern as a basis for the assurance of different SOA-based 
systems (99). We have developed a catalogue of  SOA safety argument patterns, 
which provides a framework in which an argument regarding the safety of 
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using an SOA system within a specific safety application can be developed. The 
argument patterns in the catalogue are defined separately, but are directly 
related to each other to form the overall argument structure. The SOA 
argument pattern catalogue includes rules for pattern composition and 
traceability to the architectural design (i.e. SoaML and BPMN models) and 
analysis (i.e. SHA and SFA). 
The SOA safety argument pattern catalogue consists of templates for three 
individual arguments and one argument contract Figure 39. These patterns are 
structured to form overall hazard-directed argument for the SOA (Top 
Argument), which is supported by a number of Service Hazard Arguments, SLA 
Argument Contracts and Participant Arguments. These patterns can be 
composed together to form a complete argument regarding the safety of the 
SOA system design.  
  
Figure 39: SOA Argument Patterns Catalogue 
Within the pattern catalogue, we have provided means to represent the 
argument regarding the safety of the SOA system from the perspectives of both 
the Services and the Participants. The SOA safety argument pattern catalogue is 
explained in detail in Section 5.7. In the following subsections, we summarise 
each of the template safety argument modules in the SOA safety argument 
pattern catalogue Figure 39. The SOA safety argument pattern catalogue follows 
a top-down chain of reasoning from the Top Argument module through to the 
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Participant Argument module. The instantiation of each pattern provides the 
necessary contextual information for the next pattern. 
5.3.2 Top Argument  
This module contains a hazard-directed argument, which covers the main high-
level safety claims concerning adequate mitigation of the identified service 
hazardous failures. These claims are supported by arguments and evidence 
provided in the Service Arguments – safety argument modules defined to 
address the safety assurance of services that comprise the SOA.   
5.3.3 Service Argument 
Each Service Argument module contains mitigation arguments for the hazards 
posed by a given service and its interactions. These claims are supported by the 
SLA Argument Contract modules defined to address the safety assurance 
related to participants (producers and consumers of services).   
5.3.4 SLA Argument Contract 
The SLA Argument Contract modules include the detailed SLA Contract 
argument concerning the relationship between services and participants 
within the modular safety case. The contracts between safety argument 
modules are based on the SLA, which can help to identify the 
interdependencies that exist between services and participants and their 
corresponding safety case modules. These contracts are supported by post-
conditions, relating to the services, and pre-conditions, relating to the 
participants, which specify relevant issues required from the supporting 
modules to provide safety assurance for the services.   
5.3.5 Participant Argument 
Participant Argument modules address assurance concerns associated with 
SOA participants. These modules are intended to provide sufficient support for 
the SLA argument contact modules. This includes providing the detailed 
arguments concerning the tasks relating to the relevant participant and 
interactions based on the pre-conditions allocated to the participant.  
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5.4 Relationship between SOA Modelling and Modular Safety 
Cases 
The key modules in the design and safety case of an SOA are shown in Figure 
40. 
 
Figure 40: SOA and Modular Safety Case Correspondence 
We force a traceable relationship between the high-level SOA design, in SoaML 
(ServicesArchitectures) and the overall SOA safety case, in modular GSN. For 
each service defined in the SOA, we create a Service Argument that addresses 
the hazards posed by the service (based on the results of the SHA analysis), i.e. 
the argument provides a justification for how the service hazards have been 
mitigated. In the same way, for each participant, we create a Participant 
Argument that justifies the contributions that the participant makes to service 
hazards (based on the analysis results of SFA). Moreover, participants interact 
through defined SLAs in order to provide and consume services. These 
interactions between participants can contribute to safety and therefore their 
assurance is addressed in explicit safety argument contracts (SLA Contract 
Arguments). 
Before we present the definition of SOA safety arguments (Section 5.7), it is 
important to discuss the relationship between the SOA structure and the 
modular structure of the safety case argument. More specifically, this section 
explores the relationships between the modelling of the services, contracts and 
participants that comprise an SOA and the structure of the modular safety case 
argument for the system.  
SOA Design 
Structure 
Services 
SLAs 
Participants 
SOA Modular 
Safety Case 
Service 
Arguments 
Safety 
Argument 
Contracts 
Participant 
Arguments 
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Figure 41 : Relation between SOA architecture and module safety cases 
Figure 41 illustrates the potential relationship between the SOA organisation 
and the modular safety case structure outlined above. SoaML 
ServicesArchitectures models are used to describe the main components and 
communications within the system, the relationships between services and 
participants and how they work together. The modular safety case captures the 
structure of the service safety argument.  
In Figure 41, each service, represented as a SoaML CollaborationUse, has a 
corresponding Service Argument module. Contracts between the argument 
modules are based on the SLA between the actual services as defined in the 
SoaML model (ServicesArchitectures). Each SLA will have a corresponding SLA 
Argument Contract module. Similarly, each participant will have its 
corresponding Participant Argument module and is linked to the BPMN pool 
that models the tasks and flows between tasks that define the behaviour of the 
participant.  
5.5 Relationship between SOA Safety Analysis and Modular 
Safety Cases  
In this section, the discussion focuses on how the nature of the SOA safety 
analysis (described in Chapter 4) relates to the overall structure of the SOA 
safety argument. Figure 42 illustrates the relationship between the SOA safety 
analyses, SHA and SFA, and the overall SOA safety case. In our argumentation 
approach, the main sources of reasoning and evidence are generated from the 
SHA and SFA results. 
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Figure 42: SOA safety analysis and structure of the SOA safety argument 
5.5.1 Service Hazard Analysis (SHA) 
SHA results play a significant role in defining the overall structure of the SOA 
safety argument patterns, specifically the high-level argument. For each service 
in the SOA which is related to safety, our approach requires the instantiation of 
an argument, based on the Service Argument pattern, in order to justify the 
claim that potential hazardous failures of the service are appropriately 
mitigated or managed. The argument approach is driven by the SHA results. 
These results support claims about the nature of the hazardous failures and 
how they are mitigated, based on a set of service safety requirements whose 
stringency depends on the criticality of the failures with regard to overall 
service safety. The claims made about the mitigation of the failures depend on 
how the mitigation measures are satisfied by the participants involved in 
provision and consumption of the service. These measures are modelled using 
SLAs in the SOA models. In our SOA safety case approach, we discuss the 
adequacy of the mitigation provided in a corresponding safety argument 
contract, where the claims relate to post-conditions based on the 
recommended mitigation measures generated from the SHA results. 
5.5.2 Service Failure Analysis (SFA) 
The pre-conditions of the SLAs, discussed in the previous section, are allocated 
to participants that are expected to implement the services in terms of specific 
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tasks and interactions. The aim of the Participant Argument pattern is to 
provide assurance that all the task flows have met the safety contract pre-
conditions arising from SLA argument pattern. Therefore, the second half of the 
overall SOA safety argument pattern is influenced by the SFA results, which are 
organised according to deviations in the flows from the intended behaviour 
allocated to the participants involved in the provision of a service. This is 
captured in the Participant Argument pattern. This pattern captures the 
justification for the management of potential failures in the provision and 
consumption of tasks allocated to a participant. The definition of these failures 
is generated from the SFA analysis and the strategies chosen to manage their 
causes are justified in the context of different categories of failure modes 
defined in the SOA fault taxonomy, as discussed in Chapter 4. The pattern also 
shows that for each flow between participant tasks, the mitigations suggested 
by the DSSRs have been deployed and are sufficient to guarantee the required 
behaviour.  
5.6 Managing SOA Safety Cases using GSN 
In this section, we review the concept of safety case patterns and techniques 
which have been developed to allow them to be represented graphically. We 
also introduce our approach for SOA safety. The Goal Structuring Notation 
(GSN) has been used to present the structure and contents of our SOA safety 
argument pattern catalogue. The catalogue uses both the patterns and modular 
extensions of GSN (97). 
5.6.1 Safety Case Patterns 
The safety case pattern concept was originally developed by Kelly (123) based 
upon the work of the architect Christopher Alexander (36). Alexander’s 
challenge was to try to discover a technique for town planning and structural 
engineering that could be reused to solve planning problems in multiple 
contexts. In his book, The Timeless Way of Building, Alexander shows how 
patterns can be used to abstract away from the details of specific buildings and 
environments, and can capture  fundamental aspects of the design that can be 
applied elsewhere. Alexander asserts that: 
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"Each pattern describes a problem which occurs over and over again in 
our environment, and then describes the core of the solution to that 
problem, in such a way that you can use this solution a million times over, 
without ever doing it the same way twice." (36). 
Kelly in (123) adopted Alexander’s principles concerning the use of patterns 
for documenting recurring problems, solutions and contexts, and developed 
the concept of patterns for GSN safety arguments. Kelly defined a safety case 
pattern as “a means of documenting and reusing successful safety argument 
structures”. (123) 
The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) was initially developed for the description 
of concrete safety arguments for specific systems and contexts. Kelly extended 
the original GSN technique with elements that provide the ability to represent 
an argument in a more generic format, i.e. as an abstract argument pattern, so 
that it can be applied to construct new safety arguments for different systems 
and contexts.  
5.6.2 GSN Pattern Extension 
GSN provides a means for capturing safety arguments and referencing the 
available evidence. GSN can be used to represent a specific safety argument for 
a given system or capability. Nevertheless, to be able to apply the notation in a 
more generalised way, GSN provides an extension for creating patterns and 
supporting abstraction, namely optionality, multiplicity extensions and entity 
abstractions. The pattern extension is illustrated in Figure 43 (adapted from 
(123) and (106)). The core elements of the GSN notation and methodology 
were introduced in Chapter 2. Here, we restrict our discussion to the 
extensions to support pattern definitions.  These extensions rely on two types 
of abstraction (Figure 43): 
 Structural Abstraction – supporting generalised n-ary, optional and 
alternative relationships between GSN elements (Multiplicity 
Extensions - Optionality Extension) 
 Entity Abstraction – supporting generalisation/specialisation of GSN 
elements (Entity Abstraction Extensions). 
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Figure 43:  Optionality/multiplicity extensions and entity abstractions (106)  
GSN has been also extended explicitly to allow support for the concepts of 
modular safety case construction (99). Figure 44 shows the key elements 
supporting modularity.  
 
  
Figure 44: GSN elements introduced to handle modularity 
The Argument Module is an explicit representation of a self-contained 
argument structure and is used a container for the elements used to capture 
that argument. The Away Goal element is used in order to be able to refer to 
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goals (claims) presented in one argument module which are satisfied by 
argument and/or evidence contained within other modules. Away Contexts and 
Away Solutions are used in order to make reference from the argument of one 
safety case module to context and evidence that exist within the boundary of 
another. Argument Contract symbols can be used to preserve the overall 
integrity of the modular safety case when the internal details of one or more 
argument modules are modified. The modular and pattern extensions of GSN 
are discussed in more detail in (97). 
5.6.3 Documenting Safety Case Patterns in GSN 
In this thesis, we use the template developed by (14) in order to document 
safety case patterns. The template requires the following categories of 
information (taken from Kelly, 1998): 
 
Pattern Name 
The pattern name should briefly convey the essence of the pattern. This should 
communicate the central argument being presented through the safety argument 
pattern. This will be the label by which people will identify this pattern.  
Intent 
This statement should answer the question “what the pattern is trying to 
achieve/do?” 
Also Known As 
This is used if there are other names by which the pattern could be described or 
recognised. 
Motivation 
This section gives a brief account of why the pattern was constructed. This usually 
includes scenarios that show a safety issue / process and how the elements of the 
GSN solve the problem.  
The scenarios help understand the more abstract description of the pattern that 
follows. 
Applicability (Necessary Context) 
This section records under what circumstances the argument can and should be 
applied. Any assumptions and principles underlying the argument pattern are 
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identified in this section. For example, what are the circumstances in which the 
safety case pattern can be applied? What information is required (necessary 
inputs to the pattern) to be successful? How can you recognise circumstances in 
which the pattern can be deployed? 
Structure 
A graphical representation of the structure of the argument pattern is presented 
using GSN. 
Participants 
This section provides more description of the argument pattern structure, 
including a description of each of the elements of the safety case pattern (i.e. the 
goals, the contexts, the strategies and the solutions). The element descriptions 
make clear their function within the overall argument pattern. These elements 
should also state whether the element requires development or instantiation 
when the pattern is deployed. 
Collaborations 
This section describes how the different elements of the pattern work together to 
achieve the desired effect of the pattern. This section also explicitly identifies 
where links between elements exist that are not communicated by the argument 
structure. 
Consequences 
This section identifies what work remains after having applied the argument 
pattern. 
Implementation 
This section should communicate how the application of the pattern should be 
carried out, including any hints or techniques which would ease successful 
application of the pattern. It should also highlight possible problems (or pitfalls) 
in applying the pattern as well as common misinterpretations of the terms or 
concepts. 
Example Applications 
This section provides examples that illustrate the instantiation of the pattern. 
Known Uses 
This section describes known uses of the form of argument presented in the 
pattern. 
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Related Patterns 
This section identifies any other safety case patterns that are related to the 
pattern. 
5.7 SOA Safety Argument Pattern Catalogue 
Figure 45 shows the overall organisation of the argument pattern catalogue we 
have defined for the justification of SOA safety. The following sections contain a 
detailed explanation and documentation of the argument patterns.  
  
Figure 45: SOA Argument Patterns Catalogue 
5.7.1 Top Argument  
This pattern provides the top-level decomposition for the argument structured 
over the services. Table 19 shows the documentation of the pattern in GSN. The 
instantiation of this pattern starts with the G_SOA goal, which is the claim of 
overall safety for the SOA system. The structure of the pattern is driven by the 
architecture of the services within the system, starting from the SOA system 
and identifying how the services within the system can contribute to safety. 
The top-level claim is made in the context of the description of the SOA system 
and the environment in which it will be deployed. The strategy adopted is to 
partition the argument over all of the identified services, considering each 
service in turn. The context for this is based on the service specification in 
SoaML. For each service, the argument contains a claim that the service is 
acceptably safe. This is made in the context of the SOA design (this is taken 
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from the SoaML model). In order to show that any service hazards have been 
mitigated, an away goal is defined to argue separately that there are measures 
in place to address the safety of the service (this claim is substantiated in the 
Service Argument Module).  
Top Argument  
Author Abdulaziz Al-Humam 
Created 08/07/2014 Last Modified 04/07/2015 
Intent The intent of this pattern is to provide the high level 
and overarching argument to justify the safety of the 
SOA-based system, taking into account, explicitly, the 
services comprising the system. 
Also Known As SOA Top Argument Pattern 
Motivation SOAs are increasingly used within safety-critical 
applications. The safety of an SOA system must be 
justified, to which end a safety argument should be 
provided as part of the system safety case. This pattern 
was developed to provide a structured top-level 
argument for the safety of an SOA system used within 
safety-critical applications.  
Structure 
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Participants G_SOA The overall objective of the 
argument is to provide 
sufficient support for the 
claim that the use of {SOA 
System} in the intended 
context is acceptably safe. 
{SOA System} is instantiated 
from the SoaML 
ServicesArchitecture. The 
link to this model is 
important to provide a 
specific and traceable 
description of the system 
that is the subject of the 
safety argument. 
C_SOA This context provides a 
description of the SOA 
system, including all services 
within the system. This is 
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provided by the SoaML 
ServicesArchitecture. 
C_SOA_Env This considers the scope of 
the SOA system by defining 
the boundary of it, 
explaining the domain of the 
system. It also captures the 
assumptions about the 
behaviour of the 
environment that are made 
by the SOA system. Unless 
this behaviour can be 
guaranteed, the SOA’s 
behaviour cannot be 
guaranteed. This is often 
stated in terms of 
requirements on the 
environment (e.g. in the 
form of user manuals). 
St_Top This presents the strategy 
(the decomposition of the 
argument into claims about 
each service) adopted to 
support G_SOA.  
G_Service_Hz_Service 
Argument Module 
This claim argues the safety 
of each service and is 
captured as an away goal. 
This claim references the top 
claim made and supported in 
a separate argument module 
relating to the relevant 
service: i.e. the Service 
Argument Module for that 
service. 
Collaborations  C_SOA and C_SOA_Env provide necessary context 
for the understanding of the system and its 
environment. 
 C_Top_Hz provides the link with the safety analysis, 
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SHA, used for the identification of the hazardous 
contribution of the SOA. 
Applicability This is a general pattern and, as such, has a wide 
applicability. This pattern is applicable wherever 
safety arguments need to be established for the use of 
services within a safety-critical application. However, it 
assumes that systematic SOA modelling and safety 
analysis have been performed, based on SoaML and 
SHA. 
Consequences 
 
After instantiating this pattern away goals will be 
instantiated in the Service Argument Modules. 
The Service Argument Module for SOA Safety 
Argument pattern can be used to decompose this goal. 
Implementation Top Argument Module should be fully developed and 
instantiated. Possible problems include lack of 
understanding of the environment or lack of 
knowledge of safety engineering concerns in the 
domain of the system (e.g. healthcare or aviation). 
Examples  See the two case studies in this thesis. 
Known Uses  See examples above. 
Related Patterns:  Service argument Pattern. 
Table 19: Top Argument 
5.7.2 Service Argument 
This pattern provides justification of the mitigations used to manage the 
hazardous failures associated with a service, and is structured according to the 
results of the SHA. The top-level claim is made in the context of the description 
of the current service and the identified service failure modes that have safety 
effects. The strategy adopted is to argue the safety of the service by appealing 
to the adequacy of the mitigations provided for the hazardous service failures, 
in terms of meeting the service safety requirements. The argument considers 
each service failure mode that has safety effects in turn. The strategy adopted is 
to argue that the mitigation is sufficient to achieve the required integrity. The 
achievement of the mitigation is based on, and supported by, the output or 
post-condition of an SLA. This is defined in the form of a safety case contract 
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that mediates the relationship between the Service Argument module and the 
Participant Argument module. 
 
Service Argument Pattern  
Author Abdulaziz Al-Humam  
Created 08/07/2014 Last Modified 04/07/2015 
Intent The intent of this pattern is to provide an argument to justify 
the mitigation measures used to manage the hazardous 
failures for a service and to demonstrate how the reasoning is 
supported via an SLA Contract Argument. 
Also Known As N/A. 
Motivation The contribution of each service to overall service safety 
needs to be justified. This pattern was created in order to 
provide this justification, in terms the mitigation of any 
hazardous contribution from the service. 
Structure 
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C_Service_Desc
{Service: SoaML 
CollaborationUse}
St_Service_Hz
Argument structured based 
on mitigating service 
hazardous failures
C_Service_Hz
{Service hazardous 
failures: service failure 
modes with safety 
effects: SHA}
G_Service_Mitg
{Mitigation} is satisfied to 
the required integrity
C_Service_Mitg
{Mitigation: SHA} 
C_Service_Class
Required integrity 
based on {Severity: 
SHA}
St_Service_SLA
Argument by 
enforcing {Mitigation} 
in the {SLA}
J
J_Service_SLA
Mitigation is allocated to 
the SLA post-condition
G_Service_SLA_Postcondition
s
{SLA post-condition} is 
satisfied
Spinal
SLA Contract
Description SLA 
Contract
G_Service_D_Hz
{Failure mode  with safety 
effects} is mitigated to satisfy 
the Service Safety 
Requirement
St_Service_Mitg
Argument based on 
{Mitigation} 
{For each service failure mode with safety 
effects}
G_Service_HZ
{Service} is acceptably 
safe
C_Service_SLA
{SLA: SoaML}
C_Service_Hz_SSRs
{Service Safety 
Requirement: SHA}
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Participants G_Service_Hz The top-level claim considers 
the safety of a specific service. 
The Service description is 
provided by the SoaML 
Service Contract Architecture. 
C_Service_Desc This context node provides a 
description of the service 
within the system. This is 
provided by the SoaML 
Service Contract Architecture.  
C_Service_Hz This context node provides a 
description of the service 
failure modes that have safety 
effects.  
St_Service_Hz This node presents the 
strategy adopted to support 
G_Service_Hz (i.e. mitigation 
of service hazards)  
C_Service_Hz_SSRs Definition of the service 
safety requirements 
associated with the service. 
This is provided from the 
{SSRs: SHA}. 
G_Service_D_Hz This claim is generated for 
each failure mode with 
hazardous effects that has 
been identified in SHA. This is 
provided by the {Failure 
Modes: SHA}.  
St_Service_Mitg This node presents the 
strategy adopted to support 
G_Service_D_Hz, considering 
the specific mitigation 
measures used to address a 
specific hazardous failure. 
This is provided by the 
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{Mitigation_SHA: SHA}.    
C_Service_Mitg This context defines the list of 
mitigations for a specific 
hazardous failure. This is 
provided by the SHA results.    
G_Service_Mitg This claim considers the need 
to achieve mitigation to the 
level of rigour required, 
depending on the severity of 
the failure event. This is 
provided by the SHA results.  
C_Service_Class This context node refers to 
the interpretation of the 
standard’s requirements for 
integrity level which has been 
produced for this service. . 
This is provided in the SHA 
results. 
St_Service_SLA The achievement of the 
mitigation measures is 
provided by the Participants. 
This is captured via an SLA in 
which the post-conditions 
define the achievement of the 
mitigation measures.  
J_Service_SLA The use of SLA post-
conditions must be satisfied 
to enable the mitigation to be 
achieved and assured. 
C_Service_SLA This context node provides a 
reference to the SLA used. 
This is provided in the SoaML 
Service Contract Architecture 
{SLA}. 
G_Service_SLA_Postconditio
ns 
This claim argues that the SLA 
post-conditions 
corresponding to the 
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mitigation are satisfied. 
Evidence for this is provided 
by the SoaML Service 
Contract Architecture {SLA 
post-conditions}. 
SLA_Contract The contract can be used to 
record the interdependencies 
that exist between the 
arguments containing the 
claims about post-conditions 
and pre-conditions of the SLA. 
This is provided by the SoaML 
Service Contract Architecture 
{SLA post /pre-conditions}. 
Collaborations  C_Service_Hz provides the necessary context for the 
identification of the safety hazards associated with the 
service. 
 G_Service_D_Hz makes a mitigation claim based on the 
hazardous events described in C_Service_Hz from 
different perspectives (Service not provided when 
required; Service provided when not required and 
incorrect service). 
 C_Service_Hz_SSRs and C_Service_Class provide necessary 
context for identifying suitable mitigations of the hazards 
associated with the service based on the severity level.   
  G_Service_SLA_Postconditions defines the SLA post 
condition corresponding to the mitigation within the 
contract. 
Applicability This pattern is applicable wherever a service is associated 
with failures than have safety effects (i.e. hazardous failures). 
Consequences 
 
After instantiating this pattern, the contract module should be 
developed. The SLA Contract Argument Module for SOA 
Safety Argument pattern can be used to structure this 
contract. 
Implementation Hazard Argument Module should be fully developed and 
instantiated. Possible problems include attempting to apply 
the pattern to a system which is not based on SOA, and 
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attempting to apply the pattern without having defined safety 
contract interfaces. 
Examples  See the two case studies in this thesis. 
Known Uses  See examples above. 
Related Patterns SLA Contract Argument Pattern. 
Table 20: Service argument Pattern 
5.7.3 SLA Contract Argument 
It Chapter 4, we explained how safety analysis can help identify the safety 
requirements for each service. The SLAs for each service can specify the pre- 
and post-conditions that are necessary to ensure that these requirements are 
met. The SLAs define the basis for argument contract pattern in our SOA safety 
argumentation approach. Table 21 shows the documentation of the pattern. 
The top goal of the pattern is an away goal which claims that the SLA post-
conditions from Service Argument Pattern are satisfied. The strategy adopted is 
to argue over SLA pre-conditions. The justification for this is based on meeting 
the SLA pre-conditions allocated to participants. Away goals are used to argue 
that one or more participants satisfy the SLA pre-conditions. 
 
SLA Contract Argument Pattern  
Author Abdulaziz Al-Humam  
Created 08/07/2014 Last Modified 04/07/2015 
Intent The intent of this argument contract pattern is to provide 
the justification that is needed to link the claims about the 
services and those about the participants consuming and 
providing these services. 
This pattern can be used to record and justify the 
interdependencies that exist between post-conditions and 
pre-conditions for the services and their associated 
participants. 
Also Known As SOA Safety Case Contract 
Motivation Just as SLAs are used to record interdependencies between 
services within SOA design, safety case contract modules 
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are used to represent rely-guarantee relationships between 
modules in modular safety case applications. This pattern 
was developed to exploit the correspondences between the 
structure of the SOA design and the organisation of the 
safety case and therefore improve clarify and 
maintainability. 
Structure 
  
Participants G_Service_SLA_postconditions_ 
Service Argument Module 
The top-level claim states 
that the SLA post 
condition is satisfied. The 
claim referenced in the 
away goal here originates 
in the Service Argument 
Module. It is used to 
show sufficient support 
to satisfy the 
requirements for 
mitigation. The 
information to instantiate 
this goal is provided by 
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the SoaML Service 
Contract Architecture 
{SLA post-conditions}. 
St_SLA_Contract This node presents the 
strategy of 
decomposition of the 
argument over the SLA 
pre-conditions that must 
be satisfied by the 
participants. 
J_SLA_Contract This node justifies the 
decomposition strategy 
by claiming that the use 
of SLA pre-conditions – 
satisfied by the 
participants – is sufficient 
to enable the 
achievement of the SLA 
post-conditions.  
G_Participant_Participant 
Argument  
This claim states that the 
pre-condition is satisfied 
by a participant. This is 
made in the form of an 
away goal that references 
a goal supported by 
argument and evidence 
within a Participant 
Argument. This is 
provided by the SoaML 
SLA pre-conditions.  
Collaborations  G_Service_SLA_postconditions_Service Argument 
Module and G_Participant_participant Argument are 
away goals that provide the post/pre conditions 
necessary to satisfy the safety requirements (contract) 
within the SLA service of an SOA system.  
  J_SLA_Contract provides the justification for the 
satisfaction of the pre-conditions allocated to 
participants as a means for meeting the SLA post-
156 
 
conditions. 
Applicability This pattern is applicable wherever safety arguments need 
to be established for the use of SLA within an SOA safety 
application. It assumes that both post- and pre- conditions 
are explicitly defined for the SLA. 
Consequences 
 
After instantiating this pattern, the goals referenced in the 
away goals will be developed within the Participant 
Argument Module (G_Participant_H).  
Implementation Possible problems include attempting to apply the SLA 
contract pattern to a system which is not based on SOA, 
attempting to apply the SLA contract pattern without 
having defined safety contracts and attempting to apply the 
SLA contract pattern without sufficient SLA information 
from the SoaML/BPMN models. 
Examples  See the two case studies in this thesis. 
Known Uses See examples above. 
Related Patterns  Participant Argument Pattern. 
Table 21: SLA Contract Argument Pattern 
5.7.4 Participant Argument 
This pattern provides the justification basis for the behaviour of a Participant 
in meeting SLA pre-conditions allocated to it. Table 22 shows the 
documentation of the Participant Argument pattern in GSN. The instantiation of 
this pattern starts with the goal G_Participant_H, which is a claim that the 
participant meets its allocated pre-conditions. The structure of the pattern is 
driven by the results of the SFA. The claim in G_Participant_H is made in the 
context of the Participant definition (specified in BPMN) and the allocated SLA 
pre-conditions (in the SoaML model). The strategy adopted is to argue over 
each SLA pre-condition allocated to the participant. The sub-claims 
demonstrate how the allocated SLA pre-conditions referenced in the SLA 
Contract Argument Pattern (G_Participant _Participant away goal) are satisfied. 
The strategy adopted here is to argue over the identified Participant failure 
modes which are associated with tasks and their flow interactions. This is made 
in the context of the description of the Tasks and their interactions form BPMN 
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model and the Participant failure modes (from the SFA results). A Participant is 
defined in the form of a BPMN pool that includes tasks and flows. The rest of 
the argument is used to show how the participant failure modes are mitigated 
by appealing to the results of the SFA. 
 
Participant Argument Pattern  
Author Abdulaziz Al-Humam  
Created 08/07/2014 Last Modified 04/07/2015 
Intent The intent of this pattern is to provide justification for the 
participant behaviour and to create an argument regarding 
the safety of the flow between the tasks implemented by a 
participant in an SOA system. The safety of the participant’s 
behaviour is argued from the perspectives of both the SLA 
pre-conditions and the participant interaction flow. 
Also Known As Interaction behaviour pattern 
Motivation The motivation for this pattern is the need to justify the 
behaviour of a participant, as implemented in the form of 
tasks and flows, and to demonstrate how it satisfies its 
allocated SLA pre-conditions. 
Structure  
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Participants G_Participant_H The objective of the argument 
is to provide sufficient support 
for the claim that the 
{Participant} fulfils its {SLA 
pre-conditions}. The 
information is provided by the 
BPMN model (pool) and the 
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SoaML model (SLA pre-
conditions). 
C_Participant This context node defines the 
by the BPMN model: pool. 
C_Participant_Precon This context node provides a 
description of the SLA pre-
conditions allocated to the 
Participant. This is provided 
by the SoaML model. 
J_Participants_Tasks This explains that a Participant 
is defined in the form of a 
BPMN pool. 
St_Participant The argument strategy is 
based on addressing all of the 
pre-conditions allocated to the 
Participant.  
G_Participant This claim is instantiated for 
each pre-condition, and states 
that a pre-condition allocated 
to the participant as a safety 
requirement is satisfied. This 
is provided by the SoaML: SLA 
pre-conditions. 
St_Participant_Tasks This node describes the 
mitigation strategies for the 
identified failure modes of the 
{Participant}. This is provided 
by the BPMN model.  
C_Participant_FM This context node provides a 
description of the failure 
modes associated with the 
Participant. This is provided 
by SFA: failure modes.  
G_Participant_FM This node provides a claim 
that each failure mode is 
sufficiently mitigated. This is 
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provided by SFA: deviation. 
C_Participant_Hz_DSSRs This node refers to the safety 
requirements associated with 
the Failure mode that 
contributes to service 
hazardous failures. This is 
provided by {DSSRs: SFA}. 
St_Task_Mitg This node describes an 
argument strategy by which 
the adequacy of each 
mitigation is demonstrated. 
The mitigations are 
implemented from SFA:  
mitigation. 
G_Participant_Task_Mitg This claim considers the 
adequacy of the selected 
mitigation from SFA: Failure 
modes. 
C_Participant_Tasks_Mitg This context node defines the 
list of tactics to provide 
suitable mitigation for a 
specific failure mode: e.g high-
integrity, redundancy, 
diversity and 
monitoring/checking.  
This information is provided 
by SFA:  mitigation of SFA. 
Collaborations  C_Participant and C_Participant_Precon provide 
necessary context for the system’s interaction with the 
Participant, specifically for SLA pre-conditions. 
 G_Participant_H and G_Participant argue that the pre-
conditions relating to {Participant} have been satisfied.  
 C_Participant_FM provide necessary context for 
identifying the interaction and the failure modes 
associated with the Participant. 
 G_Participant_Task_Mitg considers the suitable 
mitigations used for addressing Participant failure 
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modes.  
Applicability This pattern is applicable wherever participant safety 
arguments need to be established for the use of a SOA-
based safety critical system.  
Consequences 
 
After instantiating this pattern, one undeveloped goal will 
remain: G_Participant_Task_Mitg. The argument supporting 
this must be developed, based on more detailed 
implementation information. 
Implementation Possible problems include attempting to apply the pattern 
without sufficient design information (implementation) 
from the  SoaML/BPMN models. 
Examples  See the two case studies in this thesis. 
Known Uses  See examples above. 
Related Patterns  None provided at this stage. 
Table 22: Participant Argument Pattern 
5.8 Healthcare Case study: SOA Safety Case 
This section presents the results of applying the SOA safety argument pattern 
catalogue outlined in the previous section to the healthcare case study 
introduced in Chapter 4. The purpose of this part of the case study is to 
examine how the SOA safety argument pattern catalogue can help in 
communicating the justification for the safety of the ambulance system and its 
associated services. It also shows how the analysis process applied to the 
healthcare case study in Chapter 4 relates to the overall structure of the SOA 
safety argument. The case study will also be used to illustrate how the safety 
requirements and mitigations arising from the analysis can be used to define 
the safety argument contracts based on the SLAs defined during the design.  
The description of the system and the system design including all design 
models are taken directly from the Health and Social Care Information Centre 
(148) which was presented in Chapter 4. This section considers the safety 
arguments for one specific service: Dispatch Ambulance. Additional safety 
arguments are described in Appendix D. 
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5.8.1 Ambulance Service System Safety Argument 
The safety case for the Ambulance Service System starts with an instantiation of the Top Argument pattern. The Top Argument includes 
a service-directed argument, which covers the main safety claims concerning the ambulance service system services.  
 
Figure 46: Top Argument Module for Dispatch Ambulance 
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The results of the instantiation are shown Figure 46. G_SOA presents the claim 
about the overall safety of the Ambulance Service System in the context of the 
use case, i.e. the transportation of pregnant women (C_SOA_Env) and the list of 
services covered (C_SOA). The strategy decomposes the argument over all the 
identified services within the system, based on the SOA specification defined in 
SoaML. For each service, the argument makes a claim that the service is 
acceptably safe. This is done by means of creating an away goal for each service 
which references the corresponding Service Argument module. In this section, 
we only focus on the argument for the Dispatch Ambulance service. 
5.8.2 Service Argument for the Dispatch Ambulance Service 
The argument structure in Figure 47 shows the instantiation of the Service 
Argument pattern for the Dispatch Ambulance service. The instantiation is 
based on the  result of the SHA analysis of the Dispatch Ambulance service we 
presented in Chapter 4. The top-level claim for the Dispatch Ambulance states 
that the service is acceptably safe, in the context of the SOA specification 
defined in SoaML CollaborationUse. The strategy argues over all the identified 
service hazards within the service based on the analysis carried out in the SHA. 
This strategy is presented in the context of the results of the modelling and SHA 
for this service. 
The argument focuses on three failure modes which have hazardous effects, 
which have been generated from the SHA results, namely: 
 Ambulance not dispatched;  
 Ambulance dispatched later than intended;  
 Ambulance dispatched to the wrong address.  
The argumentation strategy adopted for each failure mode is to argue that the 
failure mode has been mitigated to the required level of integrity. For example, 
the failure ‘Ambulance not dispatched’ is mitigated by active monitoring and 
cross-checking between requested and dispatched ambulances. The mitigation 
claim is then defined in the form of a safety contract post-condition that is 
supported by the SLA Contract Argument. 
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C_Service_Desc
Dispatch ambulance: 
SoaML 
CollaborationUse
St_Service_Hz
Argument structured based 
on mitigating service 
hazardous failures
C_Service_Hz
Service hazardous failures: SHA
- Ambulance not dispatched
- Ambulance dispatched later than 
intended
- Ambulance dispatched to the wrong 
address
G_Service_N_Hz
Ambulance not dispatched is 
mitigated to satisfy the 
Service Safety Requirement
J
J_Service_N_SLA
Mitigation is allocated to 
the SLA post-condition
G_Service_N_SLA_Postconditions
Active monitoring and cross-
checking between requested and 
dispatched ambulances is satisfied   
G_Service_W_Mitg
Early address cross-checking and 
confirmation between requested 
and dispatched ambulances is 
satisfied to the required integrity
G_Service_I_Mitg
Active monitoring of timing 
targets and strategies for recovery 
from timing-related failures is 
satisfied to the required integrity
G_Service_N_Mitg
Active monitoring and cross-
checking between requested and 
dispatched ambulances is  satisfied to 
the required integrity 
 G_Service_I_Hz
Ambulance dispatched later 
than intended is mitigated to 
satisfy the Service Safety 
Requirement
G_Service_W_Hz
Ambulance dispatched to the 
wrong address is mitigated to 
satisfy the Service Safety 
Requirement
St_Service_N_Mitg
Argument based on active 
monitoring and cross-
checking between requested 
and dispatched ambulances
St_Service_I_Mitg
Argument based on active 
monitoring of timing targets 
and strategies for recovery 
from timing-related failures
St_Service_W_Mitg
Argument based on early 
address cross-checking and 
confirmation between requested 
and dispatched ambulances
C_Service_N_Mitg
Mitigation: SHA 
Active monitoring and cross-
checking between requested 
and dispatched ambulances
C_Service_I_Mitg
Active monitoring of timing 
targets and strategies for 
recovery from timing-
related failures
C_Service_W_Mitg
Early address cross-
checking and confirmation 
between requested and 
dispatched ambulances
C_Service_N_Class
Required integrity 
based on Major 
severity 
C_Service_I_Class
Required integrity 
based on Major 
severity 
C_Service_W_Class
Required integrity 
based on Major 
severity 
St_Service_N_SLA
Argument by enforcing active 
monitoring and cross-checking 
between requested and 
dispatched ambulances in SLA 
1
St_Service_I_SLA
Argument by enforcing active 
monitoring of timing targets and 
strategies for recovery from 
timing-related failures in the SLA 
2
St_Service_W_SLA
Argument by enforcing Early 
address cross-checking and 
confirmation between requested 
and dispatched ambulances in the 
SLA 3J
J_Service_I_SLA
Mitigation is allocated to 
the SLA post-condition
J
J_Service_W_SLA
Mitigation is allocated to 
the SLA post-condition
G_Service_I_SLA_Postconditions
Active monitoring of timing 
targets and strategies for 
recovery from timing-related 
failures is satisfied   
G_Service_W_SLA_Postconditions
Early address cross-checking and 
confirmation between requested 
and dispatched ambulances is 
satisfied   
Spinal
SLA Contract1
SLA of Active monitoring and 
cross-checking between requested 
and dispatched ambulances
Spinal
SLA Contract2
SLA of active monitoring of timing 
targets and strategies for 
recovery from timing-related 
failures
Spinal
SLA Contract3
SLA of early address cross-
checking and confirmation 
between requested and 
dispatched ambulances
C_Service_I_Hz_SSRs
Service Safety Requirement: 
The failure mode “ambulance 
dispatched later than 
intended” shall be prevented 
or mitigated 
G_Service_Hz
Dispatch Ambulance is 
acceptably safe
C_Service_N_Hz_SSRs
Service Safety Requirement: SHA 
The failure mode “ambulance not 
dispatched” shall be prevented or 
mitigated.
C_Service_N_SLA
SLA 1
C_Service_W_Hz_SSRs
Service Safety Requirement: 
The failure mode “ambulance 
dispatched to the wrong 
address” shall be prevented or 
mitigated. 
C_Service_I_SLA
SLA 2
C_Service_W_SLA
SLA 3
 
Figure 47: Service Argument for Dispatch Ambulance 
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5.8.3 SLA Contact Argument for the Dispatch Ambulance Service  
 
 
Figure 48: SLA contact Argument for Dispatch Ambulance 
Figure 48 shows the instantiation of the SLA Contract Argument pattern for the 
Dispatch Ambulance service. The top-level away goal states that active 
monitoring and cross-checking between requested and dispatched ambulances 
are satisfied. These correspond to the post-conditions of the SLA associated 
with the Dispatch Ambulance service. The argument strategy is to argue over 
the satisfaction of the set of SLA pre-conditions. This takes the form of away 
goals that reference claims stated in the Participant Argument for the 
participants satisfying the SLA pre-conditions. For example, the away goal 
which points to the Call-Center argument module references a claim in that 
module which states that the Call-centre sends a request to the ambulance 
crew and then monitors its status. 
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5.8.4 Participant Argument for the Call-Center Participant 
Figure 49 shows the instantiation of the Participant Argument pattern for the 
Call-Center Participant. The argument is based on the satisfaction of the pre-
conditions allocated to the Call-Center Participant via the SLA in which the 
Participant is involved; namely, that the Call-Center sends a request to 
ambulance crew and monitors its status. The argument then provides a 
justification for how the above claims are supported based on the results of the 
SFA and modelling in BPMN.  
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G_Participant_H
Call_center fulfils its 
SLA pre-conditions
C_Participant
Call_ centre: 
BPMN Pool
St_Participant
Argument by addressing 
SLA pre-conditions 
allocated to the participant 
C_Participant_Preco
n
Call_center SLA pre-
conditions: SoaML 
SLA
G_Participant_FM
No request for ambulance 
received is mitigated to 
satisfy the allocated DSSRs
St_N_Participant_Tasks
Argument based on 
identified participant 
failure modes 
J
J_N_Participants_Tasks
A participant is defined as 
a BPMN pool that includes 
tasks and flows
G_Participant_FM_late
Request arrived later than 
intended is mitigated to 
satisfy the allocated DSSRs
St_Tasks_Mitg_late
Argument based on 
monitoring of timing 
targets and strategies for 
recovery
C_Participant_Task_Mitg_la
te
Monitoring for timing 
failure and developing 
recovery strategies 
G_Participant_Task_Mitg_late
Monitoring for timing failure and 
developing recovery strategies 
provides adequate mitigation to 
request arrived later than intended
G_N_Participant
Call-center requesting an 
ambulance and monitoring its 
status are satisfied
St_Tasks_Mitg1
Argument based on use of 
redundancy in data sources 
by fitting an additional flow 
to the request
C_Participant_Hz_DSSRs
DSSR:The failure mode “no 
request for ambulance 
received” shall be 
prevented or mitigated.
G_Participant_Task_Mitg
Use of redundancy in data sources by 
fitting an additional flow to the request 
provides adequate mitigation to no 
request for ambulance received 
  
G_Participant_FM_value
Incorrect request is 
mitigated to satisfy the 
allocated DSSRs
St_Tasks_Mitg_value
Argument based on applying 
diversity via programming 
solutions to detect and reject 
improper values and fault 
containment
G_Participant_Task_Mitg_value
Applying diversity via programming 
solutions to detect and reject 
improper values and fault 
containment provides adequate 
mitigation to incorrect request
C_N_Participant_FM
Participant failure modes: SFA 
- No request for ambulance received
- Uncommanded request for 
ambulance received
- Request arrived later than intended
- Incorrect request
C_Participant_Hz_DSSRs_Late
DSSR: The failure mode 
“request arrived later than 
intended” shall be prevented 
or mitigated.
C_Participant_Task_Mitg
Use of redundancy in data 
sources by fitting an 
additional flow to the 
request
C_Participant_Task_Mitg_value
Applying diversity via 
programming solutions to 
detect and reject improper 
values and fault containment
C_Participant_Hz_DSSRs_
value
DSSR: The failure mode 
“incorrect request” shall 
be prevented or 
mitigated.
 
Figure 49: Participant Argument for Dispatch Ambulance  
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5.9 Summary: 
In this chapter, we have presented a catalogue of safety argument patterns for 
justifying the use of SOA in safety-critical applications. The overall safety 
argument is created in a modular manner to ensure a clear correspondence 
between the structure of the safety argument and the organisation of the SOA 
design. These argument patterns link the safety argument for the SOA with the 
results of the modelling in SoaML and BPMN and the results of the safety 
analysis on SHA and SFA. Finally, we illustrate the use of the safety argument 
patterns for one of the services within the healthcare case study. 
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Chapter 6 
 
6. Evaluation 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the evaluation of the SOA Safety Assurance 
Framework developed in this research. It revisits the research hypothesis and 
explains the means for evaluation used in this thesis. Further, the chapter 
provides the details of the second case study we performed and the results of 
the evaluation with respect to the research contributions.  
6.2. Research Hypothesis 
The hypothesis proposed in this thesis is as follows: 
Integrated architectural modelling and analysis of safety-critical service-
oriented systems provides a traceable, consistent and systematic means for 
assuring the safety of these systems. 
Below is an explanation of the main terms used in the hypothesis.  
• Integrated: safety analysis and design decisions evolve together; 
• Traceable: forward and backward model-based traceability between 
design and safety analysis is provided; 
• Consistent: design features are reflected in the safety analysis and the 
safety assurance and vice versa; 
• Systematic: a methodical approach to performing safety assurance is 
proposed;  
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• Assuring: the approach provides an explicit means for reasoning about 
the safety properties and system behaviour. 
The above terms define the basis for the criteria used for evaluation of the SOA 
Safety Assurance Framework. 
This hypothesis is supported by the following four contributions made as part 
of this PhD research:  
 Identification and configuration of SOA modelling notations, namely 
SoaML and BPMN, based on two criteria: coverage of the structure and 
behaviour of the services which is deemed suitable for the safety 
analysis of SOA. 
 Development of safety analysis techniques for SOA, namely SHA and 
SFA, which can be used to examine the hazardous failures of services 
and the failure behaviour of lower-level implementations.  
 Development of the concept of modular safety cases for the assurance of 
safety-critical SOAs, promoting correspondence between the structure 
of the SOA and the organisation of the modular safety case. This generic 
argument approach is defined in the form of an SOA Safety Argument 
Pattern Catalogue, which can be instantiated to produce safety 
arguments for specific SOA-based systems. 
 Implementation of tool-support that provides automated capabilities for 
building the SOA models, applying the safety analysis and building the 
safety case for the system.  
6.3. Means of Evaluation 
Two case studies have been carried out during this research. The first case 
study, which was presented in Chapters 4 and 5, is based on the healthcare 
domain. The second, which is presented later in this chapter, is based on the oil 
and gas domain. The research was also evaluated through a peer-reviewed 
publication and semi-structured interviews with practitioners. 
6.3.1. Case Studies 
The two case studies provided the primary means for evaluating the technical 
criteria related to the research hypothesis, namely that the proposed approach 
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should be ‘integrated’, ‘traceable’, ‘consistent’, ‘systematic’ and ‘assuring’. These 
are qualitative criteria and the results of examining these criteria are discussed 
in Section 6.6. The second case study in particular provides the basis for 
evaluating the feasibility of the SOA Safety Assurance Framework developed in 
this thesis. 
The two domains of the case studies, healthcare and oil and gas, are typically 
categorised as safety-critical and tend to be structured around services. 
Nevertheless, they have important differences. Safety in Oil and Gas is well 
established and is heavily regulated. The environment also tends to be 
relatively well understood. Safety in healthcare on the other hand presents 
different kinds of challenges. The environment is harder to control and safety 
as a discipline, especially for IT systems, is not well defined (149). The concept 
of engineering risk in healthcare is not typically subjected to systematic safety 
analysis, as compared to Oil and Gas. Each case study provides a different 
treatment of risk associated with services in the corresponding domain. In 
healthcare for example, safety analysis tends to be high level and not as 
detailed as in a traditional safety-intensive domain such as Oil and Gas. 
6.3.2. Semi-Structured Interviews 
In order to provide an independent evaluation of our approach, we conducted 
semi-structured interviews with domain experts from both the healthcare and 
oil and gas domains. The results of this evaluation are discussed in section 6.5 
below. 
6.3.3. Peer Review 
The technical accuracy of the research was also evaluated through a peer-
reviewed publication published in the Medical Cyber Physical Systems 
Workshop, 2014. 
The work was also evaluated by means of presentations and interactions with 
members of the High-Integrity Systems Engineering (HISE) research group at 
York. 
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6.4. Industrial Case Study: Natural Gas Processing 
This section introduces our second case study, in which the SOA Safety 
Assurance Framework was used to model an industrial service-based system. 
The case study was intended to demonstrate the application and feasibility of 
the safety analysis methods and safety case approach defined in this thesis. 
6.4.1. Aim 
The main aim of this industrial case study, based on an example from the oil 
and gas domain, is to examine the feasibility of applying our SOA Safety 
Assurance Framework in the light of the technical criteria identified in the 
research hypothesis, namely: ‘integration’, ‘traceability’, ‘consistency’, 
‘systematicness’ and ‘assurance’. The results of the application of the SOA 
Safety Assurance Framework will be compared to the traditional safety 
analysis approach based on HAZOP, the primary safety analysis technique used 
in the oil and gas industry. 
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6.4.2. System Description 
 
Figure 50 Overview of Gas Plant Processes (150) 
The case study is based on part of a system that is used to produce liquid gas in 
a Natural Gas Processing Plant. Natural Gas Processing is a commercially 
sensitive activity, and although this case study was developed in collaboration 
with a chemical engineer from the oil and gas domain, the system and plant 
used in this case study do not refer to any actual industrial systems. Some of 
the system descriptions and analyses used in this case study are based on 
information in the published literature, mainly (150) and (151).  
Figure 50 describes the Natural Gas Processing system, which comprises seven 
main services. These have been used to provide the detailed organisation of the 
SOA system:   
(1) Supply Natural Gases;  
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(2) Separate Gases;  
(3) Absorb Water;  
(4) Heat Exchange;    
(5) Separate Gas from Liquid;   
(6)  Send Emergency Signal; 
(7) Call Emergency Number. 
 
The Gas Processing Plant contains many processing units that provide facilities 
to receive the natural gas, filter it, separate it, cool it, and store the gas and 
liquids in a tank for shipment. The functions of the Plant comprise primary 
processes such as gas treatment, dehydration, acid gas removal, as well as 
heating and cooling media such as steam, cooling water and chilled water.  
The gas is provided from the wells to a treatment unit. The treatment unit 
separates the gas into acid and sweet gas. The acid gas contains hydrogen 
sulphide (H2S) and carbon dioxide (CO2). The sweet gas contains C1, C2, C3, C4, 
C5 and H2O in gas phases. The gas stream enters the dehydration unit at a 
temperature of 120°F where it first goes to dehydration unit. This unit contains 
a chemical catalyst that helps in removing the water from the gas. The objective 
is to avoid freezing the gas stream inside the pipe. The performance of the 
dehydration unit is monitored by a pressure transmitter. A transmitter is a 
device that converts measurements from a sensor to a signal which is received 
when the high pressure inside the unit results in changes to the catalysis 
process. After the water is removed, the gas goes to a cooling unit where it is 
cooled from 120°F to –40°F. The change in temperature is monitored by 
temperature transmitters.  A transmitter (pressure or temperature) should 
send a signal to the control operator inside the control room, allowing him to 
monitor the pressure or temperature changes. For any change above or below 
a pre-defined limit, the control operator should call a supervising operator to 
decide on any remedial action needed. On leaving the cooling unit, the gas is 
passed to a separator unit to separate the gas from the liquid. The drop in 
temperature helps to condense the gas into liquid form. The liquid stream is 
called liquid gas. After processing, the liquid gas is shipped to an 
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external chemical manufacturing company, whereas the gas is supplied to an 
electricity company.   
The performance of the unit as a whole is monitored by a human control 
operator, who monitors indications of pressure and temperature levels in the 
gas and liquid gas which are sent through transmitter instrument devices from 
the processing area to the operator’s computer. The control operator is 
responsible for detecting process changes and for advising the outside operator 
accordingly through a radio communication channel. 
In the event of a gas leak, the control operator is expected to detect a 
sharp increase in the temperature based on the cooler’s indicating that no gas 
is passing through. The upstream emergency isolation valve should close 
automatically, since it has a logic where any sharp increase in temperature 
should lead to the valve closing. This is to avoid the continuation of gas leakage 
from the source. The leaking gas is a fuel and any spark of ignition is likely to 
result in a fire. Next, the control operator should call the emergency centre, 
notifying the fire, medical and security services. The fire services are on 
continuous standby, and should be ready to extinguish any potential fire 
resulting from the leak. Similarly, the ambulance team should be ready to 
provide the necessary medical support, since there is a potential for people to 
inhale toxic gas which could result in death or health complications. The 
security team are responsible for traffic control and for ensuring that 
authorized people can access the emergency location (where the leak took 
place) (150). 
6.4.3. Overview of Oil and Gas Safety 
Before applying our SOA Safety Assurance Framework to the natural gas 
processing system, we will use this section to introduce the key safety factors 
of the oil and gas domain. 
An early activity in any typical safety analysis is the identification of hazards. 
The COMAH Safety Report Assessment Manual (SRAM) (152) provides some 
indication of the types of hazards relevant to the oil and gas industry and 
methods used to identify them. The principal methods they identify are: 
 Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP); 
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 Safety review and studies of the causes of past major accidents and 
incidents’ 
 Industry standards or bespoke checklists for hazard identification; 
 Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA); 
 Job safety analysis (e.g. task analysis); 
 Human error identification methods. 
According to the SRAM, the analysis should first develop a clear understanding 
of the domain (site operations), the materials involved and the process 
conditions. Secondly, it must identify the hazards to people on-site and off-site 
and to the environment. Finally, there must be an analysis of different ways in 
which the hazards can be eliminated, reduced in scale, realised and controlled 
(153). 
6.4.4. Accidents and Hazards Identification 
It is a high-level safety requirement for the process that the hazard 
identification exercise should identify all foreseeable major accidents. In order 
to make the risk assessment feasible, it is possible to group potential accident 
scenarios together for analysis. If this is the case, the grouping should be 
conservative in terms of the risk associated with each group, and should 
include worst-case scenarios. We apply this principle in our case study by 
identifying and classifying the accidents, hazards and failure modes. The main 
types of accident in this domain are: Explosion, Serious Damage, Major Leak 
and Fire.  
6.4.4.1 Accident Identification in the Oil and Gas Domain 
Explosion can be defined as a quick increase in volume and release of energy in 
an extreme manner, generally with the generation of high temperatures or 
overpressure and the release of gases or liquids (154). Large explosions are 
capable of causing immediate critical damage, e.g. BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill and offshore drilling in the Gulf of Mexico (155).  
Accidents of the serious damage type can happen when corrosive chemicals are 
used in equipment which is not designed to tolerate them. Corrosion is a 
condition which means that an agent that can destroy and damage other 
substances when it comes into contact with them, e.g. mixing incompatible 
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chemicals because of pressure reversal (incompatible materials may be mixed 
with each other, leading to corrosion of the vessel containing them).  
Major fire is defined as a quick oxidation of a material in the exothermic 
chemical process of combustion, releasing heat, light, and various reactive 
products (154). One recent example of a major fire accident is the fire at the 
Gregory natural gas plant in Texas in 2013, which resulted in a large blaze and 
operational loss (156).   
In the gas domain, ‘Major Leak’ is defined as an escape of natural gas from a 
pipeline or other containments to a living area or any other where the gas must 
not be present (154). For example, the Bhopal disaster was a leak of gas and 
other chemicals which took place at a plant in India in 1984, resulting in the 
exposure of up to 15,000 people to an extremely harmful chemical.  
6.4.4.2 Hazard Identification 
Explosions may occur in many different ways. The contributory hazards can 
typically be classified in terms of factors such as High pressure and Blockage. 
Failure modes can occur in many different environments and configurations 
(157):  
 chemical reaction inside the vessel, blocked outlets (blocked-in pump 
and blocked-in compressor); 
 loss of cooling capacity (failure of air-cooled heat exchanger, failure of 
water-cooled heat exchanger); 
 abnormal heat input (excessive heat added); 
 electrical power failure (electrical power may lead to high pressure e.g. 
loss of power will cause the vapours to pass thought the condenser 
without being cooled or condensed, thus creating a high-pressure 
situation and control failure or valve failure).  
One noteworthy cause of high pressure is close instantaneous evaporation of 
liquid through contact with hotter liquid, which can result in an explosion. This 
may occur if liquid gas comes into contact with water in areas where there is a 
potential ignition source (a key focus in our case study). The very high liquid 
gas pressure can lead to an explosion. Such an event might occur during liquid 
gas transfer between an onshore terminal and the liquid gas carrier (157). 
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Serious damage may be caused by hazards such as incorrect valve closure or a 
failure to close valves when required (mainly human error). Another potential 
example is the supply line containing water that is either not flowing or is 
flowing very slowly. In this case, an ambient temperature of below freezing 
point can cause the water in the line to freeze. This may create serious damage 
within the line where the flow is stopped.  
Major fire can also be caused in many different ways. The hazards associated 
with fire can be classified based on the flammability of the gas/liquid mixtures. 
If air enters a process involving flammable hydrocarbons and/or reducing 
chemicals then a serious accident could happen, or could occur afterwards as a 
in the presence of an ignition source. For example, if air enters the process 
through open lines and vessels, this could result in unwanted oxidation 
processes and air ingress, leading to formation of an explosive mixture (157). 
6.4.5. SOA Modelling 
In this section, we apply SoaML and BPMN to modelling the structure and 
behaviour of the Gas Processing system. The diagram in Figure 51 provides a 
structural description of the system in terms of its services and participants. 
This is defined using the SoaML Services Architecture diagram. Specifically, it 
focuses on the Natural Gas Processing System architecture with eight 
participants that are connected together by seven services.  
 
Figure 51: SoaML Service Architectures Model for Gas Processing  
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Figures 3 to 6 show the different types of interface that the SoaML standard 
(158) provides for gas modelling (Consumers/Providers). It shows the 
interfaces associated with the services. The consumer and provider participant 
roles are modelled based on the defined interfaces. This provides detailed 
traceability between the SoaML models and the behavioural model in BPMN 
where each SoaML interface operation is mapped into a BPMN task. 
 
Figure 52: Interfaces with Operations for the Supply Natural Gases Service 
 
Figure 53: Interfaces with Operations for the Separate Gases Service 
 
Figure 54: Interfaces with Operations for the Absorb Water Service 
 
 
Figure 55: Interfaces with Operations for Heat Exchange and Separate Gas from Liquid 
Services 
Figure 56 presents a more detailed behavioural model of the SOA design using 
BPMN, with the core activities and execution flow shown as processes. For 
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example, eight BPMN pools are created to capture the tasks allocated to the 
participants in the SoaML model in Figure 51. Furthermore, the BPMN model 
describes in more detail the treatment of sweet gas through providing liquid 
gas and steam gas.   
In the next section, we describe how the SoaML and BPMN models provide the 
basis for performing the SOA safety analysis using SHA and SFA. 
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Figure 56:  Gas Processing BPMN Model 
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6.4.6. SOA Safety Analysis 
In this section, we show how we applied the SHA and SFA methods to the 
Natural Gas Processing case study that we introduced in Section 6.4.2. The 
objective of this part of the case study is to illustrate the use of the methods 
and provide an evaluation of the feasibility of the analysis approach. 
6.4.6.1. SHA 
In this section, we provide an overview of the four main services used in the 
case study with their SLAs and describe how SHA is applied to the services 
within the system. The services used in the case study are as follows:  
 Absorb Water; 
 Heat Exchange; 
 Separate Gas from Liquid; 
 Send Emergency Signal. 
The following subsections provide an overview of these services and of the 
analysis results. 
Absorb Water Service 
In its gaseous form, natural gas contains H2O. When converting to a liquid, the 
H2O levels in natural gas should be decreased to less than 1% in a physical 
absorption process in which the gas is contacted through a liquid that 
preferentially absorbs the water vapour. The liquid solvent must have the 
following properties in order for the absorption process to be completed 
(150):  
 a high affinity for water and a low affinity for hydrocarbons; 
 a low volatility at the absorption temperature to reduce vaporisation 
losses; 
 a low viscosity for ease of pumping and good contact between the gas 
and liquid phases; 
 a good thermal stability to prevent decomposition during regeneration; 
and 
 a low potential for corrosion. 
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In practice, glycols such as ethylene glycol (EG), diethylene glycol (DEG), 
triethylene glycol (TEG), tetraethylene glycol (TREG) and propylene glycol are 
the most commonly used absorbents. Triethylene glycol is the glycol of choice 
in most instances.  
 
Figure 57: Schematic of a Typical Glycol Dehydrator Unit (159) 
Figure 57 shows an example of the use of glycol for H2O absorption. The wet 
gas passes through an inlet scrubber to remove solids and free liquids, and 
then enters the bottom of the glycol dehydrator. Gas flows upward in the 
dehydrator, while lean glycol solution (glycol with little or no water) flows 
down over the trays. Rich glycol absorbs water and leaves at the bottom of the 
column while dry gas exits at the top. The rich glycol flows through a heat 
exchanger at the top of the still where it is heated and provides the coolant for 
the still condenser. Then the warm solution goes to a flash tank, where the 
dissolved gas is removed. The rich glycol from the flash tank is further heated 
by heat exchange with the still bottoms, and then becomes the feed to the still. 
The still produces water at the top and a lean glycol at the bottom, which goes 
to a surge tank before being returned to the contactor (150).  
The catalyst works like a sponge (known for their exceptional ability to absorb 
water).  The gas stream enters the dehydration unit at a temperature of 120 °F 
and first goes to dehydration unit. This unit contains a catalyst that helps to 
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remove the water from the gas. The water is removed is to avoid freezing the 
gas stream inside the pipe. The performance of the dehydration unit is 
monitored through a pressure transmitter, where the high pressure will result 
in changing the catalysis reaction inside the unit. After the water is removed, 
the gas will pass by the analyser to measure that there is no water through the 
pipe. An analyser is an instrument which conducts chemical analysis on 
samples or sample streams. When the gas has less than 1% water content, the 
system can accept it. The gas will leave the analyser at a temperature of 120°F 
passing through the pipe to the cooling unit, where it is cooled from 120 to -40 
°F. The change in temperature is monitored through a temperature 
transmitter.  
The Natural Gas Processing System architecture in Figure 51 shows where the 
Absorb Water service is used. Two Participants, the Dehydration Unit and 
Cooling Unit, have been specified, their interactions captured by the Absorb 
Water service contract. These two participants represent the roles that are 
connected to this service. Table 23 shows the SLA for the Absorb Water 
service. For instance, the Participants, Cooling Unit and Dehydration Unit, 
respectively represent the consumer and provider for the service.  
Attribute Description Source 
Name Absorb Water SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture for the natural gas 
processing system 
Provider   The Dehydration Unit  that provides 
the service 
SoaML Participants 
Architecture for the natural gas 
processing system 
Consumer  The Cooling Unit that uses the service SoaML Participants 
Architecture for the natural gas 
processing system 
Start time The point at which the Dehydration 
Unit is requested to Absorb Water 
(e.g. 9:00:00 AM) 
SoaML ServicesArchitecture for 
the natural gas processing 
system 
Due time The end time of the requested 
Absorption process (e.g. 9:00:30 AM) 
SoaML ServicesArchitecture for 
the natural gas processing 
system 
Duration 30 seconds SoaML ServicesArchitecture for 
the natural gas processing 
system 
 (Pre-
condition) 
Receiving the requested information 
including the amount of water, 
percentage removal required, and 
SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture for the natural gas 
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 brief details of the condition of the 
sweet gas. 
processing system 
 (Post-
condition) 
Water absorbed and content less than 
1%.  Signal sent by transmitter at the 
expected arrival time 
SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture for the natural gas 
processing system 
Contribution 
to Safety 
Overall severity is very severe (see 
SHA results) 
SHA 
 Table 23:  Absorb Water SLA 
Table 24 shows an extract from the SHA results for the ‘Absorb Water’ service. 
The analysis establishes the potential safety criticality of the ‘Absorb Water’ 
service, based on the severity of the worst credible effects of the identified 
failure modes. As a result of the analysis, stringent safety requirements 
allocated are defined and allocated to the ‘Absorb Water’ service. 
Service Failure 
Modes 
Effects Severity SSRs Mitigation 
Absorb 
water 
 
Context: 
Absorption 
service 
means 
removing 
the water in 
gas 
dehydration 
processes 
 
Water not 
removed 
(i.e. water 
content is 
more than 
1%) 
Blockage 
in the 
pipeline; 
Damaged 
pipelines; 
Explosion  
(Very 
Severe, 4) 
The failure mode 
“water not 
removed” shall 
be prevented or 
mitigated. 
Active monitoring 
and cross-
checking between 
removing water 
and measuring 
sweet gas through 
the analyser. Also, 
checking the 
catalyst inside the 
dehydration drum 
to ensure it is 
within its service 
life e.g. needs to be 
replaced every 5 
years. 
Water 
removed 
when not 
required 
N/A N/A None. None. 
Water 
removed 
later than 
intended 
Freezing 
inside the 
pipeline; 
Blockage 
in the 
pipeline; 
Damaged 
pipelines; 
Explosion  
(Very 
Severe, 4) 
The failure mode 
“water removed 
later than 
intended” shall 
be prevented or 
mitigated. 
Active monitoring 
of timing targets 
and strategies for 
recovery from 
timing-related 
failures through 
analyser.  
Water 
removed 
earlier 
than 
intended 
N/A N/A None. None. 
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Inaccurate 
percentag
e of water 
removed 
(i.e. water 
content is 
less than 
1%) 
N/A 
No direct 
safety 
effects 
The 
system 
can 
handle 
that 
without 
any effect  
N/A None. None. 
Table 24:  Absorb Water SHA 
The Absorb Water service has two potential hazardous failure modes, namely: 
1- Water not removed (i.e. water content is more than 1%); 
2- Water removed later than intended.          
In the SHA, the failure modes are intended to act as prompts for the analyst, 
and it may be necessary to consider more than one interpretation. For 
example, the first case, “water not removed” (i.e. water content is more than 
1%), the service is not provided, which may lead to a large amount of water 
flooding into the pipeline toward the cooling unit. This water may then freeze 
inside the pipeline, which would block the pipeline and prevent the flow of 
gas. Ultimately, this could lead to damaged pipelines or an explosion. The level 
of severity is measured and classified based on a risk matrix (154). In the oil 
and gas domain, risk is commonly analysed and managed using three risk 
matrices. They are as follows:  
 Consequence Matrix; 
 Frequency Matrix; and  
 Risk Matrix. 
The consequence/severity matrix we use in this case study is depicted in 
Table 25 and is based on four types of potential consequence:  worker safety, 
public safety, environment and economic (154). 
 Worker Safety  Public Safety  Environment Economic 
(Annual) 
Low, 1 Reportable or 
equivalent. 
None. Limited impact 
that is readily 
corrected 
$10.000 to 
$100.00 
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Moderate, 2 Hospitalization 
or lost-time 
injury. 
Minor medical 
attention. 
Report to agencies 
and take remedial 
action. 
$100.000 to 
$1 million 
Severe, 3 Single 
disabling. 
Hospitalization 
or serious injury. 
Some local 
reporting. 
Irreversible 
damage to low-
quality land. Or 
clean-up of 
environmentally 
sensitive areas 
requires 
$1 million 
to $ 10 
million 
Very severe, 4 Fatality or 
multiple 
serious injuries. 
Fatality or 
multiple serious 
injuries. Massive 
negative 
publicity. 
Months of clean-
up work needed in 
environmentally 
sensitive areas 
≥ $10 
million 
 Table 25: Consequence Categories (154) 
Once the consequences associated with an incident have been identified, the 
next step is to estimate the frequency with which the incident might occur. An 
example matrix is shown in Table 26. 
 Frequency Comments 
Low, 1 < 1 in 1.000 years Essentially impossible: “ Once in a blue 
moon “ or “meteor falling out of the sky” 
Moderate, 2 1 in 100 years to 1 in 1.000 
years 
Conceivable – has never happened in the 
facility being analysed but has probably 
occurred in a similar facility somewhere 
else.  
High, 3 1 in years to 1 in 100 years Might happen once in an engineer’s 
career 
Very High, 
4 
> 1 in 10 years It is likely that the event has occurred at 
the site if the facility is more than a few 
years old. 
 Table 26: Example of Frequency Matrix (154) 
Table 27 shows the Risk Ranking Matrix that is used to categorise the level of 
severity/consequences and frequency. The colours should be interpreted as 
follows: red means very high risk, orange means high risk, yellow means 
medium risk and green means low risk.  
 Consequence 
Frequency  Low, 1 Moderate, 2 Severe, 3 Very severe, 4 
Low, 1 D D C C 
Moderate, 2 D C C B 
High, 3 C C B A 
Very High, 4 C B A A 
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Table 27: Risk Ranking Matrix (154) 
Table 28 explains the meaning of the four letters used in the Risk Ranking 
Matrix in Table 27 (154). 
A (Red) Very 
High 
This Level of risk requires prompt action: money is no object, and doing 
nothing is not an option. An “A” risk is urgent. On an operation facility, 
management must implement Immediate Temporary Controls (ITC), 
while longer-term solutions are being investigated. If effective ITCs 
cannot be found, then the operation must be stopped. During the design 
phases of a project, immediate corrective action must be taken in 
response to an “A” finding, regardless of the impact on the schedule and 
budget. 
B (Orange) High Risk must be reduced, but there is time to conduct more detailed analyses 
and investigations. Remediation is expected within, say 90 days. If the 
resolution is expected to take longer than this, then an ITC must be put in 
place. 
C (Yellow) 
Moderate 
The risk is significant. However, cost considerations can be factored into 
the final action taken, as can normal scheduling constraints such as 
availability of spare parts or the timing of facility turnarounds. 
Resolution of the finding must occur within, say, 18 months. An ITC may 
or may not be required. 
D (Green) Low  Requires action but is of low importance. In spite of their low-risk 
ranking, “D” level; risks must be resolved and recommendations 
implemented according to a schedule: they cannot be ignored. (Some 
companies do allow very low-risk ranked findings to be ignored on the 
grounds that they are within the bounds of acceptable risk.) 
If the hazard is associated with a change to an existing process, it is not 
always necessary to conduct a full risk ranking, particularly if the change 
does not make a fundamental alteration to the process itself. In these 
cases, it is enough just to check that the risk value does not shift from one 
square to another if it does not then no further evaluation is needed.  
Table 28: Interpretation of the Letters used in the Risk Ranking Matrix (151) 
In the example of the “water not removed” failure condition, the likelihood of 
there being a problem with the catalyst is low. Nevertheless, the potential 
effects are very high. As a result, the level of impact is considered very severe. 
This is because the whole plant will need to be shut down in order to fix the 
damaged pipe or to explore ways to remove the freezing water.     
Having identified the failure mode and assessed the effect and level of risk, we 
must prevent or mitigate the failure mode “water not removed”. The 
mitigation used is active monitoring and cross-checking between removing 
water and measuring the flow of sweet gas through the analyser. Also, 
monitoring of the level of catalyst inside the dehydration drum is used, e.g. it 
needs to be checked every 5 years which is a typical service life for catalysis. 
This is identified from the design representation for the dehydration drum. 
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Another failure mode is when water is removed later than intended. This may 
lead to water passing within the pipeline, freezing inside the pipeline, blocking 
the pipeline and thus preventing the flow of gas (151). A level catalyst needs to 
be fitted with the level of water. Another possible case is damaged pipelines or 
explosion. The level of the impact considered is very severe. The mitigation 
used is active monitoring of timing targets and strategies for recovery from 
timing-related failures through the analyser. This is used in order to avoid any 
delay in the process flow.  
Heat Exchange (Cooling) Service  
The Heat Exchange service is provided by the Cooling Unit which reduces the 
gas temperature from 120°F to -40°F. If the temperature does not reach the 
intended temperature, it is clear that the gas is not passing to the Cooling Unit. 
This in turn indicates that a gas leak has happened in the pipe. On receiving an 
over-temperature indication, the system should generate an automatic signal 
to shut down the cooling unit.   
Most heat exchangers operating in a gas plant are conventional shell-and-tube 
types and are ideal for steam and hot oil systems where fouling occurs. They 
are relatively inexpensive and easy to maintain because the tube bundle can 
be removed and tubes cleaned or replaced as needed. (150). 
The Engineering Data Book (159) provides extensive details of the exchangers 
used in gas processing. Where the fluids are clean and fouling does not occur, 
such as in gas−gas exchangers, compact heat exchangers are ideal. Wadekar 
(2000) provides a good overview of the more common types.  
In the event of gas leak case, the leak might occur at the beginning of the unit, 
in which case the control operator should notice a sharp increase in the 
temperature after the cooler indicates that no gas is passing through the 
cooler. The upstream emergency isolation valve should close automatically, 
since it has a logic where any sharp increase in temperature is detected and 
the valve closed in response. This is to avoid continuous gas leaking from the 
faulty location. The leaking gas is considered as a fuel and any spark of ignition 
will result in fire. 
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Here we apply SHA for the analysis of the Heat Exchange service. The SLA for 
the service is shown in Table 29 in which the Cooling Unit and the Customer 
respectively represent the consumer and the provider for the service.  
Attribute Description Source 
Name Heat Exchange SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture for the natural gas 
processing system 
Provider  Cooling Unit that provides the 
service 
SoaML Participants Architecture for 
the natural gas processing system 
Consumer  The Customer that uses the 
service 
SoaML Participants Architecture for 
the natural gas processing system 
Start time Point at which the request for 
cooling is sent to the Cooling Unit 
(1:00:00 PM) 
SoaML ServicesArchitecture for the 
natural gas processing system 
Due time The end time of the gas cooling 
process (1:00:30 PM) 
SoaML ServicesArchitecture for the 
natural gas processing system 
Duration 30 seconds SoaML ServicesArchitecture for the 
natural gas processing system 
 (Pre-
condition) 
 
The Cooling Unit has received the 
requested information including 
the amount of gas, percentage of 
cooling, and brief details of the 
condition of the gas situation 
SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture for the natural gas 
processing system 
 (Post-
condition) 
Gas is cooled to the requested 
temperature and signal sent by 
the transmitter indicating the 
expected arrival time for 
Separation 
SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture for the natural gas 
processing system 
Contribution 
to Safety 
Overall severity is very severe 
(see SHA results) 
SHA 
 Table 29:  Heat Exchange SLA 
Table 30 shows an extract from the SHA results for the ‘Heat Exchange’ 
service. The analysis establishes the potential safety criticality of the ‘Heat 
Exchange’ service, based on the severity of the worst credible effects of the 
identified failure modes. As a result of the analysis, stringent safety 
requirements are defined for and allocated to the ‘Heat Exchange’ service. 
Service Failure 
Modes 
Effects Severity SSRs Mitigation 
Heat 
exchange  
Gas not 
cooling 
Gas leak 
within 
pipelines  
(Very 
Severe, 4) 
The failure 
mode “gas not 
cooling” shall 
be prevented 
or mitigated. 
Active monitoring 
and cross-
checking the 
transmitter to 
control the liquid 
level in the 
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 cooling by 
establishing 
setting point in 
the system at -40 
°F and pressure is 
400 psig 
Gas cooling 
when not 
required  
N/A N/A None. None. 
Gas cooling 
later than 
intended 
N/A N/A None. None. 
Gas cooling 
earlier than 
intended 
N/A N/A None. None. 
Inaccurate 
percentage 
of gas 
cooling 
Gas leak 
within 
pipelines 
since no gas 
is passing 
through 
cooler  
 (Very 
Severe, 4) 
The failure 
mode 
“inaccurate 
percentage of 
gas cooling” 
shall be 
prevented or 
mitigated.  
Early 
temperature 
cross-checking of 
the transmitter 
and confirmation 
that the setting 
point in the DCS 
that the cooling 
unit is -40 °F and 
pressure is 400 
psig 
Table 30:  Heat Exchange SHA 
The Heat Exchange service has two potentially hazardous failure modes: 
1- Gas not cooling Water;    
2- Inaccurate percentage of gas cooling. 
The first failure mode may lead to a gas leak the within pipelines, since no gas 
is passing through the cooler. The level of impact of this failure mode is 
classified as Very Severe (4).  
In this service, the transmitter plays an important role in setting the point in 
the Natural Gas Processing system at -40°F, which is essential to cool the gas. 
The proposed mitigation is active monitoring and crosschecking in order to 
deal proactively with this potentially dangerous failure mode. 
Another failure mode is “inaccurate percentage of gas cooling” which may lead 
to a gas leak within the pipeline, since no gas is passing through the cooler. 
The potential frequency of this failure mode is assessed as High (3) and the 
impact is considered Very Severe (4). The risk matrix can help identify the 
resulting level of risk, which is identified as very high. The mitigation here is 
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early crosschecking of the transmitter and a confirmation of the setting point 
in the DCS. This can ensure that no more leaking gas goes into the atmosphere.  
In the event of the above failure modes, the unit needs to be shut down to 
ensure that no more gas leaks to the atmosphere. In principle, the failure 
modes identified for the system described in this example could lead to the 
same problems as those encountered during the Bhopal Plant Disaster in 
1984. At Bhopal, there were gas leaks and problems with the pressure gauge 
(160). The leak was running quite slowly and the pressure indicator 
instrument did not function as intended.  
Separate Gas from Liquid  
The Gas-Liquid Separation function is provided by the Cooling Unit. A 
Separator is designed to separate intermittent large volumes of liquids from a 
gas stream. It may take the form of vessels or a manifold pipe system. Figure 9 
shows the basic structure of a vessel-based gas-liquid separation system. 
 
Figure 58: Gas-Liquid Separation, adapted from (159) 
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The separation vessel can be orientated vertically or horizontally. Vertical 
separators are usually used while gas flow rates are low or the liquid-to-gas 
ratio is low. They are preferred offshore as they occupy less space. 
Nevertheless, gas flow in vertical systems is upwards and opposes the flow of 
liquid droplets. Vertical separators are bigger and cost more than horizontal 
separators. The inlet suction scrubbers used by compressor stations are 
commonly vertical. Horizontal separators, on the other hand, are favoured for 
large volumes of liquid or in situations where the liquid-to-gas ratio is high. 
Lower gas flow rates and increased residence times can help provide better 
liquid dropout. The larger area offers better degassing and also more stable 
liquid levels. This is can be seen in Figure 58 (161).   
After cooling, the gas is passed to the separation unit in order for the gas to be 
separated from the liquid. The drop in temperature helps condensed gas to 
liquefy.  The liquid stream is called liquid gas. After separation, the liquid gas 
is sent to a Chemical Manufacturing Company while the gas goes to an 
Electricity Company.  
We now apply SHA to the Separate Gas from Liquid service, defined in in the 
SLA shown in Table 31.  
Attribute Description Source 
Name Separate gas from liquid SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture for the natural gas 
processing system 
Provider  Cooling Unit that provides the 
service 
SoaML Participants Architecture 
for the natural gas processing 
system 
Consumer  The Customer that uses the service SoaML Participants Architecture 
for the natural gas processing 
system 
Start time Requesting Separation by the 
Cooling Unit (e.g. 11:00:00 AM) 
SoaML ServicesArchitecture for 
the natural gas processing 
system 
Due time The end time of the gas-separation 
process (e.g. 11:00:30 AM) 
SoaML ServicesArchitecture for 
the natural gas processing 
system 
Duration 30 seconds SoaML ServicesArchitecture for 
the natural gas processing 
system 
 (Pre-
condition) 
Receiving the request information 
including the amount of gas, 
percentage of separation, and brief 
SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture for the natural gas 
processing system 
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 details of the condition of the gas 
situation. 
 (Post-
condition) 
Gas is separated and send signal by 
transmitter and the expected arrival 
time to Customer 
SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture for the natural gas 
processing system 
Contribution 
to Safety 
Overall severity is very severe (see 
SHA results) 
SHA 
 Table 31:  Separate gas from liquid SLA 
Table 32 shows an extract from the SHA results for the ‘Separate Gas from 
Liquid’ service. In the example, the required separation level to be transmitted 
should be 80% for liquid gas and 20% for gas: a higher level than this may lead 
to wrong separation. There are two potentially dangerous failure modes, 
namely: 
1- Gas not Separated; 
2- Inaccurate percentage of gas separated. 
The first failure mode is “gas not separated” which may lead to a mixing of the 
gases. The customer would receive a product does not correspond to the 
specification, which might have a negative impact on the customer’s handling 
materials and lead to pipe rupture. The severity of this failure mode is 
assessed as Moderate (2). In the example, this failure mode is mitigated by 
monitoring that the level of liquid is maintained at 80%. 
Service Failure 
Modes 
Effects Severity SSRs Mitigation 
Separate 
gas from 
liquid 
service 
Gas not 
Separated 
Damage to the 
equipment in 
customer 
plant 
 
(Moderate, 
2) 
The failure 
mode “gas 
not 
separated” 
shall be 
prevented 
or 
mitigated. 
Active 
monitoring and 
cross-checking 
by installing 
level 
transmitter at 
80% to control 
the liquid level 
in the DCS 
Gas 
separated 
when not 
required  
N/A N/A None. None. 
Gas 
separated 
later than 
intended 
N/A 
No direct 
safety effects 
N/A None. None. 
Gas 
separated 
earlier than 
intended 
N/A N/A None. None. 
Inaccurate Damage to the (Moderate, The failure Early address 
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percentage 
of gas 
separated 
equipment in 
customer 
plant 
  
2) mode 
“inaccurate 
percentage 
of gas 
separated” 
shall be 
prevented 
or 
mitigated.  
crosschecking 
transmitter 
level and 
confirmation of 
separation of 
the gas to avoid 
sending mixed 
gases.   
Table 32:  Separate Gas from Liquid SHA 
Send Emergency Signal from Cooling Unit to Responder 
In the event of an emergency, the control operator should call an emergency 
number, alerting the fire, hospital and security agencies to the situation. A 
response action should follow. Each of these agencies has a different 
responsibility in the emergency situation. Fire fighters are on continuous 
standby and should be ready to extinguish any fire that could result during a 
leak.  
The ambulance team should provide the necessary medical support, since 
there is potential for people to inhale toxic gas, which could result in serious 
medical complications. The security team are responsible for emergency 
traffic control and also for ensuring that only authorised people can access the 
emergency location. 
We have applied SHA to the ‘Send Emergency Signal’ service. The example 
below explains the use of SHA, considering the corresponding SLA as defined 
in Table 33. 
Attribute Description Source 
Name Send Emergency Signal SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture for the natural gas 
processing system 
Provider   Responder that provides the service SoaML Participants 
Architecture for the natural gas 
processing system 
Consumer  Cooling Unit uses the service SoaML Participants 
Architecture for the natural gas 
processing system 
Start time The point at which the Cooling Unit 
sends the emergency signal (11:00:00 
PM) 
SoaML ServicesArchitecture for 
the natural gas processing 
system 
Due time The end time of the Receive 
Emergency Signal request (11:00:10 
PM) 
SoaML ServicesArchitecture for 
the natural gas processing 
system 
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Duration 10 seconds SoaML ServicesArchitecture for 
the natural gas processing 
system 
 (Pre-
condition) 
 
Send the signal including the current 
situation and location 
SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture for the natural gas 
processing system 
 (Post-
condition) 
Receiving the signal  SoaML Service Contract 
Architecture for the natural gas 
processing system 
Contribution 
to Safety 
Overall severity is Very Severe SHA 
 Table 33:  Send Emergency Signal SLA 
Table 34 shows an extract from the SHA results for the ‘Send Emergency 
Signal’ service. The analysis establishes the potential safety criticality of the 
‘Send Emergency Signal’ service, based on the severity of the worst credible 
effects of the identified failure modes. As a result of the analysis, stringent 
safety requirements are developed and allocated to the ‘Send Emergency 
Signal’ service. 
Service Failure 
Modes 
Effects Severity SSRs Mitigation 
Send 
emergency 
signal 
Signal not 
sent 
Damaged 
pipeline   
Explosion  
Fire   
(Very 
Severe, 4) 
The failure 
mode “signal 
not sent” shall 
be prevented 
or mitigated. 
Use of 
redundancy by 
transmitter to 
confirm the 
signal has been 
received  
Signal sent 
when not 
required  
N/A N/A None. None. 
Signal sent 
later than 
intended 
Damaged 
pipeline   
Explosion  
Fire   
(Very 
Severe, 4) 
The failure 
mode “signal   
sent later than 
intended” shall 
be prevented 
or mitigated. 
Active 
monitoring of 
timing targets 
and strategies for 
recovery from 
timing-related 
failures.  
Signal   sent 
earlier    than 
intended  
N/A N/A None. None. 
Inaccurate 
signal sent  
(Wrong 
respond)   
(Wrong 
reading) 
Damaged 
pipeline   
Explosion  
Fire   
(Very 
Severe, 4) 
The failure 
mode 
“inaccurate 
signal sent” 
shall be 
prevented or 
mitigated.  
Early 
crosschecking by 
maintenance 
technician to 
confirm that 
correct the signal    
has been 
received. 
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Table 34:  Send Emergency Signal SHA 
The first failure mode is ‘signal not sent’ which may lead to a damaged 
pipeline, an explosion or a fire. The level of impact is assessed as Very Severe 
(4). In the example, the suggested mitigation for this failure mode is the use of 
redundancy by the transmitter to confirm that the signal has been received.   
6.4.6.2. SFA 
In this section, we show how SFA is applied to two primary flows in the BPMN 
model for the Natural Gas Processing systems, which are as follows:  
 Flow between ‘Send emergency signal’ (Cooling Unit) to ‘Receive signal 
and check the status’ (Responder); 
 Flow between ‘Exchange heat from 120°F to -40°F at pressure 400 psig’ 
to ‘Monitor that the temperature is at -40 °F, the pressure is at 400 psig 
and send signal by transmitter’. 
Flow from ‘Send Emergency Signal’ to ‘Receive Signal and Check the 
Status’ 
The performance of the Cooling Unit is monitored to detect any gas leakage: 
the control operator should notice a sharp increase in temperature after the 
cooler indicating that no gas is passing through the cooler. The upstream 
emergency isolation valve should close automatically. This is to avoid 
continuous gas leaking from the leak location.  
The SFA here considers 4 main types of deviation, suggested by the following 
guidewords (Table 35): 
 Omission; 
 Commission;  
 Late; 
 Value.     
Omission may be total or partial. Total omission is when the signal is not 
communicated at all. This may be due to a conversion fault (Incorrect input or 
server crashed), which could result in the lack of an emergency request signal. 
The mitigation suggested here is redundancy in sending sources to ensure 
accurate communication. Partial omission, in which part of a communication is 
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missing, may be due to the required resource being missing or service/server 
incompatibility, which could result in an inconsistent signal. The proposed 
mitigation is to ensure accurate communication through checking and 
monitoring API functions to describe all the valid messages that one program 
can accept. Another example is related to commission failure modes 
(repetition or spurious communication). Repetition of the signal with 
additional output may lead to a redundant description (due to incorrect input 
or server crashed), which could result in a wrong response, wrong reading of 
the signal and receipt of a conflicting request. The proposed mitigation is to 
ensure safe communication through the use of high-integrity components 
between participants to detect incorrect signals. 
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ID 
(Flow) 
Guide 
Word 
Deviation Possible Causes Effects DSSRs Mitigation 
1.1  Omission 
(no 
communicat
ion within 
the signal) 
No output 
signal is sent 
Conversion fault 
(Incorrect input) (server 
crashed) 
No request received  The failure mode “no 
output signal is sent” 
shall be prevented or 
mitigated. 
Use of redundancy in sending 
sources  
Omission 
(Incomplete 
signal) 
Part of output 
signal   is 
missing 
    
Required resource 
missing  
Service/server 
incompatible 
Inconsistent signal  The failure mode “part 
of output signal   is 
missing” shall be 
prevented or mitigated. 
Checking and monitoring APIs 
function and fault 
containment 
1.2 Commission 
(Repetition) 
Additional 
output signal 
sent  
Redundant description 
(Incorrect input)  
(Server crashed)  
  
Conflicting request   
received  
Wrong response  
Wrong reading signal 
The failure mode  
“additional output 
signal sent” shall be 
prevented or mitigated. 
Use of high-integrity 
components between 
participants to detect 
incorrect signal with sufficient 
reliability and accuracy 
Commission 
(Spurious) 
The 
communication 
is unintended 
Conversion fault 
(Incorrect input) (server 
crashed) 
Only affected when 
the message is valid  
The failure mode “the 
communication is 
unintended” shall be 
prevented or mitigated. 
Use of high-integrity 
components between 
participants to detect 
incorrect signal with sufficient 
reliability and accuracy  
1.3 Early N/A N/A N/A N/A Just: the output cannot be 
produced  
1.4 Late Unacceptable 
response time 
to change in 
demands 
Execution fault 
Time out (severe crash or 
communication failure) 
Overloading signal  
  
The failure mode 
“Unacceptable response 
time to change in 
demands” shall be 
prevented or mitigated. 
Active monitoring by 
transmitter of timing targets 
and strategies for recovery 
from timing-related failures 
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Table 35:  ‘Send Emergency Signal from Cooling Unit’ to ‘Receive Signal and Check the Status’ SFA 
1.5 Value   One 
component of 
output is not 
proportional to 
demand 
Incompatible 
components  
(Composition fault) 
False signal  
Hard to detect from 
flow of wrong advice 
through radio 
communication 
channel as well 
The failure mode “One 
component of output is 
not proportional to 
demand” shall be 
prevented or mitigated. 
Applying diversity in the flow 
and fault containment to 
detect and reject incorrect 
signal 
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In the case of spurious communication, the communication is unintended 
which may lead to a conversion fault (Incorrect input or server crashed). The 
proposed mitigation is again to ensure adequate communication through the 
use of high-integrity components between the participants. If the flow occurs 
later than intended, this may lead to unacceptable response times, to changes 
in demand and to a ‘failure in execution fault’ or time out (severe crash or 
communication failure). The potential effect is to overload the signal and the 
proposed mitigation is to provide active monitoring by the transmitter of 
timing targets and strategies for recovery from timing-related failures. The 
potential deviation uncovered by application of the guide word ‘value’ is that 
one component of output is not proportional to the demand received due to 
incompatible components (composition fault). The effect is transmission of a 
false signal, which is hard to detect from the flow resulting in the wrong advice 
through the radio communication channel.  The proposed mitigation is to 
ensure accurate communication by applying diversity in the flow and fault 
containment strategies to detect and reject incorrect signals. 
Flow from ‘Exchange Heat from 120°F to -40°F at Pressure 400 psig’ to 
‘Monitor that the Temperature is at -40 °F, the Pressure is 400 psig and 
Send Signal by Transmitter’  
The SFA here considers 3 main types of deviation, suggested by the following 
guidewords (Table 36): 
 Omission; 
 Commission;  
 Value.   
One important aspect of the analysis generated from SFA in this case study is 
the commonality in the use of the types of mitigation, which should help to 
simplify the detailed design by focusing on a limited set of high-quality 
mitigation measures (mainly redundancy and reliance on high-integrity 
components) that can potentially address the identified failure modes. 
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ID Guide Word Deviation Possible Causes Effects DSSRs Justification/Design 
Recommendations 
1.1 Omission (no 
communication 
within the flow) 
No output process 
is sent   
    
conversion fault 
(Incorrect input) 
(server crashed) 
Request not 
received 
 
  
The failure mode 
“no output process 
is sent” shall be 
prevented or 
mitigated. 
 Use of redundancy in 
sending sources  
 
Omission 
(Incomplete 
communication) 
Part of output 
signal is missing 
 
Required resource 
missing 
Service/server 
incompatible 
Inconsistent 
temperature 
The failure mode 
“part of output 
signal is missing” 
shall be prevented 
or mitigated. 
Checking and monitoring 
APIs function and fault 
containment 
1.2 Commission 
(Repetition) 
Additional output 
process sent.  
Description 
incorrect or 
mismatching 
Execution fault 
(Incorrect result) 
Unwanted 
change   
Only effected 
when the flow is 
valid   
The failure mode 
“Additional output 
process sent. No 
change is required” 
shall be prevented 
or mitigated. 
Use of high-integrity 
components between 
participants to detect 
incorrect  signal 
temperature indications 
Commission 
(Spurious) 
The communication 
is unintended 
Conversation fault 
(Incorrect input) 
(server crashed) 
Accounting 
problems 
Only effected 
when the 
message is valid  
The failure mode 
“the communication 
is unintended” shall 
be prevented or 
mitigated. 
Use high-integrity 
components among 
participants to  ensure the 
message received is exactly 
the same as the message 
that was sent  
1.3 Early N/A N/A N/A  Just: the output cannot be 
produced 
1.4 Late N/A N/A N/A  N/A 
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Table 36: ‘Exchange Heat from 120 to -40 °F at Pressure 400 psig’ to ‘Monitor that the Temperature is at -40 °F, the Pressure is 400 psig and Send 
Signal by Transmitter’ 
 
 
1.5 Value   One component of 
output is not 
proportional to 
demand 
Undetected failure 
in any process. 
Corruption 
message 
(Execution fault 
incorrect result- or 
servicer crash) 
False temperate 
Can be detected 
from flow (Gas 
leak) or 
temperature 
degree 
The failure mode 
“One component of 
output is not 
proportional to 
demand” shall be 
prevented or 
mitigated. 
Applying diversity in the 
flow and early cross-
checking and fault 
containment  
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6.4.7. Safety Cases 
This section presents the results of applying the SOA safety argument pattern 
catalogue defined in Chapter 5 to the Natural Gas Processing case study 
introduced in this Chapter. The purpose of this part of the case study is to 
examine how the SOA safety argument pattern catalogue can help in 
communicating the justification for the safety of the Natural Gas Processing 
system and its associated services. It also shows how the analysis process, as 
applied to the case study, relates to the overall structure of the SOA safety 
argument. The case study will also be used to evaluate how the safety 
requirements and mitigation arising from the analysis can be used to define the 
safety argument contracts based on the SLAs defined during the design.                      
6.4.7.1. Gas Service System Safety Argument 
The safety case for the Gas Service System starts with an instantiation of the 
Top Argument pattern. The Top Argument includes a services-directed 
argument, which covers the main safety claims concerning the Natural Gas 
Processing System. The results of the instantiation are shown Figure 59 
G_SOA presents the claim for the overall safety of the Natural Gas Processing 
System in the context of the use case, i.e. the list of services covered (C_SOA). 
The strategy decomposes the argument over all of the identified services within 
the system, based on the SOA specification defined in SoaML. For each service, 
the argument makes a claim that the service is acceptably safe. This is done by 
means of creating an away goal for each service , which references the 
corresponding Service Argument module. In this section, we only focus on the 
argument for the ‘Send Emergency Signal’ service. This service is enacted in the 
event of a gas leak occurring at the beginning of the Cooling unit; the control 
operator is expected to detect a sharp increase in temperature based on the 
cooler indicating that no gas is passing through. The upstream emergency 
isolation valve should close automatically. The leaking gas is a fuel and any 
spark of ignition will result in fire. Additional safety arguments are described in 
Appendix E. 
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Figure 59: Top Argument Module 
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6.4.7.2. Service Argument for Send Emergency Signal 
The argument structure in Figure 60 shows the instantiation of the Service Argument 
pattern for the ‘Send Emergency Signal’ service. The instantiation is based on the result 
of the SHA analysis of the ‘Send Emergency Signal’ service presented in section 6.4.6.1. 
The top-level claim for the Send Emergency Signal states that the service is acceptably 
safe, in the context of the SOA specification defined in SoaML CollaborationUse. The 
strategy argues over all the identified service hazards within the service based on the 
analysis carried out in the SHA. This is made in the context of the results of the 
modelling and SHA for this service. 
The argument focuses on three failure modes, which have hazardous effects, which have 
been generated from the SHA results, namely: 
 Signal not sent;  
 Signal sent later than intended;  
 Inaccurate signal sent. 
The argumentation strategy adopted for each failure mode is to argue that the failure 
mode has been mitigated to the required level of integrity. For example, the failure 
mode ‘Signal not sent’ is mitigated by use of redundancy in the transmitter to confirm 
that the signal has been received. The mitigation claim is then defined in the form of a 
safety contract post-condition that is supported by the SLA Contract Argument. 
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Figure 60: Service Argument for ‘Send Emergency Signal’ Service 
208 
 
6.4.7.3. SLA Contact Argument for Send Emergency Signal Service  
Figure 61 shows the instantiation of the SLA Contract Argument pattern for the ‘Send 
Emergency Signal’ service. The top-level away goal states that the mitigation 
requirement for active redundancy is satisfied. This corresponds to the post-conditions 
of the SLA associated with the ‘Send Emergency Signal’ service. The argument strategy 
is to argue over the satisfaction of the set of SLA pre-conditions. This takes the form of 
away goals that references claims stated in the Participant Arguments for the 
participants satisfying the SLA pre-conditions. For example, the away goal which points 
to the Cooling Unit argument module references a claim in that module which states 
that the Cooling Unit sends a signal to the Responder and monitors to check that the 
signal has been received within 60 second. If the Responder does not receive it, the 
Cooling Unit backup should send another signal to the Responder after 60 seconds. 
 
 
G_Service_N_SLA_Postconditions_Se
nd Emergency Signal Argument 
Module
Active redundancy is satisfied   
Send Emergency Signal Argument Module
St_SLA_N_Contract
Argument over SLA 
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conditions allocated to 
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Cooling unit
G_N_Responder_Responder_Responde
r
Responder receives signal and checks 
the status are satisfied
Responder
G_N_Cooling unit backup_Cooling unit 
backup_Cooling unit backup
Cooling unit  sends signal is satisfied 
‘backup’ 
Cooling unit backup
 
Figure 61: SLA contact Argument for ‘Send Emergency Signal’ Service 
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6.4.7.4. Participant Argument for the Cooling Unit Participant 
Figure 62 shows the instantiation of the Participant Argument pattern for the Cooling 
Unit Participant. The argument is based on the satisfaction of the pre-conditions 
allocated to the Cooling unit Participant via the SLA in which the Participant is involved; 
namely, that the Cooling Unit sends a signal to the Responder. The argument then 
provides a justification for how the above claims are supported based on the results of 
the SFA and modelling in BPMN.  
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Figure 62: Participant Argument for the Cooling Unit 
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6.5.  Questionnaire-based Evaluation 
In order to provide an independent evaluation of our approach, we conducted 
semi-structured interviews with two engineers1 from the Oil and Gas industry 
and one senior safety engineer from the healthcare domain.  
The interviews started with an explanation of the interview protocol using the 
forms shown in Appendix F, which highlight the voluntary nature of the 
exercise and the fact that the confidentiality of the participants will be 
maintained. The presentations recorded in Appendix F were used to explain 
the background to and the main contributions of the research and each of the 
case studies respectively.  
This was followed by a set of open questions addressing the three key 
contributions of this thesis. The questions are shown in Table 37.  
Date: 
Areas of expertise of the interviewee: 
 
1- What do you think about the overall approach? 
2- Do you think that the modelling approach improve the understanding of the 
system?  
a. What aspects in particular did you find useful?  
b. What aspects in particular did you find hard to use?  
3- Do you think that the safety analysis methods, SHA and SFA, can provide a 
systematic approach to analysing services?  
a. What aspects do you think have the potential to improve practice?  
b. What aspects do you think are infeasible to use?  
4- Do you think that the safety case used improve the justification for the safety 
of the service-based system?  
a. What aspects do you think have the potential to improve practice?  
b. What aspects do you think are infeasible to use?  
5- Do you think that the modelling, safety analysis and safety case artefacts are 
clearly integrated?  
6- Can you provide suggestions for areas that can improve the framework?  
Table 37: Interview Questions 
The answers to the interview questions are listed in Appendix F. Below is our 
analysis of the outcome of the interviews. 
                                                        
1 Please note that one of these engineers was involved in the development of the Natural Gas 
Processing Case Study. Nevertheless, the views of this participant concerning the evaluation of the 
proposed approach, though not fully independent, provided considerable insights concerning the 
effectiveness of the approach. 
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Question 1: What do you think about the overall approach? 
All of the participants agreed that the proposed approach was useful for their 
particular domain and for service-based systems. One participant mentioned 
that it could provide a strong basis for risk assessment. 
Question 2: Do you think that the modelling approach improves the 
understanding of the system? 
All of the participants agreed that the modelling approach improved the clarity 
of the system description. One participant highlighted the fact that focusing on 
services rather than functions was useful, particularly for non-experts. They all 
emphasised the benefits of the separation between structure and behaviour 
enforced by the approach.  
Question 2a: What aspects in particular did you find useful?                       
Ease of use was a feature of interest to the participants. Representing the 
system graphically was also mentioned as a useful aspect by one of the 
participants. 
Question 2b: What aspects in particular did you find hard to use?            
The process of generating the models is manual, and two engineers highlighted 
the need for additional automated modelling functions. One engineer 
emphasised the need for initial training (mainly for non-engineers). 
Question 3: Do you think that the safety analysis methods, SHA and SFA, 
can provide a systematic approach to analysing services? 
All participants agreed on the benefits of the systematic nature of the analysis, 
highlighting the clear step-by-step process. One participant highlighted the 
benefits of adapting existing safety analysis techniques, which should already 
be familiar to many safety engineers. 
Question 3a: What aspects do you think have the potential to improve 
practice?                                                                                                                                
The clear integration between analysis and modelling was mentioned in 
addition to the potentially repeatable nature of the analysis. 
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Question 3b: What aspects do you think are infeasible to use?                        
This was a hard question for the participants to answer, since they did not have 
experience of fully applying the approach in practice. One participant 
highlighted possible language inconsistencies, e.g. mapping between what 
some call ‘fault’ and others ‘failure’ (though this is a problem which can be 
observed in many safety analysis techniques). 
Question 4: Do you think that the safety case used in the approach 
improves the justification of the safety of the service-based system? 
Having a safety case pattern was highlighted as a useful feature. The modular 
nature of the justification was mentioned as a positive aspect, particularly in 
showing the big picture for the safety argumentation. 
Question 4a: What aspects do you think have the potential to improve 
practice?                                                                                                                                
The explicit link between the analysis and the safety case was highlighted as an 
advantage, showing how the safety case is built on the results of SHA and SFA 
and therefore improving traceability. 
Question 4b: What aspects do you think are infeasible to use?               
Again, this was a hard question to answer as the engineers did not apply the 
framework in a real world context. However, one participant was sceptical of 
the benefits of, or the need for, the detailed arguments and how they are going 
to be perceived in terms of effort.  
Question 5: Do you think that the modelling, safety analysis and safety 
case artefacts are clearly integrated? 
All of the participants agreed that the integration between the different 
elements of the approach was clear. 
Question 6: Can you provide suggestions for areas that can improve the 
framework? 
Two participants were keen that the model-based weaving approach be 
implemented (an area for future work in this thesis as discussed in Chapter 7). 
One engineer highlighted the importance of addressing a practical concern: 
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how much details can be considered enough in terms of depth, e.g. can we stop 
at the SLA level, abstracting the details about participants? 
6.6. Evaluation of Thesis Contributions 
This thesis focuses on four contributions made during the development of this 
research, namely:  
 SOA Modelling; 
 SOA Safety Analysis; 
 SOA Safety Cases; 
 Tool Support. 
Each of these contributions has been evaluated and the results of this 
evaluation are discussed in the next four sections. Safety is a qualitative 
attribute and as such the results generated by this research, in terms of 
“improving safety analysis” are qualitative in nature, mostly based on our two 
qualitative case studies. 
6.6.1. SOA Modelling 
During this research, we developed design models of two case study systems 
based on information directly generated from the domain of interest, 
specifically healthcare and oil and gas. Domain knowledge is key in high-risk 
industries, since safety is a domain- and context-specific property. Evidence 
shows that a poor understanding of the domain of the system is a major 
contributor to safety accidents and incidents, especially for computer-based 
systems (162).  
Here, the main contribution of this research is in showing how SoaML and 
BPMN can be used systematically in the design and assurance of safety-critical 
SOA. Based on feedback from the case studies, the following evaluation 
observations can be made: 
 SoaML and BPMN representation is considered important to 
understanding the safety of resulting design: Since SoaML represents 
the system structure and BPMN represents the system behaviour: 
modelling both of these aspects using structured modelling languages 
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has helped in providing a holistic understanding of the design of the 
system. This reflects the fact that hazards can arise from the system 
structure as well as its behaviour.  
 Integrated modelling and analysis offers greater transparency: The 
way in which the SOA system models and analyses are developed 
provides an integrated approach to modelling and a clearer basis for 
safety analysis. This means that the results of the analysis can clearly 
show which parts of the system could potentially have contributed to 
hazardous failures.  
 Traceable integration between system design and safety analysis: 
Building on the previous point concerning integration, the clearly 
defined architecture of the proposed SOA system, based on SoaML and 
BPMN, forms the basis for a model-based integration between the 
design and safety analysis. This model-based integration improves 
traceability and supports maintenance of the safety case and the safety 
analyses when they are generated in SOA development.  
One drawback of our work is the lack of coverage of all potential SoaML design 
diagram types (e.g. capabilities) which might reveal further contributions to 
safety. These additional SoaML diagrams could have helped us provide more 
detailed safety analyses, e.g. of lower-level system failures. The reason for this 
was that it was not within the scope of our work, which mainly focused on 
safety at the requirements and architecture levels. Another limitation is that we 
have not implemented all the features of BPMN modelling, particularly model 
execution and simulation, which could have been useful in showing even more 
sources of hazardous behaviours or more detailed execution failure modes.  
6.6.2. SOA Safety Analysis 
During the analysis stage, we performed multiple analyses of the systems 
under consideration using the SHA and SFA methods we developed. The 
following evaluation observations can be made: 
 Systematic consideration of safety analysis: SHA and SFA provided a 
systematic means for examination of the hazards posed by services and 
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for understanding how the detailed failure behaviour of these services 
can contribute to hazards. These safety analysis methods provided step-
by-step processes for carrying out the SOA analysis. SHA and SFA 
extended FFA and SHARD by adding additional guidance, steps and data 
so that the results could be applicable and compatible with SOA specific 
characteristics (e.g. the notion of services, participants and tasks). As 
indicated by the interviews, practitioners found the focus on services 
and the associated SHA results more focused than the use of the 
conventional and potentially generic HAZOP technique.  
 SHA and SFA offer explicit means for generating service safety 
requirements: This is one of the most important outputs of any safety 
analysis technique. Safety requirements are vital in driving the design 
by clearly specifying what criteria need to be taken into account by the 
architects so that the identified service hazards and detailed failure 
modes are eliminated or mitigated. This will help realise the demands of 
best practice for achieving assurance-based development (163).  
One drawback of our analysis methods is the potential generation of too many 
SHA and SFA tables with little automated support. For example, for each 
service and flow we had to create a detailed analysis table and we ended up 
with a large volume of data: this was a labour intensive activity. Another 
limitation of this work is the limited integration between failure modes and the 
recommended types of suitable design tactics. This is an area where predefined 
rules connecting the types of failure modes and the categories of tactics could 
be defined in advance in order to provide proactive recommendations for the 
architects of safety-critical SOA, building on current best practice in SOA design 
and the published literature. 
6.6.3. SOA Safety Cases 
Safety cases have become a fundamental requirement in many safety-critical 
domains. Nevertheless, there is still very little research on how they can be 
applied to services and SOA. In this research, we have provided a systematic 
approach to generating a safety case for an SOA in a traceable and clear 
manner. The following evaluation observations can be made: 
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 SOA safety case patterns: This research developed safety case patterns 
for justifying the design of SOA which can be reused by the architects 
and analysts of services in isolation of any particular domain. In our 
case, we focused on healthcare and oil and gas. However, these safety 
case patterns are domain-independent and are not limited to these two 
domains. 
 Safety case traceability: Safety case patterns were traceable, at the 
model-level, to the sources of information (i.e. in the SoaML, BPMN, SHA 
and SFA models). This has helped in showing how each feature of the 
design is justified in the safety case based on the existing design 
descriptions and analysis evidence.  
 Safety case structure mirroring the system design: This mirroring 
has improved the representation of system safety reasoning by 
clarifying the relationship between the design and safety evidence. By 
looking at the organisation of the argument and the structure of the 
system design, we can more clearly understand the correspondence 
between them.  
 Separation of concerns: This is enforced via argument contracts based 
on SLAs (i.e. concerns about hazards versus concerns about failures). 
The SLA helps us create a separation between the justification of the 
mitigation of the hazards which are important at the system level and 
the design failure modes that can contribute to the these hazards at a 
more detailed level. 
One limitation of this work is the lack of automated support for argument 
pattern instantiation from models and analyses. Although argument pattern 
instantiation is predominantly manual, adding automated capabilities would 
improve the efficiency of the process. In our work, we provide a preliminary 
basis for weaving the argument patterns into the source design and analysis 
models and metamodels (please see the preliminary weaving model in 
Appendix G). However, this approach was not fully evaluated in the case 
studies. Further work here includes the evaluation of this automated approach 
via the case studies.  
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6.6.4. Tool Support 
During this research, tooling and automated support was developed for 
modelling and safety analysis for the SOA environment. This tooling comprises 
the integrated Eclipse tool plugins that have been developed to support our 
SOA safety assurance framework. The following evaluation observations can be 
made: 
 Implementing model-based integration of SOA system 
structural and behavioural models: The integration of models in 
this research offers greater transparency about how the models are 
developed and how they relate to one another. The overlap provides 
a specific emphasis on the relation between the structure of a service 
and its behaviour. In the tooling, users can automatically navigate 
between the different views of the SOA design, e.g. selecting a service 
and being able to review the corresponding low-level behaviour 
(detailed tasks and flows). 
 Automated support for traceability: The use of SoaML and BPMN 
allows services and tasks to be based on machine-checkable models. 
This is implemented in a way that generates traceability links from 
SoaML models to BPMN models to indicate how the BPMN process 
implements the SoaML services and vice versa. This also provides 
the ability to apply the safety analysis in a more interactive manner. 
 Automated means for supporting SOA safety analysis: The tool-
support is extended to provide semi-automated configuration of the 
system safety analysis methods. The extension of the modelling 
environment is implemented to support SHA and SFA results by 
providing automated means for capturing and displaying the safety 
analysis for the services and the flow between tasks. This means that 
the results of the analysis can clearly show which parts of the system 
could have potentially contributed to hazardous failures.  
 Automated means for supporting SLA: The tool also provides 
semi-automated configurations of SLAs between a certain service 
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provider and its consumers. This creates and integrates SLAs into 
the SoaML service contracts for the representation of the SLAs.  
A limitation of this work, as mentioned earlier, is the lack of automated support 
for argument pattern instantiation from SOA models and SHA and SFA results. 
Partly, this is due to the use of different tool plugins, which do not offer clear 
interfaces that support interoperability. These tools were useful for 
demonstrating a proof of concept but could not easily be extended for a 
complete and fully functional toolset. Revisiting the choice of tools and plugins 
is an area for further work.  
6.7. Hypothesis Revisited 
The hypothesis made in this thesis is as follows: 
Integrated architectural modelling and analysis of safety-critical 
service-oriented systems provides a traceable, consistent and 
systematic means for assuring the safety of these systems 
In this section, we reflect on the results of the evaluation with respect to the 
main terms used in the hypothesis. 
6.7.1. Integration 
Achieving integrated design and safety assurance is a key aim within the safety 
domain. In this thesis, we address this aim for SOA engineering. The activities 
for modelling, safety analysis and safety cases for SOA are integrated both at 
the level of the methodology (e.g. a clear model in SoaML is a prerequisite for 
instantiating the SOA patterns for safety cases) and also at the model level (e.g. 
model features in SoaML and BPMN are linked to model elements, represented 
in a tabular format, in the SHA and SFA). As a result, the SOA Safety Assurance 
Framework provides a clear and structured basis for integrated design, safety 
analysis and safety case development with explicit considerations of hazardous 
behaviour and safety justification. 
6.7.2. Traceability  
In this thesis, forward and backward model-based traceability between the 
design and safety analysis provided a seamless means of understanding and 
220 
 
checking the relationship between the SOA structure and behaviour and their 
safety consequences. Ensuring traceability is a fundamental requirement for all 
safety standards. The value of the safety analysis can easily be threated if its 
relation to design is not well understood. During this research, this thesis also 
considered a new way for linking the argument pattern instantiation with the 
design modelling and analysis processes through a weaving model (164). The 
weaving model in Appendix G provides a preliminary basis for automating 
argument pattern instantiation based on the source design and analysis models 
and metamodels. 
6.7.3. Consistency 
In the SOA Safety Assurance Framework, design features are reflected in the 
safety analysis and assurance and vice versa. This helps assess the 
completeness of how the different design features are covered by the safety 
analysis and safety cases. Inconsistencies can either be detected through the 
tool-supported traceability techniques implemented in this research or 
through pattern instantiation, e.g. by assessing claims that cannot be 
instantiated due to incomplete design structures or contracts or incomplete 
safety analysis results. 
6.7.4. Systematicness 
One of the weaknesses identified in the current literature concerning SOAs and 
safety-critical systems was the lack of a systematic method for assuring SOAs. 
One of the aims of this thesis was to provide a coherent step by-step process, 
by applying and adapting techniques available within SOA and safety domains. 
For each step within the framework, it is clear which methods are being used 
and which design models of are being analysed. This thesis uses the SOA 
concept in order to provide the necessary modelling languages with clear 
modelling steps. Next, the analysis is focussed on analysing individual services 
and their associated interactions in order to identify hazardous behaviours 
associated with the system, based on two well-defined processes (i.e. SHA and 
SFA). This is followed by the definition of a set of reusable safety argument 
patterns for generating the SOA safety case.  
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To illustrate how the framework may be applied in practice, the process was 
applied to two realistic case studies. The results of the case studies were 
validated by domain experts, who considered the approach to be potentially 
helpful in the safety analysis processes used in their own systems and 
environments, particularly due to the systematic and clear basis of the 
assurance framework. One of the key features of the framework is that the 
rationale for the approach is clear: each stage is performed for a specific reason 
producing very concrete artefacts, e.g. design models, analysis results or 
specific safety arguments. 
6.7.5. Assurance  
The SOA safety argument pattern catalogue created in this research follows a 
reasoning chain from the Top Argument until the Participant Argument. It can 
be instantiated for justification of the design and analysis for generating 
trustworthy evidence regarding the safety of deploying an SOA-based system 
within a specific safety application. These patterns are directly related to each 
other. The SOA argument pattern catalogue includes rules for pattern 
composition and traceability which are linked to the architectural design (i.e. 
SoaML and BPMN models) and analyses (i.e. SHA and SFA). These patterns 
were useful in showing how the results of modelling and analysis can support 
the development of explicit SOA arguments. 
6.8. Threats to Validity 
In this section, we describe the main threats to the validity of the findings of 
this thesis.  
Firstly, although our modelling approach is biased towards the use of SoaML 
and BPMN, the overall framework does not depend on the specific use of these 
notations, as long as well-defined modelling languages are used for capturing 
the structural and behavioural aspects of an SOA design. This can be seen as a 
threat to external validity. However, for the sake of focused evaluation, it was 
important to limit the modelling to two specific notations. 
Secondly, the choice of the domains for evaluation was important. We chose 
two different domains for the two case studies in order to evaluate the 
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capability of our framework against diverse challenges. Oil and Gas and 
Healthcare are two conceptually different domains. The first has well-
established and detailed safety practices while the second only has high-level 
safety processes, particularly for computer-based systems (see Section 6.3.1 for 
a more detailed discussion). Due to the scale of the work, it was difficult to 
apply our approach to all key safety-critical industries. However, the two case 
studies cover the two main categories of domains in safety engineering, i.e. 
traditional (Oil and Gas) and emerging (Healthcare). 
Thirdly, there is a great interdependency between the modelling, safety 
analysis and safety cases within the framework. This might affect the scalability 
and wider applicability of the framework if any of the underlying notations and 
techniques used are changed. That is if a different safety analysis techniques 
was used it may not scale as well as the one which was used e.g. the use of FTA 
rather than SFA. This is a limitation from a scalability point of view. However, 
there is a tradeoff between the wider usefulness of the approach and ensuring 
internal consistency between the different components of the framework. 
Fourthly, the sample in the interviews is small (three interviewees). The 
experts hold senior roles and have been involved in the engineering of large-
scale safety-critical services. Safety-critical information is hard to collect due to 
the sensitivity of the domain. Therefore it was decided that one-one interviews 
with experienced practitioners would allow us to evaluate the general validity 
of the approach and the potential for scalability for use in actual industrial 
contexts.  
Finally, the proposed approach was implemented in the form of research 
prototype tools. Although they were useful in the case studies, the effectiveness 
and reliability of these tools for other uses cannot be demonstrated.   
6.9. Chapter Summary  
This chapter presented the results of the evaluation of the four main 
contributions of the research presented in this thesis. It revisited the research 
hypothesis and explained the means for evaluation used in this research. This 
evaluation was carried out by means of case studies, semi-structured 
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interviews and peer review. These forms of evaluation produced results 
supporting the hypothesis of the thesis which also highlighted potential 
limitations and possible areas for future work. The final conclusions of the 
research are presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
 
This chapter provides a summary of the main contributions of the research 
presented in this thesis and proposes areas for further work. 
7.1 Thesis Contributions 
The overarching contribution of this research is the development of a model-
based assurance framework for SOA. This approach considers the architecture 
of the SOA system, based on SOA services and the low-level behavioural tasks 
that are relevant to safety, and features a model-based technique for 
integrating the design activity and safety analysis. This technique improves 
traceability and supports safety justification as well as facilitating the 
maintenance of the safety case and safety analysis artefacts generated within 
the SOA engineering process. In this thesis, we have focused on four main areas 
of contribution, namely: 
 Identification and adaptation of SOA modelling notations, namely SoaML 
and BPMN, based on two criteria: the coverage of the structure and 
behaviour of the services that are deemed suitable for the safety 
assessment of an SOA design. 
 Development of safety analysis techniques for SOA, namely SHA and 
SFA, which can be used to examine the hazardous failures of services 
and the failure behaviour of lower-level implementations.  
 Development of the concept of modular safety cases for the assurance of 
safety-critical SOAs, promoting correspondence between the structure 
of the SOA and the organisation of the modular safety case. This generic 
argument approach is defined in the form of an SOA Safety Argument 
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Pattern Catalogue, which can be instantiated to produce safety 
arguments for specific SOA-based systems. 
 Implementation of tool-support that provides automated capabilities for 
building the SOA models, applying the safety analysis and building the 
safety case for the system.  
Concluding observations regarding these contributions are discussed in the 
following sections. Finally, in Section 7.2, we suggest some areas for further 
work. 
7.1.1. SOA Modelling  
In this thesis, we proposed a systematic, model-based approach to address SOA 
safety, which is supported by tooling. We call this approach the SOA Safety 
Assurance Framework. The Framework captures the essential relationships 
between safety concerns and how they directly relate to SOA services, tasks 
and flows. The SOA modelling pulls together SOA safety analyses and safety 
cases in such a way that they are traceably linked during the engineering of 
safety-critical service-based systems. 
7.1.2. SOA Safety Analysis  
A key contribution made by the safety analysis techniques developed during 
our research is to provide structured step-by-step processes for the 
examination of the design of an SOA. The clear system design models, in SoaML 
and BPMN, facilitate the systematic integration of safety analysis in the SOA 
design process, mainly by being fully traceable to the SOA architectural models. 
In this thesis, we propose and demonstrate safety analysis techniques for 
examining an SOA design and generating relevant safety requirements which 
are focussed on the SOA’s structure and concerns. These safety requirements 
provide the basis for integrating safety considerations into the design of the 
system, by providing a clear rationale and steer for design decisions. This 
analysis also emphasises the interactions between services and tasks in order 
to identify failures in participant behaviour that could contribute to service 
hazards within the SOA system. Our approach provides more transparency in 
the generation of SOA system safety requirements than do traditional methods, 
which typically force a distinction between safety and design. 
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7.1.3. SOA Safety Case Development  
This thesis has developed a new approach to developing SOA safety cases 
through safety case patterns, in order to address the need for explicit safety 
assurance within SOA engineering. The safety argument patterns presented in 
Chapter 5 demonstrate how a defensible argument for an SOA system can be 
constructed by allowing the argument structure to mirror the SOA design, 
thereby improving the clarity of the reasoning. Specifically, the patterns show 
how the safety arguments have been structured to correspond directly to the 
SOA design as defined in the structured architectural models. 
7.1.4. Tool-support 
The tools implemented in this research are used to support the capabilities of 
the SOA Safety Assurance Framework. The tools provide a semi-automated 
environment for supporting the system safety analysis methods and for 
representing SLAs. They also provide a means for improving traceability 
between the different SOA models, by linking structural models in SoaML with 
behavioural models in BPMN. 
7.2 Further work   
During the course our research, we have identified a number of areas for future 
work: 
- Integration of safety analysis with search-based technologies (e.g. 
simulation and model-checking);  
- Further tool-support to implement model-based assurance cases for 
SOA based on model weaving; 
-  Extending the work to cover runtime composition and certification of 
SOA; 
- Extending the SOA safety case pattern catalogue as a generic solution for 
related domains.  
The following sections provide a brief overview of these topics: 
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7.2.1. Integration of Safety Analysis with Search-based Technologies  
One important technique with potential for supporting safety analysis of SOA 
system, which we have not investigated as part of this thesis, is the search-
based approach. One beneficial area of future work would therefore be to 
investigate different search-based technologies which could potentially provide 
an automated reasoning basis for SOA safety analysis. This work could include 
the development of a safety analysis approach based on model-checking, which 
could on the one hand provide an automated proof that the system satisfies the 
safety properties (assuming that they could be defined with a suitable 
formalism) and on the other hand identify scenarios which lead to undesired 
events. Similarly, simulation models could be built for an SOA during safety 
analysis, allowing for dynamic exploration of the behaviour of the SOA under 
different scenarios.  
7.2.2. Further tool-support to implement model-based assurance 
cases for SOA based on model weaving 
Various tools have been extended over the course of this research. These tools 
were developed within the Eclipse Integrated Development Environment 
platform. We believe that there is scope to add automated capabilities that 
would improve the efficiency of the argument pattern instantiation process 
which has been developed based on the work of (164). This approach was not 
fully evaluated in the case studies, but is a promising basis for future work on 
model-based approaches to assurance case development. Further work here 
includes the evaluation of this automated approach via further case studies 
which would suggest further ways to integrate SOA modelling, safety analysis 
and safety cases using model-based techniques. 
7.2.3. Runtime Composition and Certification of SOA 
This thesis has described a process for developing SOA safety cases that 
demonstrates how a defensible argument for an SOA system can be structured 
at design-time. One area that was not considered as part of the thesis was the 
maintenance of the safety analyses and the safety case at runtime, specifically 
the runtime composition of argument modules to produce a comprehensive 
safety argument for an SOA. Runtime composition and certification was 
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explicitly outside of the scope of the research. However, there are key issues in 
this area which are worthy of further investigation, particularly in terms of 
their application to autonomous service-based systems. There is some scope 
for exploring and constructing assurance cases for SOA to support runtime and 
dynamic composition and certification (165). 
7.2.4. Safety Case Pattern Catalogue for SOA as Generic Solution to 
Related Systems Domains  
In this thesis, we have developed an approach to evolving SOA safety cases 
using the modular and pattern extensions of GSN. We have proposed a  safety 
case pattern catalogue which captures successful safety argument structures 
which are not specific to any domain. One area for further work is to 
investigate the applicability of the patterns for the justification of related 
systems such as Systems of Systems, as discussed in the literature review 
(Chapter2). Research should be done to investigate how systems composed of 
different and independent elements can be justified through a generic set of 
argument patterns. 
7.3 Coda 
The author hopes that the SOA Safety Assurance Framework created in this 
thesis, supported by the evaluation and case studies, will deliver valuable and 
valid insights both for future research and for industrial practice in the use of 
SOA for safety-critical applications.  
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Appendix A: Managing Child Birth 
and Caesarean 
In this medical process, we have applied BPMN to do the modelling for the 
business processes. The main target of using BPMN is to apply safety analysis 
and assurance because of BPMN’s safety support tool (166). 
Child birth scenario (137) 
 Figure 63, in the beginning the woman contacts the ambulance, which 
assumes the delivery time is very close.  
 The ambulance station orders a vehicle to go and collect the patient and 
take her to hospital. 
 Check if the patient’s information is in the EHR system and add her 
information if she is not in the system. 
 Assess the patient, checking the maternal and foetal condition to 
determine if she is ready to deliver. If not we stop the process, 
otherwise, we start preparations for labour & care.  At each stage, we 
need to update the EHR system for the patient. As explained in Figure 
Manage the stage of Labour with caesarean operation. 
 We start the first stage as seen in Figure Manage the stage of labour with 
caesarean operation 2. 
 Then, start the examination as shown in  Figure First stage of labour  
 If there is any delay we apply the Figure of Delay in the First stage and 
Delay in the First stage (2) Otherwise we move to the Figure second 
stage of labour. 
 In the second stage, we need to apply the Figure Second stage of labour 
and if there is any delay, we apply the Figure Delay in the Second stage 
of labour. 
 If the second stage, passes successfully, we need to apply the Figure of 
Third stage of labour and continue the demonstration of the process 
until we get to figure stage of labour Care after birth, otherwise we will 
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move to Figure stage of consider caesarean section CS and apply the 
Caesarean Figure. 
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Figure 63: the Medical Process for Child Birth Scenario 
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Appendix B. SHA for Healthcare 
Case Study 
This section considers the SHA for two services:  
(1) Request ambulance; 
(2) Update health record; 
 
Service Failure 
Modes 
Effects Severity SSRs Mitigation 
Request 
ambulance 
 
Ambulance 
not requested 
Delay in 
treatment and 
increased 
complication 
 
Major 
 
The failure mode 
“ambulance not 
request” shall be 
prevented or 
mitigated. 
Active monitoring 
and cross-checking 
between calling and 
requesting 
ambulances to 
ensure the 
communication is 
applied successfully 
Ambulance 
provided 
when not 
required 
N/A 
No direct safety 
effects but waste 
for critical 
services. 
N/A 
 
None. None. 
Ambulance 
required later 
than intended 
Delay in 
treatment, and 
increased 
complication 
 
Major 
 
The failure mode 
“ambulance required 
later than intended” 
shall be prevented or 
mitigated. 
Active monitoring of 
timing targets and 
strategies for 
recovery from 
timing-related 
failures. 
Ambulance 
request 
improper 
information 
Delay in 
treatment, and 
increased 
complication 
Major 
 
The failure mode 
“Ambulance request 
improper 
information” shall be 
prevented or 
mitigated. 
Early checking 
information and 
confirmation 
between calling and 
requested 
ambulances to 
ensure the 
information transfer 
correctly through the 
system 
Table 38:  A sample of SHA output for the request ambulance service system 
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Service Failure 
Modes 
Effects Severity SSRs Mitigation 
Update 
health 
record 
Loss of 
Updating 
Difficulty in assessing 
condition 
 
Considerable 
 
The failure mode 
“Loss of 
Updating” shall 
be prevented or 
mitigated. 
Use of   
redundancy   
through fitting an 
addition flow to 
provide patient 
information from 
the another source 
of health record 
Updating 
provided 
when not 
required 
Incorrect data leading 
to wrong treatment 
Major 
 
The failure mode 
“Updating 
provided when 
not required” 
shall be 
prevented or 
mitigated. 
Active cross-
checking and 
interlocks 
Updating 
provide 
later than 
intended 
Delay the treatment, 
and increased 
complication 
 
Considerable The failure mode 
“Updating 
provide later 
than intended” 
shall be 
prevented or 
mitigated. 
Active monitoring 
of timing targets 
Inaccurate 
service   
Updating 
Incorrect treatments Major The failure mode 
“Inaccurate 
service   
Updating” shall 
be prevented or 
mitigated. 
Active monitoring  
and cross-
checking to ensure 
the record 
updated correctly 
Table 39:  A sample of SHA output for the Update health record service system 
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Appendix C. SFA for Healthcare 
Case Study 
This section considers the SFA for other flows:  
(1) From call ambulance and provide information to receive request; 
(2) From authorize and authenticate to provide patient name;   
 
 
ID 
(Flow) 
Guide Word Deviation Possible 
Causes 
Effects DSSRs Mitigation 
1.1 Omission 
(Incomplete 
data) 
no request 
received 
 
Deployment 
fault (Request 
resource 
missing) 
Service/server 
incompatible 
Task crashed 
Incomplete 
data, no 
information 
for the 
request 
The failure 
mode “no 
output 
process is 
sent” shall be 
prevented or 
mitigated. 
Ensure 
redundancy in 
the system can 
help to 
duplicate the 
task within the 
system which 
allows one or 
more copies of 
the same task 
1.2 Commission 
(Repetition- 
Data 
overrun) 
With 
additional 
output  
incorrect or 
mismatching 
messages 
description 
No safety 
effect 
Unwanted 
change   
N/A N/A 
1.3 Early N/A N/A N/A  N/A  
1.4 Late Unacceptable 
response 
time  
Failure in  
scheduling 
system   
Time out of 
the task  
Overloading 
in task in the 
flow may 
lead to delay 
tasks 
The failure 
mode 
“Unacceptable 
response time 
to change in 
demands” 
shall be 
prevented or 
mitigated. 
Monitoring for 
timing failure 
and developing 
recovery 
strategies  
 
1.5 Value  Incorrect 
request 
 
Incorrect 
input or 
conversion 
fault   
execution 
fault, incorrect 
result or 
servicer crash 
Delay in the 
treatment  
and increase 
complication 
The failure 
mode “One 
component of 
output is not 
proportional 
to demand” 
shall be 
prevented or 
mitigated. 
Diversity to 
make sure 
there is not 
error 
propagation 
across system 
boundaries. 
 
Table 40: A sample of SFA output for flow from call ambulance and provide 
information to receive request 
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ID 
(Flow) 
Guide Word Deviation Possible 
Causes 
Effects DSSRs Mitigation 
1.1 Omission No access 
available 
authorization  
and 
authentication 
failed       
No patient 
history and 
background  
 
The failure 
mode “No 
access 
available” 
shall be 
prevented or 
mitigated. 
Use of redundancy 
in data sources for 
access  the system 
1.2 Commission unwanted  
access  
Failure of 
output  
process on the 
system.  
No direct 
safety 
effects 
The failure 
mode 
“unwanted  
access” shall 
be prevented 
or mitigated. 
Monitoring of 
access requests 
1.3 Early N/A N/A N/A  Just: the output 
cannot be produced  
1.4 Late Unacceptable 
response 
time  
Failure in  
scheduling 
Overloading The failure 
mode 
“Unacceptable 
response 
time” shall be 
prevented or 
mitigated. 
Monitoring of time 
delays and recovery 
by giving more 
priority for delayed 
requests 
1.5 Incorrect 
access the 
system 
Incorrect 
output  or 
task crash   
 
Undetected 
failure in any 
process. 
insufficient 
security 
unknown 
allergy 
status 
The failure 
mode 
“Incorrect 
output  or 
task crash   
” shall be 
prevented or 
mitigated. 
Data entry cross-
checking, online 
monitoring and 
fault containment 
Table 41: A sample of SFA output for flow from provide user name and password to 
authorize and authenticate
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Appendix D. Safety Case for Healthcare Case Study:  
This section considers the safety arguments for another specific service: Retrieve Health Record. The safety arguments are described in 
this Appendix. 
G_Service_Hz_Retrieve Health Record 
Argument Module
Retrieve Health Record is acceptably 
safe
Retrieve Health Record Argument Module
G_SOA
Ambulance service system is 
acceptably safe to operate in 
pregnant women 
transportation
C_SOA
 Ambulance service system: SoaML Services Architecture
- Request Ambulance Service
- Dispatch Ambulance Service
- Update Status Service
- Request Record Service
- Provide Patient Record Service
- Update Health Record Service
- Retrieve Health Record Service
- Pick up Patient Service
- Examine Patie
C_SOA_Env
Scope focus is on 
pregnant women 
transportation
St_Top
Argument structured 
over each service of the 
SOA system
G_Service_Hz_Dispatch Ambulance 
Argument Module
Dispatch Ambulance is acceptably 
safe
Dispatch Ambulance Argument Module
G_Service_Hz_Request Ambulance 
Argument Module
Request Ambulance is acceptably 
safe
Request Ambulance Argument Module
G_Service_Hz_Update Health Record 
Argument Module
Update Health Record is acceptably 
safe
Update Health Record Argument Module
G_Service_Hz_Pick up Patient 
Argument Module
Pick up Patient is accptably safe
Pick up Patient Argument Module
G_Service_Hz_Examine Patient 
Argumrnt Module
Examine Patient is acceptably safe
Examine Patient Argumrnt Module
G_Service_Hz_Drop off Patient 
Argument Module
Drop off Patient is acceptably safe
Drop off Patient Argument Module
G_Service_Hz_Request Record 
Argument Module
Request Record is acceptably safe
Request Record Argument Module
G_Service_HZ_Provide Patient Record 
Argument Module
Provide Patient Record is acceptably 
safe
Provide Patient Record Argument Module
G_Service_Hz_Update Status 
Argument Module
Update Status is acceptably safe 
Update Status Argument Module
 
Figure 64: Top Argument Module  
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C_Service_Desc
Retrieve Health Record: 
SoaML 
CollaborationUse
St_Service_Hz
Argument structured 
based on mitigating 
service hazardous failures
C_Service_Hz
Service hazardous failures: SHA
- EHR not retrieved
- EHR retrieved later than 
intended
- Incorrect record retrieved
G_Service_N_Hz
EHR not retrieved is mitigated 
to satisfy the Service Safety 
Requirement
J
J_Service_N_SLA
Mitigation is allocated to 
the SLA post-condition
G_Service_N_SLA_Postconditions
Use of redundancy through fitting 
an addition flow to provide patient 
information from another source
is satisfied   
G_Service_W_Mitg
Active monitoring and cross-
checking of the information 
retrieved is satisfied to the required 
integrity
G_Service_I_Mitg
Active monitoring of timing targets 
and strategies for recovery from 
timing-related failures is satisfied to 
the required integrity
G_Service_N_Mitg
Use of redundancy through fitting 
an addition flow to provide patient 
information from another source is 
satisfied to the required integrity
 G_Service_I_Hz
 EHR retrieved later than intended 
is mitigated to satisfy the Service 
Safety Requirement
G_Service_W_Hz
 Incorrect record retrieved is 
mitigated to satisfy the Service 
Safety Requirement
St_Service_N_Hz_Mitg
Argument based on use of 
redundancy through fitting an 
addition flow to provide patient 
information from another source. 
St_Service_I_Hz_Mitg
Argument based on active 
monitoring of timing targets 
and strategies for recovery 
from timing-related failures
St_Service_W_Hz_Mitg
Argument based on active 
monitoring and cross-
checking of the information 
retrieved
C_Service_Hz_N_Mitg
Mitigation: SHA 
Use of redundancy through fitting 
an addition flow to provide patient 
information from another source
C_Service_Hz_I_Mitg
Mitigation: SHA 
Active monitoring of timing 
targets and strategies for 
recovery from timing-related 
failures
C_Service_Hz_W_Mitg
Mitigation: SHA 
Active monitoring and cross-
checking of the information 
retrieved
C_Service_N_Class
Required integrity 
based on Considerable 
severity 
C_Service_I_Class
Required integrity 
based on Considerable 
severity 
C_Service_W_Class
Required integrity 
based on Considerable 
severity 
St_Service_N_SLA
Argument by enforcing use of 
redundancy through fitting an 
addition flow to provide patient 
information from another sourcein 
the SLA 1
St_Service_I_SLA
Argument by enforcing active 
monitoring of timing targets and 
strategies for recovery from 
timing-related failuresin the SLA 2
St_Service_W_SLA
Argument by enforcing active 
monitoring and cross-checking 
of the information retrieved
in the SLA 3
J
J_Service_I_SLA
Mitigation is allocated to 
the SLA post-condition
J
J_Service_W_SLA
Mitigation is allocated to 
the SLA post-condition
G_Service_I_SLA_Postconditions
Active monitoring of timing 
targets and strategies for recovery 
from timing-related failures is 
satisfied   
G_Service_W_SLA_Postconditions
Active monitoring and cross-
checking of the information 
retrieved is satisfied   
Spinal
SLA Contract1
SLA of use of redundancy through 
fitting an addition flow to provide 
patient information from another 
source
Spinal
SLA Contract2
SLA of active monitoring of timing 
targets and strategies for 
recovery from timing-related 
failures
Spinal
SLA Contract3
SLA of active monitoring and 
cross-checking of the information 
retrieved
G_Service_Hz
Retrieve Health Record is 
acceptably safe
C_Service_N_Hz_SSRs
Service Safety Requirement: SHA 
The failure mode “EHR not 
retrieved” shall be prevented or 
mitigated
C_Service_I_Hz_SSRs
Service Safety Requirement: 
The failure mode “EHR retrieved 
later than intended” shall be 
prevented or mitigated.
C_Service_W_Hz_SSRs
Service Safety Requirement: 
The failure mode “inaccurate 
records retrieved” shall be 
prevented or mitigated.
C_Service_N_SLA
SLA 1
C_Service_I_SLA
SLA 2
C_Service_W_SLA
SLA 3
 
Figure 65: Service Argument for Retrieve Health Record 
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G_Service_N_SLA_Postconditions_Retrieve Health 
Record Argument Module
Use of redundancy through fitting an addition flow to 
provide patient information from another source
is satisfied   
Retrieve Health Record Argument Module
St_SLA_N_Contract
Argument over SLA 
pre-conditions
J
J_SLA_N_Contract
 Argument is satisfied by 
meeting the SLA pre-
conditions allocated to 
participants
G_N_Participant_Ambl- crew
Ambulance crew provide patient name 
and monitoring the status are satisfied
Ambl- crew
G_N_Participant_EHR
EHR provides patient record  and 
update the state are satisfied
EHR
G_N_Participant_EHR backup
EHR backup provides patient record  
and update the state are satisfied
EHR backup
 
Figure 66: SLA contact Argument for Retrieve Health Record 
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G_Participant_H
Ambulance-crew fulfils 
its SLA pre-conditions
C_Participant
Ambulance-crew: 
BPMN Pool
St_Participant
Argument by addressing 
SLA pre-conditions 
allocated to the 
participant 
C_Participant_Precon
Ambulance-crew SLA 
pre-conditions: SoaML 
SLA
G_Participant_FM
No record available is 
mitigated to satisfy the 
allocated DSSRs
C_N_Participant_FMs
Participant failure modes: SFA 
- No record available
- Patient record provided when not 
requested
- Record arrived later than intended
- Incorrect record retrieved
St_N_Participant_Task
s
Argument based on 
identified participant 
failure modes 
G_Participant_FM2
Patient record provided when 
not requested is mitigated to 
satisfy the allocated DSSRs
St_Tasks_Mitg2
Argument based on 
monitoring of 
uncommanded requests
C_Participant_Task_
Mitg2
Monitoring of 
uncommanded 
requests
G_Participant_Task_check2
Monitoring of uncommanded 
requests provides adequate 
mitigation to patient record 
provided when not requested 
J
J_N_Participants_Tasks
A participant is defined as a 
BPMN pool that includes 
tasks and flows
Participants are defined in terms of the 
interactions between internal and external 
tasks (External = 
interactions between BPMN pools; internal 
= interactions between tasks in the same 
pool)
G_Participant_FM3
Record arrived later than 
intended is mitigated to satisfy 
the allocated DSSRs
St_Tasks_Mitg3
Argument based on monitoring 
of time delays and recovery by 
giving more priority for delayed 
requests
C_Participant_Task_Mitg3
Monitoring of time delays 
and recovery by giving more 
priority for delayed 
requests
G_Participant_Task_check3
Monitoring of time delays and recovery 
by giving more priority for delayed 
requests provides adequate mitigation 
to record arrived later than intended 
St_Tasks_Mitg
Argument based on use of 
redundancy in data 
sources for health records
C_Participant_Task_
Mitg
Use of redundancy in 
data sources for 
health records
G_Participant_Task_check
Use of redundancy in data sources 
for health records to provides 
adequate mitigation to No record 
available 
G_Participant_FM4
Incorrect record retrieved is 
mitigated to satisfy the 
allocated DSSRs
St_Tasks_Mitg4
Argument based on data entry 
cross-checking, online 
monitoring and fault 
containment
C_Participant_Task_Mitg4
Data entry cross-checking, 
online monitoring and fault 
containment
G_Participant_Task_check5
Data entry cross-checking, online 
monitoring and fault containment 
provides adequate mitigation to 
incorrect record retrieved 
G_N_Participant
Ambulance crew provide 
patient name and monitoring 
the status are satisfied
C_Participant_Hz_DSSRs_O
mission
DSSR:The failure mode “no 
record available” shall be 
prevented or mitigated.
C_Participant_Hz_DSSRs_Comm
ission
DSSR: The failure mode 
“patient record provided when 
not requested” shall be 
prevented or mitigated.
C_Participant_Hz_DSSRs_Late
DSSR: The failure mode 
“record arrived later than 
intended” shall be prevented 
or mitigated.
C_Participant_Hz_DSSRs_
value
DSSR: The failure mode 
“incorrect record 
retrieved” shall be 
prevented or mitigated.
 
Figure 67: Participant Argument for Retrieve Health Record
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Appendix E. Natural Gas 
Processing Case Study  
SFA 
(1) Measure sweet gas by analyser to confirm water content is less than %1; 
and 
(2) Pump the liquid gas to receive liquid gas. 
 
ID 
(Flow) 
Guide Word Deviation Possible 
Causes 
Effects Justification/Design 
Recommendations 
1.1  Omission (no 
communication 
within the 
flow) 
No output data 
is sent 
Description 
incomplete or 
incorrect input 
Service 
crashed 
Incomplete 
data  
  
Use of redundancy in 
data sources   
  
Omission 
(Incomplete 
flow) 
Part of output 
signal is 
missing 
 
Required 
resource 
missing 
Inconsistent  
water 
content 
Checking integrity of 
data and monitoring 
1.2 Commission 
(Repetition) 
With additional 
output process 
sent. No 
change is 
required. 
False flow 
Execution fault 
(Incorrect 
result) 
 
Conflicting  
request   
received        
Unwanted 
change     
Use of interlock 
mechanism 
 Commission 
(Spurious) 
The 
communication 
is unintended 
Conversation 
fault (Incorrect 
input) (server 
crashed) 
 
Conflicting  
request   
received        
Unwanted 
change     
Use of interlock 
mechanism 
1.3 Early N/A N/A N/A N/A  
1.4 Late Unacceptable 
response time 
to changes in 
demands 
Execution fault 
Time out 
(severe crash 
or 
communication 
failure) 
Late 
detection of 
safety 
events  
Active monitoring of 
timing targets and 
strategies for 
recovery from 
timing-related 
failures through 
analyser 
246 
 
1.5 Value   One 
component of  
output is not 
proportional to 
demand 
Require 
resource 
missing 
Range 
exceeded 
(execution 
fault incorrect 
result- or 
servicer crash) 
False value  
Unknown 
value 
Applying diversity in 
the flow and early 
cross-checking fault 
containment to 
detect and reject 
incorrect value and 
fault containment. 
 
Table 42: Measure sweet gas by analyser to confirm water content is less than %1; 
 
ID Guide Word Deviation Possible 
Causes 
Effects Justification/Design 
Recommendations 
1.1 Omission (no 
communication 
within the 
flow) 
no output 
process is sent 
    
Content fault 
(conflicting 
Content) 
Liquid not 
received 
 
Use of redundancy 
through providing 
other  sources 
 
Omission 
(Incomplete 
flow) 
part of output 
signal   is 
missing 
 
Required 
resource 
missing 
 
Inconsistent  
receiving of 
liquid gas 
Checking and 
monitoring and fault 
containment 
1.2 Commission 
(Repetition) 
With additional 
output process 
sent. No 
change is 
required 
Content fault 
(Redundant 
description) 
Overloading Check high-integrity 
among participants 
to consider 
sufficiency pump  the 
liquid  
 
 Commission 
(Spurious) 
The 
communication 
is unintended 
conversation 
fault (Incorrect 
input)  
Overloading Apply high-integrity 
among participants 
to consider 
sufficiently incorrect 
pump liquid  
1.3 Early N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1.4 Late Unacceptable 
response time 
to change in 
demands 
Execution fault 
Time out 
communication 
failure) 
Delays in 
production  
Active monitoring 
transmitter of timing 
targets and 
strategies for 
recovery from 
timing-related  
failures    
1.5 Value   One 
component of  
output is not 
proportional to 
demand 
Execution fault 
 
Incorrect 
level of  
liquid gas 
Increased 
monitoring + fault 
containment 
Table 43: Pump the liquid gas to receive liquid gas 
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Example of Safety Case for Natural Gas Processing for the Absorb Water Service 
Absorb water (Top) 
 
G_SOA
Gas service system is acceptably 
safe to operate in emergency 
case for sweet gas processing
C_SOA
Gas service system: SoaML Services Architecture 
- Supply natural gases 
- Separate gases 
- Absorb water 
- Heat exchange   
- The Separate gas from liquid  
- Send emergency signal
- Call emergency number
C_SOA_Env
Scope focus in 
emergency case for 
sweet gas processing
St_Top
Argument structured over 
each service of the SOA 
system
G_Service_Hz_Send Emergency Signal 
Argument Module
Send Emergency Signal is acceptably 
safe   
Send Emergency Signal Argument Module
G_Service_Hz_Supply Natural Gases 
Argument Module
Supply Natural Gases is accaptably 
safe
Supply Natural Gases Argument Module
G_Service_Hz_Separate Gases 
Argument Module
Separate Gases is accaptably safe
Separate Gases Argument Module
G_Service_Hz_Absorb Water 
Argument Module_Absorb Argument 
Module
Absorb Water is accaptably safe
Absorb Argument Module
G_Service_Hz_Heat exchange 
Argument Module
Heat Exchange is accaptably safe
Heat exchange Argument Module
G_Service_Hz_The Separate Gas from 
Liquid Argument Module
The Separate Gas from Liquid is accaptable 
safe 
The Separate Gas from Liquid Argument Module
G_Service_HZ_Call Emergency Number 
Argument Module
Call Emergency Number is accaptable 
safe  
Call Emergency Number Argument Module
 
Figure 68: Top Argument Module for Absorb water 
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Absorb water Service 
C_Service_Desc
Absorb water is 
described based in 
SoaML Version1.0.1
St_Service_Hz
Argument structured 
based on identified service 
hazards
C_Service_Hz
Absorb water SHA 
G_Service_N_Hz
Water not removed is 
mitigated
J
J_Service_N_SLA
DSSR are specified as 
SLA post-conditions
G_Service_N_SLA_Postcondit
ions
Active monitoring and cross-
checking are satisfied   
G_Service_W_DSSR
Early address cross-checking by analyser (e.g. 
analyser need to be checked every day)and 
confirmation between removing water and 
measure sweet gas (No direct safety effects) 
are satisfied to the required integrity 
G_Service_I_DSSR
Active monitoring of timing targets and 
strategies for recovery from timing-
related failures bythrough analyser are 
satisfied to the required integrity 
G_Service_N_DSSR
Active monitoring and cross-checking between 
removing water and measure sweet gas 
through the analyser. Also, checking the 
catalyst inside the dehydration drum e.g. needs 
to be replaced every 5 years are satisfied to the 
required integrity 
 G_Service_I_Hz
Water removed later than 
intended is mitigated
G_Service_W_Hz
Inaccurate percentage of 
water removed is 
mitigated
St_Service_N_Hz_Mitg
Argument based active 
monitoring and cross-
checking 
St_Service_I_Hz_Mitg
Argument based on 
monitoring of timing targets 
and strategies for recovery 
St_Service_W_Hz_Mitg
Argument based on 
early address cross-
checking  
C_Service_Hz_N_Mitg
Active monitoring and 
cross-checking 
C_Service_Hz_I_Mitg
Active monitoring of 
timing targets and 
strategies for recovery  
C_Service_Hz_W_Mitg
Early address cross-
checking 
C_Service_N_Class
Severity is very 
high
C_Service_I_Class
Severity is very 
high
C_Service_W_Cla
ss
Severity is low 
St_Service_N_SLA
Argument by enforcing 
DSSR in the SLA
C_Service_N_DSSR
Active monitoring and cross-
checking between removing water 
and measure sweet gas through the 
analyser. Also, checking the catalyst 
inside the dehydration drum e.g. 
needs to be replaced every 5 years.
C_Service_I_DSSR
Active monitoring of timing 
targets and strategies for 
recovery from timing-
related failures bythrough 
analyser
C_Service_W_DSSR
Early address cross-checking by 
analyser (e.g. analyser need to be 
checked every day)and confirmation 
between removing water and 
measure sweet gas (No direct safety 
effects) 
St_Service_I_SLA
Argument by enforcing 
DSSR in the SLA
St_Service_W_SLA
Argument by enforcing 
DSSR in the SLA
J
J_Service_I_SLA
DSSR are specified as 
SLA post-conditions
J
J_Service_W_SLA
DSSR are specified as 
SLA post-conditions
G_Service_I_SLA_Postconditions
Monitoring of timing targets and 
strategies for recovery are 
satisfied   
G_Service_W_SLA_Postcondi
tions
Early address cross-checking 
are satisfied   
Spinal
SLA Contract
SLA of active  monitoring 
and cross-checking
Spinal
SLA Contract2
SLA of Argument based on 
monitoring of timing targets and 
strategies for recovery
Spinal
SLA Contract3
SLA of early address cross-
checking
G_Service_Hz_Absorb Water 
Argument Module
Absorb Water is accaptably 
safe
 
Figure 69: Service Argument for Absorb Water Service 
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SLA Contract 
 
  
Figure 70: SLA contact Argument for Absorb Water Service
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Participant 
G_Participant_H
Dehydration unit fulfils 
its safety requirements
C_Participant_Preco
n
Measure sweet gas 
and monitoring the 
status 
C_Participant
Dehydration unit defined 
based in SoaML 
version1.0.1 and BPMN 
version 2.0.2
St_Participant
Argument by addressing 
SLA preconditions 
allocated to participant  
C_Participant_FMs1
Participant failure modes: SFA  
- part of output signal   is missing
- The communication is unintended
- Unacceptable response time to change in 
demands
- One component of output is not 
proportional to demand
St_Participant_Tasks_Fms_Mitg
2
Argument based on apply high-
integrity among participants to 
consider sufficiently incorrect 
signal     
C_Participant_Hz_Mitg
2
Check high-integrity 
among the processes  to 
consider sufficiently 
incorrect water content
G_Participant_Task_check2
Apply high-integrity among 
participants to consider sufficiently 
incorrect signal to provides 
adequate mitigation of Commission 
C_Participant_Task_FMs_C
auses2
Required resource missing
Service/server incompatible
St_I_Participant_Tasks
Argument based on identified 
service failure mode by dehydration 
unit within monitor water content is 
less than %1 and send signal by 
transmitter  
J
J_I_Participants_Tasks
Participants are defined in terms 
of the interactions between 
BPMN pools and tasks in the 
same pool)
G_Participant_Fms
part of output signal   is 
missing is mitigated
G_Participant_Fms2
The communication is 
unintended is mitigated
C_Participant_Task_FMs_Causes1
Description incomplete or incorrect 
input
Service crashed
G_Participant__Fms3
Late cause is mitigated
C_Participant_Task_FMs_Cause
s3
Unacceptable response time to 
change in demands
St_Participant_Tasks_Fms_Mitg3 
Argument based on Active monitoring 
of timing targets and strategies for 
recovery from timing-related failures 
through analyse
C_Participant_Hz_Mitg3 
Active monitoring of timing 
targets and strategies for 
recovery from timing-
related failures through 
analyser. 
G_Participant_Task_check3 
Active monitoring of timing targets 
and strategies for recovery from 
timing-related failures through 
analyser to provides adequate 
mitigation of late  
St_Participant_Tasks_Fms_M
itg1
Argument based on Checking  
and monitoring APIs function 
and fault containment
C_Participant_Hz_Mitg1
Checking  and 
monitoring APIs function 
and fault containment
G_Participant_Task_check1
Checking  and monitoring APIs 
function and fault containment 
provides adequate mitigation of 
omission
G_Participant_Fms5
Value cause is mitigated
C_Participant_Task_FMs_C
auses5
One component of  output 
is not proportional to 
demand
St_Participant_Tasks_Fms_Mitg5
Argument based on applying 
diversity in the flow and early 
address cross-checking fault 
containment to detect and reject 
incorrect value and fault 
containment.
C_Participant_Hz_Mitg5
Applying diversity in the flow 
and early address cross-checking 
fault containment to detect and 
reject incorrect value and fault 
containment.
G_Participant_Task_check5
Applying diversity in the flow and early 
address cross-checking fault containment 
to detect and reject incorrect value and 
fault containment to provides adequate 
mitigation of value  
G_I_Participant_Participant_Dehydration 
_Dehydration unit_Dehydration 
unit_Dehydration unit_Dehydration unit
Dehydration unit measure sweet gas and 
monitoring the status through timing targets 
and strategies for recovery are satisfied
 
Figure 71: Participant Argument for Absorb Water Service 
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Appendix F. Interviews 
 
INFORMATION SHEET  
PhD PROJECT TITLE:  Service-Oriented Architectures for Safety Critical 
Systems 
INVITATION 
You are being asked to take part in a research study for a PhD project on the 
safety assurance of service-oriented architectures. 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN 
In this study, you will be asked a set of predefined questions and your answers 
will be recorded on paper at the time and written up on electronic media after 
the interview. 
TIME COMMITMENT 
The study typically takes 20 minutes. 
PARTICIPANTS’ RIGHTS 
You may decide to stop being a part of the research study at any time without 
giving an explanation. You have the right to ask that any data you have supplied 
to that point be withdrawn/destroyed.  
You have the right to omit or refuse to answer or respond to any question that 
is asked of you. 
You have the right to have your questions about the procedures answered 
(unless answering these questions would interfere with the study’s outcome). 
If you have any questions as a result of reading this information sheet, you 
should ask the researcher before the study begins. 
BENEFITS AND RISKS 
There are no known benefits for me or risks for you in this study. 
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COST, REIMBURSEMENT AND COMPENSATION 
Your participation in this study is voluntary.  
CONFIDENTIALITY/ANONYMITY 
The data I collect will not contain any personal information about you except 
for you current role and your present and previous experience.  
The results of the interview will be written up as part of my doctoral thesis. 
They may also be published in academic outlets such as journals, conferences 
or academic books. In all cases, the data will only be presented in summary 
form and you will not be directly identifiable in any way. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
Abdulaziz Al-Humam will be glad to answer your questions about this study at 
any time. He may be contacted as follows 
Abdulaziz Al-Humam, aaah501@york.ac.uk  
If you want to find out about the final results of this study, please let me know 
now and I will email you the results upon completion. 
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CONSENT FORM 
PhD PROJECT TITLE:  Service-Oriented Architectures for Safety Critical 
Systems 
Name of Researcher: Abdulaziz Al-Humam 
Supervisors Ibrahim Habli        
                                                                  Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the 
information sheet for the above study. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and 
that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving 
any reason. 
 
3. I understand that any information given by me may be 
used in future reports, articles or presentations by the 
researcher. 
 
4. I understand that my name will not appear in any 
reports, articles or presentations. 
 
5. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
________________________ ________________   ________________ 
Name of Participant Date                     Signature 
_________________________ ________________   ________________ 
Researcher Date                     Signature 
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Date: 
Areas of expertise of the interviewee: 
7- What do you think about the overall approach? 
 
8- Do you think that the modelling approach improve the 
understanding of the system? 
 
a. What aspects in particular did you find useful? 
 
b. What aspects in particular did you find hard to use? 
 
9- Do you think that the safety analysis methods, SHA and SFA, can 
provide a systematic approach to analysing services? 
 
a. What aspects do you think have the potential to improve 
practice? 
 
b. What aspects do you think are infeasible to use? 
 
10- Do you think that the safety case used improve the justification 
for the safety of the service-based system? 
 
a. What aspects do you think have the potential to improve 
practice? 
 
b. What aspects do you think are infeasible to use? 
 
11- Do you think that the modelling, safety analysis and safety case 
artefacts are clearly integrated? 
 
12- Can you provide suggestions for areas that can improve the 
framework? 
 
 Table 44: Interview Questions 
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The presentations of the case studies respectively (Healthcare - Natural 
Gas Processing) 
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Date: 03/09/2015 
Areas of expertise of the interviewee: Chemical engineers in the oil and 
gas industry 
1- What do you think about the overall approach? 
I can say the overall approach can be very useful to be used in service-
based systems.  
2- Do you think that the modelling approach improve the 
understanding of the system? 
Of course, Yes I think it helps making the system structure and behaviour 
related hazards clearer and more visible through following the logical and 
layered approach. 
a. What aspects in particular did you find useful? 
I can say that it could be the system design models, the systematic 
procedure of the analysis and also make it appealing and easy to use. I 
recommend this kind of approach to be utilized.  
b. What aspects in particular did you find hard to use? 
Most likely the way it requires to be configured, the tool and the 
requirements of entering data manually, this area of improvement that 
needs to be look at carefully. Also, the manual part is the most difficult 
that needs to be looked carefully as this can reduce the usability and 
usefulness of the tool. 
3- Do you think that the safety analysis methods, SHA and SFA, can 
provide a systematic approach to analysing services? 
Yes, based on what I have seen,  
Yes, they do help the safety engineers through using this easy to follow up 
steps, clear methodology or process. We can enhance the engineers or the 
process developers to follow and track easy.  
a. What aspects do you think have the potential to improve 
practice? 
I will think the integration modelling safety analysis and safety case can 
help a lot to improve the safety management. This pat need to be looked in 
it carefully to added value to it.  
b. What aspects do you think are infeasible to use? 
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I am not sure that I have not apply the approach extensively 
So, this require more research, development and digging more to finalize 
this infeasible area that cannot be use. 
4- Do you think that the safety case used improve the justification 
for the safety of the service-based system? 
Yes, what we have seen and looked in it  
Yes, using safety case patterns can help a lot to establish more structure 
and logical safety case 
a. What aspects do you think have the potential to improve 
practice? 
Applying what do you call it SHA, SFA and using their result together with 
safety case patterns 
I think can help and improve the practice as well   
b. What aspects do you think are infeasible to use? 
again, Not very sure  
As I have not  had the chance to apply the approach thoroughly and 
extensively 
I think, it require more research to be finalize 
5- Do you think that the modelling, safety analysis and safety case 
artefacts are clearly integrated? 
Yes, what I have seen and looked it,  
I think, Yes, This kind from overall system architecture, it is very clear how 
the aspects are related and integrated 
6- Can you provide suggestions for areas that can improve the 
framework? 
I think it would be better, if you implement and integrate the model –
based weaving approach in the framework. That is added value. 
 
Table 45: Interview Questions and answer one 
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Date: 03/09/2015 
Areas of expertise of the interviewee: Chemical engineers in the oil and 
gas industry and overall in processing requirements  
1- What do you think about the overall approach? 
The overall approach of the system, I can say that is very useful and can 
help be use in any service-based system with oil and gas domain industry. 
The overall of the approach is very great. 
2- Do you think that the modelling approach improve the 
understanding of the system? 
For the demonstration,  I strongly believe that the system structure and 
behaviour related hazards and failure modes in the system.  
So, I believe the system is very clear, friendly to be used and can help a lot 
meeting overall system objective requirements. 
 
a. What aspects in particular did you find useful? 
Typically, for the analysis models and system design models, I think the 
system  procedure of the analysis method make it more applicable and 
easy to be used   
b. What aspects in particular did you find hard to use? 
The system design and analysis is very friendly, handy and can be easily 
understand but I believe that the need for human interface in order to go 
and enter the data manually can somehow, it will not be an accurate data 
and infeasible. This in the only area need to be looked in it  
3- Do you think that the safety analysis methods, SHA and SFA, can 
provide a systematic approach to analysing services? 
Yes, this will help the engineers overall to use the system, the systematic is 
very easy to be followed steps are very clear and handy 
a. What aspects do you think have the potential to improve 
practice? 
For new system, we need to analysis the system and the safety case and 
also the integration model. I believe that will help improve the overall 
system management. This aspect can help improve the practice  
b. What aspects do you think are infeasible to use? 
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To be honest, I start with you from the beginning of the system and I have 
already applied the approaches in one area of processing oil and gas 
industry. I see is very useful but I think I need to dig more in order to get 
the outcome what is an infeasible area. 
4- Do you think that the safety case used improve the justification 
for the safety of the service-based system? 
I strongly believe that the safety case can be used to improve 
Definitely, this will help in establish more structure and logical safety case 
Overall, having  safety case patterns for overall the system will improve 
the justification   
a. What aspects do you think have the potential to improve 
practice? 
Looking as the safety analysis methods Basically, SHA and SFA using their 
result together with safety case. I think this will help improve the  practice 
of the system 
b. What aspects do you think are infeasible to use? 
As I highlighted earlier, it is area of more research and when we dig more 
and more practice. The infeasible will appear and can figure out  
5- Do you think that the modelling, safety analysis and safety case 
artefacts are clearly integrated? 
For sure, it is very clear for the framework that are integrated. 
6- Can you provide suggestions for areas that can improve the 
framework? 
I think, If you can improve and integrated the mode –based weaving 
This is definitely can help to approach the overall framework 
 
Table 46: Interview Questions and answer two 
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Date: 26 August 2015 
Areas of expertise of the interviewee: Senior Safety Engineering 
(Healthcare domain) 
1- What do you think about the overall approach? 
I can see a lot of applications, especially in my domain, healthcare. 
The modelling approach produces a strong basis for the risk assessment 
2- Do you think that the modelling approach improve the 
understanding of the system? 
Focusing on services gives an easier way to manage and visualise the 
systems for non-experts. 
Services provide a clearer way of presenting the system as compared to 
functions. 
a. What aspects in particular did you find useful? 
Producers and consumers and the relation between them (dependencies 
between people and systems). 
Richer than a textual narrative for complex situations. 
Better than more complex models such as state machines. 
b. What aspects in particular did you find hard to use? 
Initial period for training and learning the language (but not for 
engineers). 
Not difficult for engineers because of the limited number of elements to 
model. 
3- Do you think that the safety analysis methods, SHA and SFA, can 
provide a systematic approach to analysing services? 
Yes, especially that they are built on familiar safety techniques.  
a. What aspects do you think have the potential to improve 
practice? 
Not much a new element of re-learning. 
Repeatable. 
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Keeps the relation between the hazards, services and tasks clear. 
b. What aspects do you think are infeasible to use? 
Language control: different people have different styles or use different 
terminology: faults vs failures (hard to trace and map different 
expressions of the same condition) 
4- Do you think that the safety case used improve the justification 
for the safety of the service-based system? 
The modular view provides the right level of abstraction 
The modular view provides value in showing the big picture. 
a. What aspects do you think have the potential to improve 
practice? 
The link between the hazards and causes 
Traceability between the hazards and the evidence 
b. What aspects do you think are infeasible to use? 
Detailed arguments (detailed pattern instantiation). 
People are not trained to do it/perceived to take a lot of time. 
5- Do you think that the modelling, safety analysis and safety case 
artefacts are clearly integrated? 
Yes, without a model you cannot do the analysis. 
I understand how they interrelate from the framework. 
6- Can you provide suggestions for areas that can improve the 
framework? 
Make sure to maintain a thread between the hazards and failures. 
How much enough analysis is enough? How much details are needed? 
When do we stop at the SLA level? (abstract how participants do) 
 
Table 47: Interview Questions and answer three 
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Appendix G. Weaving Model 
A preliminary weaving model, based on the work in (164), shown in Figure 72, 
is used for defining the dependencies, mainly at the metamodel level between, 
on the one hand, the SOA safety argument patterns and, on the other hand the 
SoaML, BPMN, SLAs, SHA and SFA metamodels. This aims at improving 
traceability and allowing the argument pattern instantiation to be 
automatically executed. The instantiation program, developed in (164), runs on 
the Eclipse platform. It identifies the required information from those 
information models (SoaML and BPMN) and performs the instantiation. 
Overall, the tool-support in this thesis offered a means for checking the 
consistency and well-formedness of the models and metamodels defined in the 
SOA safety assurance framework. 
 
Figure 72: Preliminary Weaving Model  
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Appendix H. Abbreviations and 
Acronyms 
SOA   Service-Oriented Architecture 
BPMN  Business Process Management Notation  
SoaML  Service oriented architecture Modeling Language 
AADL   Architecture Analysis and Design Language 
COTS   Commercial Off-The-Shelf  
EHR   Electronic Health Record 
GSN   Goal Structuring Notation 
HAZOP  Hazard and Operability Studies  
HISE   High-Integrity Systems Engineering 
MoD   Ministry of Defence (UK) 
EMR   Electronic Medical Record 
FFA   Functional Failure Analysis 
FHA   Functional Hazard Analysis 
FMEA   Failure Mode Effect Analysis 
FTA   Fault Tree Analysis 
NHS   National Health Service 
OMG   Object Management Group  
SHARD  Software Hazard Analysis and Resolution in Design  
SFA   Service Failure Analysis  
SHA   Service Hazard Analysis  
UML   Unified Modelling Language  
SysML  Systems Modelling Language 
SLA   Service Level Agreement  
NASA   National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
ESA  European Space Agency 
OASIS   Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information 
Standards  
QoS   Quality of Service  
EIA   Enterprise Integration Applications  
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ROI   Return-On-Investment  
TMR   Triple Modular Redundancy  
SDL   Specification and Description Language  
SOMA   Service-Oriented Modelling and Architecture    
SOMF   Service-Oriented Modelling Framework   
BPMI    Business Process Management Initiative   
MA   Markov Analysis   
FPTC   Fault Propagation and Transformation Calculus   
PSSA    Preliminary System Safety Assessment   
ATAM   Architecture Tradeoff Analysis Method   
IEC SC 54A  International Electro-technical Commission subcommittee 54A  
IMA  Integrated Modular Avionics  
SAAM   Software Architectural Analysis Method  
DGR   Dependency-Guarantee Relationships  
IDE  Integrated Development Environment  
BPM   Business Process Management   
SSRs   Service Safety Requirements   
 DSSRs  Derived Service Safety Requirements  
EHR   Electronic Health Record   
CO2  Carbon Dioxide   
H2S   Yydrogen Sulphide   
EG   Ethylene Glycol   
 DEG   Diethylene Glycol   
 TEG   Triethylene Glycol  
 TREG  Tetraethylene Glycol  
SRAM   Safety Report Assessment Manual   
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